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Summary 
 
Traditionally, mainstream models of attention have neglected the role of motivationally 
meaningful stimuli (e.g. threat/reward). These stimuli can cause the rapid and involuntary 
attraction of attention (attentional capture), and can hence be said to have motivational salience. 
It is sometimes considered that this capture occurs in a stimulus-driven manner (versus goal-
driven). I, however, suggest that attentional capture by motivational salience could be caused by 
a goal-driven mechanism. To test this we asked three overarching questions: 
1) Is detecting motivationally salient stimuli considered important?  
By using a novel concurrent forced choice task, which isolates the priority of an  
individual’s explicit search goals, we found that individuals believed that it was advantageous to 
detect and search for motivationally salient stimuli. 
2) Can voluntary search goals induce attentional capture?  
In Chapter 2 we revealed that task-irrelevant threatening stimuli only captured attention, 
versus neutral distractors, when participants were searching for that category of threatening 
stimuli. This goal-driven capture effect was robust yet highly specific, affecting only the single 
specific semantic category, rather than generalising across all related stimuli (Chapter 3). We 
found an identical pattern of results for reward associated stimuli (alcohol in social drinkers) in 
Chapter 4, with capture only occurring in the goal-driven condition. The same was true for 
smoking related images in Chapter 5, and this occurred independently of current nicotine 
dependence. Additionally, self-selected search goals were capable of inducing attentional 
capture, not just instructed goals (Chapter 7). 
3) How are top-down search goals initially selected?  
Chapter 6 revealed that search goal priority was positively predicted by stimulus 
importance and expectancy. This task also revealed a contextual cueing effect on search goal 
priority, whereby threat was prioritised more in a threatening context (versus safe). On the basis 
of my findings we propose a novel Importance-Expectancy model of attentional goal selection.  
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Preface  
 
The thesis conforms to article format with tables and figures embedded in the text. The 
six empirical chapters are preceded by an introduction chapter, and followed by a discussion 
chapter where the findings are summarised. All references for all chapters are presented in 
alphabetical order at the end of the thesis. All papers are written in the style appropriate for the 
journal which they were intended to be submitted to – however, they were all referenced and 
formatted in APA format. When these empirical chapters are referenced across the thesis they 
are cited as they would be had they been published, however the corresponding chapter is also 
referenced. 
 
Chapter 2 – submitted to Emotion  
Chapter 3 – in preparation for submission to Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 
Chapter 4 – in press at Psychopharmacology 
Chapter 5 – under revision at Drug and Alcohol Dependence (with integrated results and 
discussion) 
Chapter 6 – written in the style of submission to Journal of Experimental Psychology: General  
Chapter 7 – written in the style of submission to Emotion 
 
I have been the lead author on all papers regarding empirical work and writing. Dr 
Sophie Forster and Dr Theodora Duka have supervised the empirical work and writing of this 
thesis. Their involvement is reflected in the order of authorship of the empirical chapters, with 
final author representing the principal investigator. Dr Sophie Forster has contributed to the 
writing of the introduction and discussion. Dr Nick Berggren collaborated on Chapters 2 and 3 
assisting with the design of the experiment, participant recruitment, and interpretation of the 
findings.  
Data was collected by Kasheena Paryag for Experiment 2 in Chapter 4 for her 
undergraduate dissertation. The data for Chapter 5 was collected by Zoe Sylvester for her 
undergraduate thesis, Laura Perryman also assisted in data collection in this chapter as a 
research assistant.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Distraction by irrelevant information and objects is an everyday occurrence, we can 
often have the initial intention of focusing on a specific task only for a more interesting or a 
visually salient object to capture our attention. In the current investigation, we refer to 
attentional capture as the involuntary and rapid allocation of attention towards a stimulus. 
Comparatively, attentional bias refers the general influence of a stimulus on attention, either 
altering the allocation of attentional resources towards or away from the stimulus, this is not 
specific to early or purely involuntary attentional processes. 
The focus of the current thesis is attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli. 
This classification refers to stimuli which capture attention purely because of their association 
with an outcome relevant to an individuals’ concerns or goals; if these stimuli did not have an 
association with a valued outcome then their features would not bias attention. Their salience is 
therefore dependent on their features signalling motivational relevance. The motivational 
outcome could be a universal biological need such as avoiding physical harm, or a specific one 
relevant to only some individuals, such as cigarettes in smokers.  
Due to the pervasive nature of distraction, investigation of this topic is essential in order 
to redress the negative consequences of distraction: lapses in attention have been linked to a 
large number of road accidents (Beanland, Fitzharris, Young & Lenne, 2013); individuals 
automatically attend more to threat related stimuli than less anxious individuals (Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2014), and that this may have a causal relationship with elevated 
anxiety levels, thus perpetuating anxious states in these individuals (Van Bockstaele et al., 
2014); additionally, it has been found that individuals who consume more potentially addictive 
drugs, such as tobacco and alcohol, selectively attend more to images of these substances 
(Townsend & Duka 2001; Bradley, Field, Mogg & De Houwer, 2004); and that this may result 
in elevated craving for these substances which could drive further drug use (Field & Cox, 2008; 
Field et al., 2016).  
Traditionally, experimental research which has explored the fundamental mechanism of 
attention has employed stimuli such as simple coloured shapes and letters, which did not contain 
any motivational associations (e.g. Folk, Remington & Johnson, 1992; Theeuwes, 1992). As an 
unintended consequence, attentional capture which occurs due to a stimulus’ associated 
meaning and value is neglected by mainstream models of attention. Many of the most prominent 
theoretical models of the last several decades (e.g. Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Theeuwes, 1994; 
2010; Itti & Koch, 2001; Buschman & Miller, 2007; Parkhurst, Law & Niebur, 2002; Turatto & 
Galfano, 2000; Corbetta & Schulman, 2002) share a dichotomous framework composed of two 
distinct mechanisms; one, a stimulus-driven or bottom-up mechanism in which attention is 
directed towards a stimulus based on its inherent properties such as brightness or contrast. For 
instance, we may attend to our phone because the screen lights up when receiving a message, 
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the sudden change in brightness and colour then catches our eye relative to the background of 
our desk. The other mechanism posited is a goal-driven or top-down mechanism which guides 
attention based on the intentions of the individual, and biases attention towards the features and 
locations of stimuli which are held as a current search goal. In this case, the goal-driven 
mechanism would guide attention to our phone because we would intentionally decide to text a 
friend, we would then retrieve the features associated with a phone from memory (e.g. slim 
black object) and then search for these phone matching features.  
Despite being able to account for attention which is allocated in simple psychological 
tasks, where the main factors are task instructions and stimulus qualities, this dichotomous 
model of attention does not accommodate attention to many real-world objects. These objects 
have associated meaning and value to individuals. For instance, our phone is not defined simply 
by its visual properties or congruence with our current intentions – it has a long history of 
motivationally relevant events associated with it, ranging from anxiously checking online maps 
when we’re lost in an unfamiliar city, to the pleasant experience of receiving a message from a 
friend inviting us to a party. The motivational salience we refer to across this thesis is a general 
term that encompasses several outcomes. These can include emotional/affective content, 
reward/ appetitive or threat/aversive outcomes, positive or negative outcomes, or personally 
relevant stimuli (for reviews see Carretie, 2014; Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George & Wills, 
2016; Pool, Brosch, Delplanque & Sander, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015). It is the aim of the 
current thesis to integrate motivationally salient stimuli into current mainstream models of 
attention. 
Mainstream Models of Attention  
Within the traditional attention literature, there are multiple theories which draw upon 
the idea of attention as competing stimulus-driven and goal-driven mechanisms. For instance, 
the Biased Competition Theory proposed by Desimone and Duncan (1995; see Figure 1) 
suggests that goal-driven (top-down) inputs directly compete for attention with the stimulus-
driven (bottom-up) qualities. The goal-driven mechanism in this model is posited to suppress 
the input of task-irrelevant objects in order to guide attention to currently relevant objects. To 
use the phone example, the goal to focus on our work directly competes with the visual input of 
the phone’s screen in our peripheral vision. The stronger the goal to focus on our work the less 
likely the phone screen is to outcompete the top-down control and distract us from our work. 
The idea of competing dichotomous inputs has been a feature in more recent 
mainstream models of attention as well. However, these models often debate the stage of 
selection that the goal-driven mechanisms influences attention. For instance, Theeuwes’ (2010; 
see Figure 2) model posits that attention is initially captured by the stimulus qualities; the most 
salient feature in the visual field is selected from an initial sweep of visual input within a set 
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spatial location or ‘window’ of attention. It is only after this initial sweep and selection of 
salient features that goal-driven inputs influence attention, by selecting only the salient 
information which is relevant to the current task goals. If the selected input is congruent with 
the current attentional goals of the individual then the features are carried forward for further 
processing; however, if they are irrelevant then individuals suppress these features and select the 
next most salient feature in the environment (Theeuwes, 1991; 1992; 2010; Wolfe, 1994; 
Yantis, 1993; Yantis & Jonides, 1990). For instance, we may be working at our desk, attending 
to our computer screen; however, when our phone lights up the visual features of the phone are 
perceived as the most salient in the visual field and are selected. However, because they are 
inconsistent with the goal to finish work, after this initial capture top-down goals suppress the 
phone’s features. This class of model suggest that a stimulus-driven mechanism captures 
attention early, involuntarily, and dominates attention prior to the modulating influence of an 
individual’s current goals.  
 
Figure 2. A schematic diagram of the Biased competition model of attention (Desimone & Duncan, 1995).  
Figure 1. A schematic diagram of the dichotomous model of attention outlined by Theeuwes (2010). 
Goal-driven attentional control 
mechanisms 
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salience 
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On the other side of the debate are models which suggest that goal-driven input 
influences attention at the earliest stage of stimulus selection. These models posit that 
attentional capture by a stimulus is contingent upon whether the features of a stimulus match 
what an individual is already searching for. The resultant distraction by these stimuli is known 
as contingent capture. Within this contingent capture framework, even bright and colourful 
distractors do not capture attention unless they share the same features which an individual is 
searching for. For instance, it has been found that when an individual is given a goal to search 
for a specific coloured feature, object, or category, any stimulus which matches the features of 
the specified goal capture attention, and that when these same stimuli do not match the features 
of the current goal then these stimuli no longer capture attention (Folk, Remington & Johnson, 
1992; Folk, Leber & Egeth, 2002; 2008; Wyble, Folk & Potter, 2013). Interestingly, the 
contingent capture within these tasks occurred when distractors appeared in a task-irrelevant 
location and participants knew that the distractor was to be ignored. 
This model would suggest that our phone on our desk would only capture our attention 
if we were searching for the features associated with the phone to begin with, and that if we 
were focusing fully on our work then the phone would not capture attention even if it were the 
most salient feature in the environment. However, once an individual prioritised the features of 
their phone and the search goal became active, then the phone would capture attention 
regardless of whether the individual meant to attend to it at that moment.  This theory posits that 
a goal-driven mechanism influences attention early and despite having voluntary origins, can 
result in an involuntary shift of attention to any stimulus feature which is congruent with the 
contents of the search goal. Therefore, stimulus features may not be the primary driver of 
attentional capture, but rather the current goals of the individual.  
In summary, mainstream models of attention generally posit a dichotomous model, but 
differ in regard to the stage at which the goal-driven mechanism influences attention. For 
example, Theeuwes’ (2010) model suggests that goal-driven influences play a role in filtering 
and selecting salient stimuli which have already captured attention; whilst the contingent 
capture model initially proposed by Folk et al. (1992) would suggest that the goal-driven 
mechanism influences attention at the earliest level of stimulus selection. 
Theoretical Integration of Motivationally Salient Stimuli into Models of Attention 
Despite mainstream models of attention often not including the motivational salience of 
the stimuli, there has been a history within the clinical and individual differences literatures of 
investigating how these stimuli affect attention. These investigations have included a large array 
of stimuli associated with reward (e.g. money, erotic images, food, illicit drugs, alcohol, 
tobacco) and threat (e.g. mutilation and death images, fearful or angry faces, dangerous animals; 
for reviews and meta-analyses see: Pool et al., 2016; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Pergamin-Hight, 
Naim, Bakrmans-Kranenburg, van Ijzendoorn & Bar-Haim, 2015; Field & Cox, 2008). Within 
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these tasks, it is found that motivationally salient stimuli capture attention despite being no more 
visually salient than neutral stimuli, yet they exhibit characteristics which some theories of 
attention propose are stimulus-driven (e.g. Theeuwes, 2010).  For instance, attentional capture 
by motivationally salient stimuli has been found to emerge even when distractors are only 
presented very briefly (e.g. ~100ms; Most, Chun Widders & Zald, 2005). This also occurs 
despite instructions to ignore these stimuli and focus on a specific target, thus suggesting an 
involuntary capture independent of the current goals of the individual (e.g. Le Pelley, Pearson, 
Griffiths & Beesley, 2015). This has led some researchers to posit that the attentional capture by 
motivationally salient stimuli can be considered stimulus-driven (e.g., Carretie, 2014; Bishop, 
2007; 2009).  
 
More recently, models of attention have begun to integrate motivationally salient 
stimuli with more traditional models of attention (see Figure 3). These models are based 
predominantly on conditioning experiments, which reveal that once a coloured shape has been 
repeatedly paired with financial reward or an aversive electric shock it captures attention, much 
like conventional motivationally salient stimuli (e.g. faces; Langton, Law, Burton & 
Schweinberger, 2008), despite being no more visually salient than an unconditioned stimulus 
(e.g.  Anderson, Laurent & Yantis, 2011; Schmidt, Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2015). This has led 
to the conclusion that, once a stimulus has become associated with a motivationally salient 
outcome, the stimulus’ features take on an incentive value (Le Pelley et al., 2016; Berridge & 
Robinson, 2016). Similarly, a stimulus’ selection history has been found to capture attention, 
meaning that a feature which was previously a task-relevant target continues to capture attention 
even though it is no longer relevant (Awh et al., 2012). It has been suggested that both value and 
selection history constitute a distinct third mechanism, which is neither goal-driven nor 
stimulus-driven. Despite the third mechanism being characterised as distinct from stimulus-
driven attention, it is thought to influence attention early on prior to the guidance of a goal-
Figure 3. Schematic diagram of the different inputs to a priority map as proposed by the selection history 
framework (based on figure in Awh, Belopolsky & Theeuews, 2012). The priority map refers to the selection 
space which various neural inputs feed into, attention is then directed towards the largest peak of activation from 
the sum of these inputs (Zelinsky & Bisley, 2015). Selection history and value encompasses a range of stimuli 
which are associated with any motivational outcome or was previously task-relevant. 
Priority map  
Current goals 
Selection history 
and learned value 
Physical salience 
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driven mechanism, in a stimulus driven manner (Awh et al., 2012; Munneke, Hoppenbrouwers 
& Theeuwes, 2015). In the current thesis we shall refer to goal-independent attentional capture 
as stimulus-driven in reference to earlier models of attention to emotion (Öhman & Minneka, 
2001; Amaral, Price, Pitkanen, & Carmichael, 1992; LeDoux, 2000). In Chapter 8, however, we 
shall address the relation of our findings to more recent models of attention to motivationally 
salient stimuli, which suggest a third mechanism which drives attentional capture (e.g. Awh et 
al., 2012). 
Potential Goal-Driven Mechanism of Attentional Capture by Motivational Salience 
In the current thesis, we shall propose an alternative to the above accounts: namely, that 
motivationally salient stimuli could actually be integrated into the existing dichotomous model 
of attention as a goal-driven mechanism. Attention to these stimuli is often considered 
involuntary because they contradict the task instructions. However, as mentioned above, the 
contingent capture literature suggests that the current voluntary search goals of the individual 
can drive involuntary attention to task irrelevant stimuli (Folk et al., 1992). Once an individual 
assumes a search goal for an object or category, stimuli which match the features of this search 
goal capture attention regardless of where they appear in the visual field (Folk et al., 2002; 
Eimer, 2015; Wyble et al., 2013). Further, contingent capture research has shown attentional 
capture by goal-congruent stimuli under conditions which are thought to reflect the influence at 
pre-attentive stages, such as when the distractors are masked or presented very briefly (Ansorge, 
Horstmann & Scharlau, 2011) 
Given that a goal-driven mechanism appears to have a substantial involuntary effect 
over attention it could be that an individual’s current attentional goals could play a role in 
distraction. For this to be the case individuals would have to hold long-term search goals for 
motivationally salient stimuli. This is possible, given that it is beneficial to search for these 
stimuli in the environment rather than intentionally focus attention on less motivationally 
relevant goals. It would be unusual for an individual to search for a stimulus which was not 
related to a beneficial outcome at the expense of pursuing goals which could ensure an 
individuals’ safety or personal gain. Participants may therefore want to detect motivationally 
salient stimuli because of their relevance to long-term goals to avoid danger and seek rewarding 
outcomes (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). Within previous investigations, participants 
were often instructed to search for a target stimulus which was less motivationally salient than 
the distractor. It may be that instead of always tuning attention towards the target, participants’ 
own long-term goals to detect motivationally salient stimuli were active during the task and 
competed for the guidance of attention. In the phone example, the reason that we may be 
distracted by our mobile phone is that we may want to talk to our friends, and despite needing to 
do work, we may be periodically more motivated to look at our phone rather than our computer, 
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meaning that the features of the phone capture attention because of their congruence with the 
search goal.  
Previous investigations may not have explored this possibility because of the nature of 
the experimental paradigms used to measure the interference from motivationally salient 
distractors (see Figure 4). Specifically, these tasks may have reduced the ability to distinguish 
between stimulus-driven and goal-driven attention because the motivationally salient distractors 
appeared in a potential target location. These distractors cannot, therefore, be considered truly 
task-irrelevant (Forster, 2013). There is no evidence or theory which suggests that an individual 
can intentionally attend to a location whilst entirely ignoring the features which are present 
there. Further, participants would actually be impeded in completing the task if they attempted 
to inhibit the locations where the target would appear. Hence, any stimuli appearing in relevant 
locations necessarily receive a certain degree of top down priority, and the task aims can only be 
completed by attending to all the locations to find the target. This is, therefore, not evidence of 
attentional capture, which is the initial early allocation of attention to the stimulus, but instead 
disengagement from the distractor after intentionally deploying top-down attention to its 
location.  
Interestingly, it has been found that when a motivationally salient stimulus (e.g. fearful 
face or stimulus associated with an electric shock) does appear in a task-irrelevant location, 
away from where the target could appear, then attentional capture is not always found (Reeck, 
LaBar & Egner, 2012; Notebaert, Crombez, Van Damme, Durnez & Theeuwes, 2013). 
Evidence, therefore, suggests that the spatial location of the distractors in the previous tasks 
may have played a causal role in the involuntary capture by motivationally salient stimuli, and 
that stimulus-driven capture by motivationally salient stimuli may not operate completely 
independently of goal-driven attention. 
More recently, researchers have begun to question the role of top-down goals in 
attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli. Evidence from this recent line of research 
has suggested that top-down attention may be required in order for motivationally salient stimuli 
to capture attention. This evidence comes from tasks where distraction does not occur when the 
motivationally salient features are irrelevant to the current task. For instance, when participants 
are given a competing search goal, such as searching for a specific target shape at the end of a 
trial, then attention is directed towards this shape and away from threat related stimuli presented 
in an intervening dot-probe (Vogt, De Houwer, Crombez & Van Damme, 2013). It, therefore, 
appears that attention to motivationally salient stimuli is not unconditional, as would be 
predicted by a stimulus-driven or goal-independent mechanism.  
Additionally, the attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli appears to be 
modulated by task-relevance. There are multiple investigations which reveal that when the 
motivationally salient content of a stimulus is made task-irrelevant, for instance by instructing 
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participants to categorise emotional stimuli along a nonaffective stimulus dimension (e.g. 
categorising emotional faces as male or female; Stein, Zwickel, Ritter, Kitzmantel & Schneider, 
2009), or by requiring participants to complete a task with only neutral targets, and never 
respond to motivationally salient stimuli (e.g. Vromen, Lipp & Remington, 2016), then the 
affective stimuli no longer capture attention more than matched neutral distractors. Further, 
when the motivationally salient content is then made relevant to the task, by instructing 
participants to categorise the stimulus along affective dimensions (e.g. categorise emotional 
faces as neutral or fearful), or including motivationally salient stimuli as part of the target set, 
then the typical involuntary attentional capture emerges (see also, Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; 
Everaert, Spruyt & De Houwer, 2013; Everaert, Spruyt, Rossi, Pourtois & De Houwer, 2014; 
Lichtenstein et al. 2017; Lichtenstein-Vidne, Henik & Safadi, 2012; Vogt, Koster & De 
Houwer, 2017). A stimulus-driven account would suggest that motivational salience influences 
attention independent of the current goals of the individual, which is not always the case. If 
attentional capture can be blocked by simply instructing participants to direct their attention 
elsewhere or to another goal, then this suggests one of two things: Either top-down goals can 
easily overcome the stimulus-driven effect, in which case stimulus-driven capture may not be as 
pervasive as stated in some models (e.g. Awh et al., 2012; Anderson, 2016). Alternatively, as 
we will argue, top-down goals are the mediating factor which drives involuntary attention to 
these stimuli, and that by occupying the participants with a competing goal, they cannot adopt a 
search goal for the motivationally salient stimuli.  
If it is the case that goal-driven attention has a causal role in attentional capture by 
motivationally salient stimuli, then by manipulating the task-relevance of the motivational 
content, the previous tasks may have increased or decreased the chance that participants would 
adopt a search goal for these stimuli. However, it is not clear from these findings whether the 
involuntary capture was actually caused by top-down search goals. It may be that by reducing 
the relevance of the motivational content, participants were more able to suppress the stimulus-
driven input of the motivational salience; and when the motivational content was more task-
relevant these individuals were unable to inhibit this motivational input. In the previous tasks 
top down goals were neither directly measured nor manipulated, therefore we cannot know 
which interpretation is more likely. Note also that relevance is not universally considered a top-
down feature - some forms of relevance have been suggested to have a stimulus-driven element 
which would not reflect the consequence of a voluntary top-down search goal (see Sui & 
Humphreys, 2015, for review). 
In the current investigation we will, therefore, focus specifically on how individuals’ 
current search goals can result in capture by motivationally salient stimuli. Rather than 
manipulating the relevance of the stimuli by including them in the target set or as part of the 
target identification response, we will explicitly instruct participants to search for a category of 
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motivationally salient stimuli, thereby manipulating exactly what features participants are 
searching for.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing the Goal-Driven Account of Attentional Capture 
If, indeed, attention to motivationally salient stimuli can be integrated into the existing 
models of attention as a goal-driven effect, then the overarching question must be answered: 
“can top-down search goals account for involuntary attentional capture by motivationally salient 
stimuli?”. To break this down further we shall use various methods to answer two specific sub-
questions which must be addressed if a goal-driven account of attention is possible.  
 
Question 1: Do individuals believe that detecting motivationally salient stimuli is 
important? 
Question 2: Can voluntary top-down search goals for motivationally salient stimuli 
induce an involuntary attentional capture to goal-congruent motivationally 
salient stimuli? If so does this extend to self-selected goals? 
Figure 4. Examples of typical experimental tasks used to 
measure interference of motivationally salient content on 
visual attention. Figure 4a. depicts a visual search task 
(taken from Hodsoll, Lavie & Viding, 2014). Within this 
task participants have to identify the face which is the odd-
one-out orientation (i.e. left or right tilt), the non-target 
fearful face in this situation would result in slower target 
detection compared to when all stimuli were neutral faces. 
Figure 4b. depicts the dot-probe (figure taken from Cooper, 
Bailey, Diaper & Munafo, 2011). In this task participants 
are instructed to respond to the location of the dot on the 
screen (left or right) at the end of the trial. Prior to the dot-
probe appearing, an emotional face and a neutral face are 
presented. If attention is allocated to one face over another, 
then participants will be slower to respond to the dot if it 
appears away from that face, and faster to detect it if it 
appears in the same location of that specific face. Figure 4c. 
depicts the affective blink RSVP task (Figure taken from 
Smith, Most, Newsome & Zald, 2006). Within this version 
of the task participants are instructed to identify the 
orientation of the only rotated image in the RSVP stream 
(left or right). Prior to the rotated target image, a distractor 
image is presented which has previously been associated 
with a motivationally salient outcome (e.g. aversive shock). 
Attentional capture is measured by the reduced target 
identification accuracy when it is preceded by the 
motivationally salient distractor versus a neutral distractor. 
There are multiple variations based on these tasks, however, 
the common feature across these tasks is the positioning of 
the stimuli in potential target locations, and the requirement 
that participants have to process the distractor features in 
order to detect the target. 
 
a 
b 
c 
18 
 
 
If answered, these two questions would provide the essential requirements for a goal-
driven account of the phenomenon of involuntary attentional capture by motivationally salient 
stimuli. As well as this basic requirement for the goal-driven account, we intend to elaborate on 
this account, and explore how a goal may initially be set and how this may operate within real-
world contexts. For this reason, we posit a separate question to further explore exactly how a 
goal-driven mechanism may drive attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli. 
 
Question 3: How are top-down search goals initially selected? 
 
Do Individuals Believe that Detecting Motivationally Salient Stimuli is Important? 
It has long been established in the social and motivation literatures that goal-directed behaviour 
is directly influenced by the incentive properties of the outcome, and that in order for a goal to 
be actively pursued individuals must desire the outcome. If a goal is unrewarding then 
individuals will cease to follow it and will instead pursue a competing goal (for reviews see 
Deci & Ryan, 2000; Braver et al., 2014). This line of research has, however, not yet been 
integrated with the cognitive attention literature. we therefore aim to directly test, for the first 
time, whether individuals consider objects which capture attention in cognitive tasks to be 
important to detect and therefore search for. This would be the first necessary requirement if a 
goal-driven mechanism were to plausibly account for attentional capture by motivationally 
salient stimuli. 
In order to determine whether individuals did, indeed, believe that motivationally 
salient stimuli were important to detect, we created a novel paradigm named the Concurrent 
Attentional Goal Task (CAGT). In this task participants were presented with a concurrent 
choice between different pairs of neutral and motivationally salient objects. Each object was 
presented in a pair with all other objects, thus forcing participants to select which object they 
believe is more important to detect when both objects are present in a situation. Previously, 
concurrent choice tasks have been used to determine which one of two valued outcomes is 
preferred by an individual (e.g. high calorie food versus computer games, or alcohol versus 
money; Saelens & Epstein, 1996; Murphy & MacKillop, 2006). I, therefore, adapted this forced 
choice nature of the task in order to isolate the importance of detecting different classes of 
motivationally salient stimuli, compared to neutral stimuli. Additionally, priority map models of 
attention propose that multiple neural inputs feed into a single selection space (see Figure 3). 
The different neural inputs compete for selection, and the cumulative input with the largest peak 
of activation is then selected and attended to, whilst other inputs are ignored. The forced choice 
nature of the task mimics this competition between neural inputs, thus the measure of 
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importance in this task could be considered analogous to how selection may work at the neural 
level (Fecteau & Munoz, 2006; Bisley & Goldberg, 2010). 
 Through the multiple paired comparisons, a hierarchy of detection importance can be 
formed, with more important objects rated more highly, and the forced choice nature of the 
concurrent choice task automatically resulting in less important objects being rated as lower on 
this measure. we hypothesised that participants will judge that the motivationally salient stimuli 
(i.e. threatening and rewarding) objects are more important to detect than neutral objects. The 
CAGT also allowed me to explore a secondary question, which was whether personality 
variables associated with attentional captured by threat might predict the importance ratings of 
the motivationally salient objects. we hence measured trait anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) and behavioural activation system score (BAS) which is a 
measure of reward seeking (Carver & White, 1994), using questionnaires, alongside the CAGT 
performance. we predicted that trait anxious individuals would report that threat was more 
important to detect than low trait anxious individuals, and high scorers on the BAS would report 
that detecting reward was more important than low scorers on the BAS.  
Evidence has, however, suggested that individuals believe motivationally salient stimuli 
are emotionally arousing and will respond to approach or avoid them (Austin & Duka, 2010; 
Carver & White, 1994; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2005), this investigation would provide the 
first explicit evidence that individuals believe that these stimuli were important to detect and 
search for (in other words, deserving of attentional priority). For this method we required a large 
sample, therefore the task was conducted using online testing resources.  
Can top-down search goals for motivationally salient stimuli induce an involuntary 
attentional capture by goal-congruent motivationally salient stimuli? If so does this extend 
to self-selected goals? In order for a goal-driven mechanism to account for involuntary capture 
by motivationally salient stimuli, there must be direct evidence that a top-down goal can induce 
capture by a broad range of stimuli which signal motivational outcomes. Previous research has 
found that the relevance of the motivationally salient stimuli to a task seems to modulate 
whether it captures attention (e.g. Lichtenstein-Vidne et al., 2012; Vromen et al., 2016). This is 
consistent with a goal-driven effect, there has thus far been no direct test of whether 
manipulating the current search goal across a task can induce or abolish attentional capture by 
motivationally salient stimuli. We therefore conducted multiple experiments in Chapters 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 to test whether this was possible.  
The task used across these chapters was based upon the paradigm used by Wyble et al. 
(2013) which was a variation of the rapid serial visual presentation task (RSVP; e.g. Folk et al., 
2002). Within the task, participants were presented with a stream of images in the centre of the 
screen and were instructed to search for a specific conceptual category of stimuli within this 
stream. Task-irrelevant distractors which flanked the RSVP stream were presented prior to the 
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target. It was found that when the distractor was from the same category as the current search 
goal, then participants were poorer at identifying the target, compared to when the distractor 
was incongruent with the category currently being searched for. Previous evidence would 
suggest that this was due to the goal-congruent distractors inducing a spatial-temporal 
‘attentional blink’, whereby finite attentional resources are allocated to features which match the 
contents of the search goal, and this caused participants to miss a subsequent target in the briefly 
presented RSVP stream images (Raymond, Shapiro & Arnell, 1992; Folk et al., 2002; LeBlanc, 
Prime & Jolicoeur, 2008). We adapted this paradigm by presenting categories of motivationally 
salient stimuli, along with control neutral category, as distractors. Previous research has found 
that when presented in an RSVP stream, prior to the target, motivationally salient stimuli reduce 
identification of the target independent of the current search goal, versus neutral images, and 
induce a phenomenon known as the ‘affective blink’, whereby the affective or motivational 
content of the images capture attention involuntarily and cause an attentional blink (Most et al., 
2005; McHugo, Olatunji & Zald, 2013). These previous investigations, however, presented the 
distractors in the central stream of stimuli (see Figure 4). As previously stated, the task-relevant 
location of the distractor makes it impossible to disentangle the contributions of goal-driven 
attention and purely stimulus-driven attention to the motivationally salient stimuli. The current 
paradigm, therefore, avoids task-relevance by presenting the distractors in task-irrelevant 
locations, outside of the RSVP stream.  
In order to manipulate the current search goals of the participants, we instructed them to 
search for the same motivationally salient category as the distractor in the central stream, or a 
different category of stimuli incongruent with the motivationally salient distractor category. The 
general hypothesis was that a goal-driven mechanism would predict that the instructed search 
goal for motivationally salient stimuli would induce attentional capture by these motivational 
distractors, and that this capture would be absent when participants were not searching for that 
category of stimuli. Conversely, if the current goals of the individual had no effect upon 
involuntary attention to motivationally salient stimuli, then we would predict that these 
distractors would capture attention across conditions, regardless of whether the contents of the 
current search goal were congruent with the distractor category.  
Due to much of the interpretation being based on a null finding, that is, an absence of 
capture when distractors were goal-incongruent, we computed Bayes factors to facilitate 
interpretation. Bayes factors compare evidence for the experimental hypothesis and the null 
hypothesis by contrasting the recorded difference between conditions to a prior expected effect 
size, this being drawn from previous research comparing similar experimental conditions. This 
analysis provides a value which signifies the magnitude of evidence favouring either the 
experimental or the null hypothesis. Based on this value, we will be able to interpret whether, 
compared to a previously expected effect size, the actual data shows evidence for a difference 
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between conditions, or whether the evidence suggests that there is no difference between 
conditions. This method will allow me to draw more precise conclusions about whether there is 
an absence of interference from motivational distractors in some conditions (Dienes, 2008; 
2011; 2014; 2016). 
In order to test the reliability and generalisability of the goal-driven attentional capture 
by motivationally salient stimuli, we used a range of aversive (threatening) and appetitive 
(rewarding) stimuli, all of which have been found to capture attention in visual attention tasks. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 these distractors included stimuli which have previously been posited to 
constitute an unconditional stimulus-driven attentional capture, these being emotional faces and 
threatening animals (Bradley, Mogg & White, 1999; Mogg, Millar & Bradley, 2000; Eimer & 
Kiss, 2007; Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Peltola, Hietanen, Forssman & Leppanen, 2013; Lipp & 
Derakshan, 2005; Öhman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001; LoBue & DeLoache, 2008). We also 
presented aversive stimuli which have been rated as highly emotionally arousing and depict 
extremely aversive consequences of threat in Chapter 3 (e.g. mutilation), these have also been 
found to capture attention across previous investigations (Vogt, De Houwer, Koster, Van 
Damme & Crombez, 2008; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere & De Houwer, 2004; Mogg, Bradley, 
Miles & Dixon, 2004). Further, in Chapters 3wepresented reward associated distractors which 
had been found to capture attention in previous research – these being alcohol stimuli in social 
drinkers (for review see Field & Cox, 2008; Rooke, Hine & Thorsteinsson, 2008). In Chapter 
4wethen explored whether personal experience and relevance of the appetitive and aversive 
images influenced attentional capture, by comparing the distraction by appetitive and aversive 
smoking cues between nicotine dependent smokers, occasional smokers, and non-smokers.  
As well as exploring whether goal-driven attention can induce an involuntary 
attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli, we sought to test the boundary conditions 
of this goal-driven effect. Prior research has suggested that individuals can adopt a broad 
semantic search goal for a category, and that this can induce contingent capture by distractors 
from this broad category (Wyble et al., 2013). Within Chapter 3,wetherefore, attempted to 
induce goal-driven attentional capture by all threat related stimuli by instructing participants to 
search for all threat as a superordinate category. Evidence from this Chapter provides details 
about the specificity of such a goal-driven mechanism.  
As well as testing whether an instructed search goal could induce involuntary 
attentional capture, as in Chapters 2-5, in Chapter 7wealso investigated whether participants 
self-selected search goals could also induce a similar attentional capture. To this end, we created 
a novel goal-competition task which utilised the competition between two valued goal outcomes 
to force participants to make a choice between them. One of the goals required participants to 
respond to a target which resulted in a rewarding outcome (reward seeking goal), whilst the 
other required participants to respond to a different target which results in avoiding an aversive 
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outcome (threat avoidance goal).We predict that participants who self-report searching for one 
target (e.g. reward related target) more than the other (e.g. threat related target) will be more 
distracted by a task-irrelevant distractor which shares the features of the prioritised goal (e.g. 
reward coloured distractor), compared to individuals who prioritised the competing goal. 
Further, we took the opportunity to explore whether any personality or state 
questionnaire measures predicted self-reported goal preference. If a correlation between these 
measures were found, it could suggest that stimulus specific attentional capture previously 
found in clinical samples (e.g. attentional orienting towards threat in trait anxious participants; 
Bar-Haim et al., 2007) could be mediated by deliberate goal selection, rather than a stimulus-
driven mechanism (e.g. Bishop, 2009). 
How are Top-Down Search Goals Initially Selected? Top-down goals have typically 
been operationalised in the attention literature as the instructed goal of an experimental task. 
Across Chapters 2 – 5,weinvestigated the effect of an instructed search goal on involuntary 
attention to motivationally salient stimuli. However, in daily life, it seems likely that only a 
minority of attentional goals are selected in response to explicit external instructions (e.g. we 
may look for our phone when we are asked: ‘can I borrow your phone, please?’). Instead it 
appears likely that individuals often freely select their own goals based (at least in part) on 
motivational factors such as their current desires and needs. For example, if we haven’t spoken 
to friend for a while we may want to communicate with them and want to call them on the 
phone – the goal would be to talk to our friend and the phone becomes the associated target of 
this goal. Surprisingly, there has never been any work which has investigated how top-down 
attentional goals are selected over other competing goals in real-world settings. I, therefore, 
aimed to investigate what factors influenced the selection of one search goal over another, and 
aimed to contextualise these factors by relating them to imagined real-world settings.   
Specifically, we drew upon social models of goal-directed behaviour and motivation, 
which have investigated the different factors which determine goal-setting. Within this 
literature, a two factor Importance-Expectancy model has been used to account for whether an 
individual pursues or neglects a goal; whereby the activation of a goal is determined by both the 
expectancy of a beneficial outcome from pursuing the goal, and the importance of the outcome 
to the individual (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger & Sears, 1944; Gollwitzer, 1990; Locke & Latham, 
2002; 2006). I, therefore, applied this model of human behaviour to current attentional search 
goal selection, in order to determine whether participants reported that the prioritisation of a 
search goal was positively related to an increase in perceived importance of a goal outcome, as 
well as an increase in expectancy of this outcome. These factors were measured using a 
modified version of the CAGT, in which as well as measuring detection importance, hierarchies 
of expectancy of an object appearing and the priority of a current search goal were also 
measured through the forced choice task. 
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The results of experiments in Chapters 2 – 5 consistently revealed that the goal-driven 
mechanism of attentional capture may in fact be specific to the category which was searched 
for, at the cost of attention to other motivationally salient stimuli. Unless there was a specific 
mechanism which would allow for accurate prioritisation of an appropriate search goal in a real-
world setting, individuals could potentially miss important stimuli in the environment. 
In Chapter 6,wepropose that a context dependent search mechanism, in which 
participants learn what specific category to search for based on previous experience within a 
context, would allow individuals to search for the most likely motivationally salient object 
within a specific setting, whilst minimising the cost of missing less likely objects. Therefore, in 
order to determine whether this contextual cueing mechanism was compatible with the 
Importance-Expectancy model, we tested the model in two imagined contexts. One of these was 
a threat associated context (dark alley) and another a safe context (work office). It was expected 
that the threat associated stimuli would be most prioritised as a goal in the threat associated 
context, and that these same stimuli would be prioritised less in the safe context. Further, we 
explored how this contextual cueing effect may influence importance and expectancy. we were 
also interested in how individual differences in trait anxiety and reward seeking may influence 
self-reported search goal prioritisation across contexts, and whether these personality 
differences influenced search goal priority through importance or expectancy. Due to the need 
to measure individual differences we collected a large sample from an online testing resource. 
Based on the answers to these three overarching questions, we will integrate the results 
into a novel framework of goal-driven attention. This framework will account for how 
attentional goals are selected, and how these goals may lead to involuntary attentional capture 
across multiple motivationally salient stimuli. 
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Abstract 
Attention has long been characterised within prominent models as reflecting a competition 
between goal-driven and stimulus-driven processes.  It remains unclear, however, how 
involuntary attentional capture by motivationally salient (e.g. threatening or rewarding) stimuli 
fit into such models.  While such effects were traditionally held to reflect stimulus-driven 
processes, the phenomenon of ‘contingent capture’ highlights that top-down goals can not only 
guide voluntary attention, but also paradoxically lead to involuntary attentional capture by goal-
congruent yet task-irrelevant stimuli.  Here we test an alternative account of involuntary 
attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli, in terms of goal-driven rather than 
stimulus-driven prioritisation processes.  To this end we combined the classic ‘contingent 
capture’ and ‘affective blink’ paradigms in an RSVP task with either positive or threatening 
target search goals.  Across five experiments, task-irrelevant positive and threat distractors were 
presented in peripheral, parafoveal, and central locations.  Across all distractor locations, we 
found that attentional capture by irrelevant threatening distractors was contingent upon the 
adoption of a search goal for a threatening category – adopting a goal for a positive category 
conversely led to capture only by positive stimuli.  My findings provide the first direct 
experimental demonstration that involuntary capture by irrelevant motivationally salient stimuli 
can be induced by voluntary goals, and hence support a top-down account of this phenomenon. 
we discuss the application of these findings to real-world contexts, as well as implications for 
cognitive models of clinical disorders.   
 
 
In daily life, selective attention allows us to make sense of an otherwise overwhelming 
volume of perceptual input – prioritising the processing of stimuli that are in some way flagged 
as important (e.g. the words on a computer screen, or a voice over a phone), over stimuli that 
may have less importance (e.g. email pop-ups, a colleague passing by, or the tactile sensation of 
sitting in a chair).  Some stimuli are selected intentionally, in line with our current goals (e.g. a 
person might prioritise words on a computer screen due to a goal to write a research paper).  
Other stimuli, however, are selected in an involuntary manner – for example, while focusing on 
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our research paper we might nevertheless find our attention captured by a stimulus with high 
perceptual salience (e.g. a flickering light).  Prominent models of attention account well for the 
above examples within frameworks involving two key drivers of attention: a goal-driven 
‘endogenous’ mechanism which directs attention in a strategic top-down manner, and a 
stimulus-driven ‘exogenous’ mechanism which directs attention in an involuntary manner to 
perceptually salient stimuli (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Theeuwes, 1994; 2010; Itti & Koch, 
2001; Buschman & Miller, 2007; Parkhurst, Law & Niebur, 2002; Turatto & Galfano, 2000).  
However, in daily life, stimuli may also catch our attention involuntarily, not due to low-level 
perceptual salience, but rather due to motivational salience – for example, being associated with 
a potential threat (e.g. a spider on the office wall) or reward (e.g. a chocolate bar on the desk; 
Cunningham & Brosch, 2012).  It is not readily apparent how this form of attentional capture by 
motivationally salient stimuli can be accommodated within a goal-driven and stimulus-driven 
dichotomy, which is seen in many mainstream models of attention – indeed, this problem has 
led to calls for theoretical revisions involving a third driver of attention (Awh, Belopolsky & 
Theeuwes, 2012; Anderson, 2015; Klink, Jentgens & Lorteije, 2014).   
The omission of motivationally salient stimuli from mainstream models of selective 
attention may have arisen, in part, due to the experimental paradigms which shaped these 
theories involving simple, affectively neutral stimuli such as basic geometric shapes or letters 
(e.g. Theeuwes, 1992; Yantis, 1993; Folk, Johnson & Remington, 1992).  Such situations limit 
the likely influences on attention to two factors: the task instructions influencing goal-driven 
attention, and the perceptual stimulus-driven salience of the components of the stimulus display.  
This however does not fully represent the complexity of the real-world environment, in which 
stimuli often have rich semantic and affective associations and are predictive of meaningful 
outcomes.  On the other hand, over the last several decades a rich literature has amassed 
regarding the study of attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli.  Much of this 
research was conducted within the context of specific sub-disciplines such as on attentional 
biases towards drugs and threat in addiction or anxiety (e.g., Robinson & Berridge, 1993; 1998; 
Franken, Booij & van den Brink, 2005; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Yiend, 2010; Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014), although more recent work has begun to investigate 
motivationally salient stimuli within the framework of mainstream selective attention (Schmidt, 
Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2015; Notebaert, Crombez, Van Damme, De Houwer & Theeuwes, 
2011; Anderson, Laurent & Yantis, 2011; Anderson, 2013; 2015; Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea 
& Della Libera, 2013; Hickey, Chelazzi & Theeuwes, 2010).  Based on this, there is 
considerable empirical evidence to suggest that motivationally salient stimuli can capture 
attention in a seemingly involuntary manner (e.g. see Carratie, 2014; Cisler & Koster, 2010; 
Anderson, 2013; 2016; Compton, 2003 for reviews).   
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Within the framework of the goal-driven/stimulus-driven dichotomy, involuntary 
selection of motivationally salient stimuli might initially be presumed to be stimulus-driven due 
to the apparent ability of stimulus-content to override task goals.  Indeed, the stimulus-driven 
view of attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli has traditionally been the prevalent 
interpretation of these effects within the relevant literatures (Le Doux, 1995; 1998; Öhman, 
1992; Carretie, 2014).  Influential theories of attention in addiction and anxiety have suggested 
that the attentional capture by these stimuli is due to their learnt salience increasing bottom-up 
perceptual input; with addicted and highly anxious individuals being more sensitive to certain 
categories of stimulus-specific salience (Robinson & Berridge, 1993; 1998; Field & Cox, 2008; 
Wiers & Stacy, 2006; Bishop, 2007; 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 2016).   
It is important to note, however, that involuntary attentional capture is not exclusively 
driven by a stimulus-driven mechanism.  In fact, while it may appear paradoxical, there is 
considerable evidence that involuntary attentional capture can in fact occur as an unintended 
consequence of voluntary goal-driven attention (Folk et al., 1992; Folk, Leber & Egeth, 2002; 
2008; LeBlanc & Jolicoer, 2005).  Compelling evidence from the ‘contingent capture’ literature 
suggests that when goal-driven attention is directed to a particular type of stimulus (e.g. a 
particular colour, shape, or even semantic category), any stimulus which matches the features 
which are currently being searched for may capture attention, even if they are in some way 
known to be irrelevant to the task (e.g. being presented in a task-irrelevant location).  For 
example, when instructed to search for a letter of a particular colour in an RSVP stream of other 
coloured letters, an irrelevant peripherally presented distractor, which shares the target colour, 
captures attention and results in participants being unable to identify a subsequently presented 
search target (i.e. producing an attentional blink; Raymond, Shapiro & Arnell, 1992).  
Importantly, equally salient coloured distractors which do not share the specified target colour 
do not capture attention.  In other words, participants searching for a green letter are typically 
distracted by peripheral green distractors but not red distractors, while participants searching for 
a red letter are distracted by red but not green distractors (Folk et al., 2002; 2008; Leblanc & 
Jolicoer, 2005).   
 The phenomenon of ‘contingent capture’ has even been found to occur under conditions 
which are typically considered indicative of stimulus-driven capture, such as brief or subliminal 
presentations (Ansorge, Horstmann & Scharlau, 2011; Chen & Mordkoff, 2007).  More recently 
it has been found to extend beyond low-level visual features to broadly defined goals, such as a 
conceptual category (e.g. stationary or cars, Wyble, Folk & Potter, 2013; Reeder, van Zoest & 
Peelen, 2015).  Critically, contingent capture occurs involuntarily, even though participants 
know that the stimulus is irrelevant to their current task goals (e.g. because it is presented in an 
irrelevant location, in which the relevant task stimuli never appear).  This has an important 
implication for accommodating motivationally salient stimuli within mainstream models of 
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selective attention: The involuntary nature of capture by motivationally salient stimuli does not 
necessarily imply a stimulus-driven mechanism.  Rather, the contingent capture literature 
implies that such involuntary capture might instead emerge as a consequence of any top-down 
goals to attend to motivationally salient stimuli. 
It is intuitively plausible that individuals might commonly adopt top-down goals which 
prioritise motivationally salient stimuli.  Such goals are often adaptive, allowing individuals to 
flexibly maximise rewarding outcomes and avoid potentially harmful ones.  Indeed, within 
current theories of motivation, there is a consensus that goal-driven behaviour is determined by 
the magnitude of a rewarding or aversive outcome and expected probability that the outcome 
will occur in a given situation (for review see Braver et al., 2014).  Due to their association with 
important potential outcomes, it is logical that individuals would tune their attention system 
towards these stimuli in order to allow them to respond quickly towards them (Cunningham & 
Brosch, 2012).  It is hence interesting to consider the possibility that some previous 
experimental demonstrations of attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli might, in 
fact, be contingent upon pre-existing goals held by the participants which may be active during 
the experimental task. We will discuss this possibility in detail in the General Discussion.   
For now, we note that recent studies of attentional capture involving motivationally 
salient stimuli (particularly threat stimuli) suggest that such capture effects are not 
unconditional, as might be expected from a strong stimulus-driven account.  Rather, evidence 
increasingly points to a critical modulatory role of task relevance (Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; 
Everaert, Spruyt & De Houwer, 2013; Everaert, Spruyt, Rossi, Pourtois & De Houwer, 2014; 
Stein, Zwickel, Ritter, Kitzmantel & Schneider, 2009; Vogt, De Houwer, Crombez, & Van 
Damme, 2013; Lichtenstein-Vidne, Henik & Safadi, 2012; Lichtenstein et al. 2017).  For 
example, Stein et al (2009) examined the degree to which the emotional expressions of face 
search targets would heighten the attentional blink (AB) effect (i.e. impeding detection of a 
second target).  Fearful versus neutral targets only produced heightened AB when the target 
response involved classifying the emotion of the face – when the response was non-emotional 
(male versus female) the same stimuli showed no difference in the AB effect for fearful versus 
neutral targets.  Such findings appear consistent with the notion of a goal-driven mechanism, 
which would prioritise stimuli with greater relevance to the current task goals.  However, we 
note that certain manipulations of relevance have also been argued to affect stimulus-driven 
mechanisms (see Sui & Humphreys, 2015 for review) and many demonstrated effects of 
relevance might be alternatively accounted for by proposals that the previous ‘selection history’ 
of a stimulus captures attention independently of current goals (Awh et al., 2012). 
Manipulations of relevance are also rather indirect manipulations of goal-driven attention.  For 
example, Stein and colleagues’ manipulation of response settings only indirectly manipulates 
goal driven selection, as participants could conceivably have simply adopted a goal to select 
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faces across all conditions and activated the response set post-selection. Other studies have 
manipulated the motivational salience of search targets (e.g. Lichtenstein-Vidne et al., 2012), 
but within contexts in which motivational salience was irrelevant to the target selection criteria 
and the instructed task goals were identical across conditions.  
A direct test of whether goal-driven mechanisms can play a causal role in involuntary 
attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli must meet the following conditions.  First, 
goal-driven attentional settings must be manipulated directly by changing the criteria for 
selection (e.g. the search goal), such that a task can only be completed by adopting this goal.  
Second, attentional capture can only be assumed to be entirely involuntary if the task does not 
require any voluntary allocation of attention to the capturing stimulus.  Any demonstrations of 
attentional capture by a stimulus which participants are asked to search for (i.e. a search target), 
or to a stimulus presented in a potential target location (which necessarily requires some 
allocation of attention, cf. Forster, 2013), could potentially reflect goal-driven enhancement of 
voluntary rather than involuntary attentional processes.  To my knowledge no prior study meets 
both of these criteria.   
 In order to directly test the goal-driven hypothesis we therefore designed a task that 
would allow us to experimentally manipulate the goal-driven mechanism and measure the effect 
of this manipulation on involuntary attentional capture by entirely task-irrelevant motivationally 
salient stimuli.  To this end, we fused a contingent capture paradigm from selective attention 
literature (e.g. Folk et al., 2002; 2008; Wyble, 2013) with the classic affective blink paradigm 
from anxiety and emotion literatures (e.g. Most, Chun, Widders & Zald, 2005; Smith, Most, 
Newsome & Zald, 2006; Piech, Pastorino & Zald, 2010; de Oca, Villa, Cervantes & Welbourne, 
2012; Failing & Theeuwes, 2015; see McHugo, Olatunji & Zald, 2013 for review).  
Specifically, participants were instructed to search for a target stimulus defined by its affective 
category (e.g. positive or threatening), in a central RSVP stream while ignoring peripherally 
presented distractor images which were either positive, threatening, or neutral.  The 
motivationally salient targets and distractors consisted of stimuli that have been widely used in 
the affective attentional capture literature - animals and faces (e.g. Lipp & Derakshan, 2005; 
Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002; Öhman, 2005; LoBue & Rakison, 2013).  Any purely stimulus-
driven attentional capture by these motivationally salient stimuli should occur irrespective of 
task goals.  Conversely, goal-driven attentional capture would occur only when the stimuli are 
congruent with what participants are searching for.   
Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants.  Twenty participants were initially recruited, though one participant was 
excluded prior to analysis for accuracy being 3 SDs below the group mean (16 female, 3 male; 
Age: M = 22.37, SD = 3).  The sample size was derived from study 2 of Wyble et al.  (2013) 
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which found highly significant contingent capture.  The mean accuracy, prior to data 
transformation for significant skewness, was 54.79% (SD = 11.3%).   
Given the well-established correlation of anxiety with attentional capture by threat, we 
measured both state and trait anxiety in order to compare sample characteristics across previous 
research and the current experiments (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).  Participants’ state and trait 
anxiety were in line with the expected range given participants’ age (norms: M  = 36, SD = 10; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983), state: M = 32.95, SD = 13.16; trait: M = 
36.95, SD = 10.48.  Participants were remunerated with course credits or a small cash payment.   
Stimuli.  The neutral animal stimuli were a range of animal images sourced from 
Google images.  In total, 391 images of individual animals, without any other salient objects in 
the scene, were initially selected.  The images were all resized to 300×200 pixels and all writing 
was removed.  These images were rated in a pilot study by 36 participants using a ten-point 
Likert scale measuring how threatening, cute, positive and negative they were.  To select the 
most neutral animals, a composite affect score was created by averaging these four scales 
together.  280 images which were rated lowest on this measure were selected for neutral stimuli 
(Affect score: M = 3.23, SD = .46, highest score = 4.01; highest positive score = 6.31; highest 
cute score = 6.83; highest negative score = 4.08; highest threat score = 3.58).  From these 280 
images we removed images which contained features which could be mistaken for part of the 
target set.  For instance, many images of elephants, walruses, and water buffalo were removed 
because their horns and tusks could be mistaken for bared teeth.  Additionally, we removed one 
image of a bear because the animal was semantically related to the threat category despite the 
specific exemplar being neutral, as well as some images of tropical fish and exotic birds because 
their colours were highly salient.  These images were replaced by 35 images of animals which 
were similar to those ranked in the lowest 150 images on overall affect (e.g. fish, birds, farm 
animals).  Overall, the neutral animals were rated as moderately positive and cute, importantly, 
all images were rated low on negative and threat scores which was the main focus of the current 
investigation. 
The threatening and cute animal images were partly selected from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS), but in order to provide a greater number of distinct 
threatening and cute animal images (reducing potential habituation effects) the IAPS images 
were supplemented with images from Google images. These latter images were selected based 
on their similarity to cute and threatening animals in the IAPS database (Lang, Bradley & 
Cuthbert, 2005) - cute animals were usually pets or infant animals, whilst the threatening 
animals were either predators in attack positions or snakes and spiders.  Based on these criteria 
we collected twelve target images and twelve different distractor images for the cute and 
threatening animal categories.  The 24 images used in the threatening animal category (12 
targets and 12 distractors) consisted of six different animals: spiders, lions, tigers, snakes, 
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sharks, and crocodiles.  For the cute category targets and distractors were comprised of six 
different cute animals: kittens, puppies, pandas, red pandas, ducklings, and rabbits.  Again, 
twelve images appeared as targets and twelve different images as distractors.  For both cute and 
threatening categories, all six types of animals appeared as both targets and distractors, but not 
the individual images.  To validate the images, arousal and valence ratings were collected again 
from participants in Experiments 3, 4, and 5 (see Table 2) which confirmed that these images 
were considered to have negative valence and be highly arousing.  All unlicensed images and 
their ratings are available online via the Open Science Framework (link: osf.io/mr5yk). 
The images were presented using E-prime 2.0 on a Dell OptiPlex 780 PC, displayed on 
a 16inch monitor with a screen resolution of 800×600.  The experiment was conducted in a 
dimly lit room.  Participants viewed the screen from 59cm away, this distance was kept constant 
by using a chin rest.  All images in the central RSVP stream measured 6°×4.02°.  The 
distractors measured, 8.09°×5.35°, these were larger relative to the central target due to visual 
acuity being poorer at peripheral locations.  The distractors were presented above and below the 
central RSVP stream with a gap of .5° separation from the target.  Trials were controlled so the 
specific animal presented as a distractor was never the same as the target animal. 
Procedure. See Figure 5 for an example trial sequence in the experimental paradigm.  
Participants were given the following instructions at the start of the task: “You will be shown 
several images of animals in quick succession. You must look out for either a 'cute' (e.g. baby or 
pet) or 'threatening' animal (e.g. predator or poisonous). You will be instructed which type of 
animal you are looking for before each trial. At the end of each trial you must write out the 
name of the cute/threatening animal using the keyboard. The target image will always appear in 
the centre of the screen. Occasionally two other images will appear at the top and bottom of the 
screen, you must ignore these images.”.  Search goal reminders were also presented at the 
beginning of each trial in order to ensure goal maintenance.  The cute or threatening target 
stimulus was presented in a nine frame RSVP stream consisting of eight other neutral animal 
stimuli which were randomly selected from the total pool of neutral stimuli.  Each stimulus 
frame was presented for 100ms with no inter-stimulus interval.  The target stimulus appeared at 
positions five, six, seven, or eight in the RSVP stream an equal number of times within each 
block, and was counterbalanced across conditions.  The peripheral distractor stimulus was 
consistently presented two slides prior to the target at Lag 2, and this was the only distractor-
target relationship.  These peripheral distractors were two images presented above and below 
the central stimulus position.  The distractor was presented at Lag 2 because the current thesis 
focused on involuntary attentional capture, rather than later differences in attentional 
disengagement. The attentional blink produced by Lag 2 distractors reflects the earliest onset of 
attentional capture, and would therefore not reflect differences in disengagement that would 
occur at later lags (cf. McHugo et al., 2013). One of these stimuli was always a neutral animal 
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stimulus which was randomly selected from the pool of neutral animal images.  The other 
distractor stimulus could either be a threatening animal, cute animal, or another neutral animal.  
Within each condition the distractor image appeared an equal number of times above and below 
the central stream.  At the end of each trial, the participant typed out the animal they identified 
as the cute or threatening target using the keyboard and pressed the ‘Enter’.  The dependent 
variable was the percentage of trials that participants accurately reported the correct cute or 
threatening animal which had been presented.   
  
Figure 5: Structure of a single RSVP trial and example stimuli from across 5 Experiments; 9 images were 
presented per trial for either 83 (in Experiment 5) or 100ms (in Experiments 1-4) per image with no inter-
stimulus interval. Examples of the instruction frame depict how the search instructions were presented in 
Experiments 1-4, Experiment 5 differed by instructing participants to search for happy and scared faces. 
The distractor and target frame examples depict the categories of images which appeared as stimuli, as 
well as the location of the distractor in each task, as symbolised by dashed lines. In Experiments 1-4, 
threatening and cute animal targets were presented, whilst in Experiment 5 happy and fearful face targets 
were presented. At the end of the trial participants were either required to type out what the specific 
animal target had been (Experiments 1-4), or whether the motivationally salient target had been present or 
absent from the RSVP stream (Experiment 5). 
 
Before the main task, participants completed an eight-trial practice block with four cute 
targets and four threat targets (the specific images used in these practice trials were different 
from the set used in the main experiment).  For the main task, participants completed six blocks 
of 36 trials each, with a period of rest every two blocks, the duration of which was determined 
by the participant.  The search condition blocks were presented in an alternating format (e.g. 
cute-threat-cute-threat-cute-threat).  The block order was counterbalanced between participants, 
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with half the participants completing a threat search block first.  When blocks were not 
separated by a rest period, a text warning was presented for 3000ms alerting the participant that 
the search goal had changed.  Other than search goal, which was manipulated between blocks, 
all within participant factors were fully counterbalanced within each block.   
Scoring. The percentage of correctly identified animals was recorded as the outcome 
measure for analysis.  In order to objectively score this measure, an excel formula was applied 
which marked a trial as correct when the spelling of the target animal matched the spelling of 
the response.  To make sure that the responses were readable for this formula they were coded 
prior to the analyses.  During the coding process the experimenter was blind to both the 
distractor conditions and the correct answers.  Incorrectly spelt answers were corrected to the 
most similar animal included in the set of images1.  Animals judged to be subordinate to the 
potential target animal were changed to the superordinate animal (e.g. black widow was 
changed to spider).  A superordinate category answer was marked to the closest subordinate 
target, but only if there was only one possible animal within that category which it could be 
(e.g. ‘reptile’ could be either a crocodile or snake, so was left incorrect; but ‘insect’ was 
changed to spider).  Additionally, if a participant wrote the mature version of the infant target 
animal it was changed to the correct version (e.g. dog was changed to puppy).  To remain 
consistent across answers, changes were made universally to all answers made by a single 
participant, meaning that once a change was made to an answer it was also made for all identical 
answers that individual participant had made.  Scoring rules were developed prior to 
Experiment 1 based on the pattern of responses from a pilot experiment.   
Analytic strategy. Data from experiments 1, 2 and 4 were significantly skewed 
(skewness ratio > 1.96) therefore an arcsine transformation was applied to the data.  All 
statistics were performed upon the arcsine transformed data.  For ease of interpretation, graphs 
are presented with untransformed data. Note, the results remained unchanged with respect to 
patterns and significance when untransformed data were analysed.  Analyses were performed 
using SPSS and R-studio for Bayesian analyses (R-studio team, 2015). 
 To supplement the main analysis, we computed a Bayes factor in order to determine 
whether any null effects were due to insensitivity or a true null effect.  A Bayes factor compares 
evidence for the experimental hypothesis (motivationally salient stimuli will result in greater 
attentional capture) and the null hypothesis (motivationally salient stimuli will not result in 
attentional capture).  The Bayes factor ranges from 0 to infinity, values less than 1 indicate that 
there is support for the null hypothesis, whilst values of greater than 1 indicate that there is 
                                                             
1 Some participants answered “chick” to the “duckling” target.  This was accepted as correct due to the 
two animals being highly visually similar, and there being no chicks amongst the stimulus set, thus 
meaning that it was not mistaken for another target image.  Additionally, “fox” was accepted as “red 
panda” for the same reasons.  These changes were applied universally to all the participant’s responses 
whilst the experimenter was blind to any of the correct target animals and conditions. 
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support for the experimental hypothesis.  The strength of this evidence is indicated by the 
magnitude of the Bayes Factor; values greater than three or less than .33 indicate substantial 
evidence for either the experimental or null hypothesis.  A value closer to 1 suggests that any 
nonsignificant result may be due to insensitivity and any difference is ‘anecdotal’ (Jeffrey, 
1961; Dienes, 2008; 2011; 2014; 2016). 
The Bayes factor was computed using a modified version of Baguley and Kaye’s (2010) 
R code (retrieved from Dienes, 2008).  To compute the factor, we used a half-normal 
distribution which estimates that smaller differences are more probable than large difference.  
The mean of this distribution was set to zero, which reflects a null hypothesis of zero difference. 
we used a half-normal distribution due to the previous evidence in the literature that the effect 
would be directional; specifically, that motivationally salient stimuli would capture attention 
more than neutral stimuli.  The standard deviation of this distribution was set based on the prior 
expected effect size. For Experiment 1 this was a plausible effect size of 15% 2, however, based 
on the new data collected we revised this prior to 13% for subsequent experiments.  All 
Bayesian analyses were performed using arcsine transformed data if a transformation was 
performed.  All direct comparisons between conditions were tested using Bayes factors, 
however, p-values were also computed using two-way paired samples t-tests to facilitate 
comparison to previous results. 
Results and Discussion 
A 2×3 ANOVA with the factors of current search goal (cute/ threatening animal) and 
distractor category (cute/ threatening/ neutral animal) was performed on mean accuracy (Table 
1).  This revealed that there was no significant difference in the accuracy with which 
participants detected cute versus threatening targets, F(1, 18) = 1.60, p = .222, ƞ2p = .08.  There 
was a significant main effect of distractor, F(2, 36) = 7.51, p = .002, ƞ2p = .30, with the cute and 
threatening distractors resulting in significantly lower performance than neutral distractors.   
Importantly, this effect was qualified by a highly significant interaction between target 
and distractor, F(1.69, 30.47) = 16.11, p < .001, ƞ2p = .48 (Huynh-Feldt corrected).  In order to 
plot the interaction more clearly, we created a motivational distractor effect score by subtracting 
the accuracy when the distractor was cute or threatening from the neutral distractor condition, 
both for cute and threat search conditions (see Figure 6).  Performance when the distractor was a 
                                                             
2 The prior used to determine the width of the half-normal distribution was taken from Wyble et al.  
(2013) Experiment 2, due to this being the most methodologically similar to the current design.  This 
yielded a plausible effect size of 15% difference in performance, reflecting the difference between 
distractors that were congruent and incongruent with a current search goal.  Additionally, this is in line 
with the effect size of 14% decrement in accuracy after attentional capture by the threatening stimuli used 
in the original affective blink task (Most et al., 2005 - Experiment 1).  In order to update the prior based 
on relevant information, the largest effect size from Experiment 1 (13%) was used as the prior for all 
subsequent analyses.  Based on our sample size we used an adjusted standard error by applying the 
following equation:  SE*(1 + 20/df*df) (Dienes, 2008; 2011). 
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cute animal was lower when the target was also a cute animal, and a similar pattern was also 
observed for threatening distractors when the target was also threatening.  Thus, participants 
were significantly poorer at identifying the target when the distractor category matched the 
current search goal.   
 
 
Table 1. Mean and Standard error for accuracy across all target and search conditions within Experiment 
1 and 2. Data presented are arcsine transformed to account for significant skewness. 
 
In order to investigate whether there was any evidence of stimulus-driven attentional 
capture by motivationally salient stimuli, we compared target identification accuracy between 
motivationally salient and neutral distractors within each search condition.  As can be seen in 
Figure 6, motivational distractor effects associated with the motivationally salient versus neutral 
distractors were only observed when the distractors shared an affective category with the current 
search goal: cute distractors had significantly lower performance than neutral distractors when 
participants were searching for the cute target, t(18) = 4.98, p < .001, BH(0,15) = 14896.33, and 
threat distractors had significantly lower performance relative to neutral distractors in the threat 
search condition, t(18) = 3.88, p = .001, BH(0,15)  = 224.34.  Strikingly, there was no reduction in 
performance when the motivationally salient stimuli were incongruent with the current search 
goal; cute animal distractors resulted in the same accuracy as neutral distractors in the threat 
search condition, t(18) = .16, p = .876, BH(0,15) = .19.  The same was true of threatening 
distractors in the cute search condition, t(18) = .34, p = .738, BH(0,15) = .19.  Note that the Bayes 
factors for both effects are under one third and hence confirm that the null results reflect an 
absence of attentional capture rather than insensitivity.  Therefore, there was substantial 
evidence that, within the current task, motivationally salient distractors only captured attention 
when they were congruent with current top-down search goals.   
 
 Search goal Distractor  
Mean 
(% accuracy) 
SE 
Experiment 1 
(n = 19) 
Cute search 
Cute animal 52.93 4.11 
Threat animal 64.98 3.84 
Neutral animal 65.68 3.41 
Threat search 
Cute animal 60.67 3.77 
Threat animal 51.18 3.58 
Neutral animal 61.05 3.83 
Experiment 2 
(n = 18) 
Cute search 
Happy face 56.00 3.94 
Fearful face 56.80 4.39 
Neutral face 58.86 4.49 
Threat search 
Happy face 51.27 3.31 
Fearful face 52.70 3.38 
Neutral face 54.07 3.69 
35 
 
 
Figure 6. Motivational distractor effects (% correct neutral distractor - % correct motivationally salient 
distractor) for cute and threatening animal distractors across both cute and threatening animal search 
conditions in Experiment 1. Error bars represent within-subjects standard error.  
 
The results of Experiment 1 provide direct evidence that involuntary attentional capture 
by motivationally salient stimuli can be induced via the adoption of a congruent top-down goal, 
even when they are completely task-irrelevant.  Furthermore, the results demonstrate a striking 
absence of any attentional capture effects from either positive or threatening stimuli when these 
did not share an affective category with the current top-down goal.  The latter absence of goal-
irrelevant attentional capture initially appears to challenge the widely held stimulus-driven view 
of attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli.   
Experiment 2 attempted to replicate the current findings using another well-established 
class of motivationally salient stimuli: emotional faces.   
Experiment 2 
In order to provide a more extensive test of whether stimulus-driven attentional capture 
could be found in the current task, Experiment 2 repeated the design of Experiment 1 using 
fearful and happy face stimuli as distractors.  Fearful face stimuli are one of the most widely 
used stimuli in attention to threat paradigms, and have been found to reliably activate neural 
regions associated with threat processing even at brief presentations (e.g. the amygdala; Bishop, 
200).  Further, attentional capture by emotional faces, especially fearful faces, appears in 
infancy (5 – 7 months old), suggesting it is a rapidly learnt motivationally salient stimulus and 
should be universally captivating across participants (Peltola, Hietanen, Forssman & Leppanen, 
2013). 
Experiment 2 was also designed to further clarify the nature of the goal-driven 
attentional capture effects in Experiment 1, by investigating generalisability.  Contingent 
capture effects have previously been found to extend across visually diverse stimuli belonging 
to a semantic category, such as ‘furniture’ or ‘sports equipment’ (Wyble et al., 2013).  
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Experiment 2 was therefore designed to test whether the contingent capture effects found in 
Experiment 1 might extend beyond the specific stimulus category (e.g. ‘threatening animals’) to 
the broader affective category (e.g. ‘threat’).  If the emotional faces captured attention more 
when they were congruent with the affective category of the search goal (i.e. threatening animal 
search goal - fearful face distractor), this would imply the ability to adopt a broad attentional 
setting for an entire affective category rather than a specific sub class of affective stimuli.  
Methods 
Participants. Twenty participants were initially recruited, though 2 participants were 
excluded prior to analyses for taking an excessively long time to complete the search task (over 
50 minutes, compared to the typical task duration of 20-25 minutes)3, leaving 12 female and 6 
male participants  (Age: M = 21.78, SD = 2.39).  The mean accuracy, prior to data 
transformation, was 51.29% (SD = 11.86%).  Participants’ state and trait anxiety were above the 
expected range given participants’ age, state: M = 41.5, SD = 8.39; trait: M = 39.34, SD = 7.9.  
Participants were remunerated with course credits or a small cash payment.   
Stimuli and procedure. The stimuli and methods were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1, except that the threatening, cute, and neutral animal distractors were replaced 
with fearful, happy, and neutral faces taken from the NimStim database, which have been 
widely used in both emotion processing and attentional literatures (Tottenham et al., 2009).  
Twelve fearful faces, twelve happy faces, and twelve neutral faces were selected; they all shared 
the same 12 identities, so were matched on every feature except emotion.  As in previous 
instigations which found attentional capture by fearful faces (e.g. Hodsoll et al., 2011), we 
ovalled the faces to remove any non-emotional identifying features of the outline, such as jaw 
line or hair style.  To occupy the opposite distractor location not occupied with the face 
distractor, we presented one of twelve different skin patches.  These were the same size and 
shape as the face distractors, and were created from a close up of the skin of these distractor 
faces but did not contain any facial features. 
Due to the face stimuli being taller than animal images, distractors were presented to the 
left and right of the target in an upright position.  In order to compensate for the increased 
distance from the centre of attention, the images were enlarged so they measured, 11.33°×7.49°.  
They were presented with a gap of .5° between them and the central RSVP stream.   
Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, a 2×3 ANOVA was performed with target search category (cute/ 
threatening animal) as one factor and distractor category as the second (happy/ fearful/ neutral 
faces).  This revealed that there was a non-significant difference between cute targets and 
threatening targets, F(1, 17) = 1.63, p = .219, ƞ2p = .09, as well as a nonsignificant main effect of 
                                                             
3 Including these two participants did not alter the significance values or pattern of my findings.   
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distractor, F(2, 34) = 1.84, p = .174, ƞ2p = .1.  The interaction between target and distractor was 
also non-significant, F(2, 34) = .04, p = .961, ƞ2p = .002.  Therefore, unlike Experiment 1, there 
was no significant difference in identification accuracy between any of the distractor conditions 
across either search condition.  As in Experiment 1,weplotted a motivational distractor effect 
score to clearly present the distraction compared to the neutral distractor (see Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7. Motivational distractor effects (% correct neutral distractor - % correct motivationally salient 
distractor) for happy and fearful face distractors across both cute and threatening animal search conditions 
in Experiment 2. Error bars represent within-subjects standard error. 
 
To investigate whether there was any evidence of stimulus-driven capture, comparisons 
were made between motivationally salient distractors and neutral distractors within each search 
goal condition.  The Bayesian analysis revealed that evidence favoured the null hypothesis 
across all conditions.  When the distractor was a fearful face there was greater evidence for the 
null hypothesis than the experimental hypothesis, this was true for both cute and threatening 
search conditions, t(17) = 1.08, p = .297, BH(0,13) =  .43 and t(17) = 0.88, p = .389, BH(0,13) = .28, 
respectively.  This was also true for happy faces in both cute and threat search conditions, t(17) 
= 1.28, p = .218, BH(0,13) = .64 and t(17) = 1.24, p = .232, BH(0,13) = .61, respectively.  Overall, the 
Bayes factors were closer to 0 than 1, therefore, evidence favoured the null rather than the 
experimental hypothesis, although the Bayes factors revealed that the data were insensitive.   
Experiment 2 hence did not find evidence of stimulus-driven attentional capture 
independent of current search goals, nor of the generalisation of goal-driven capture to an 
affectively related category.  It should be noted, however, that the distractors in Experiment 2 
were presented further away from fixation than those in Experiment 1, to accommodate the 
stimulus dimensions.  It was therefore important to rule out the possibility that this difference 
could have reduced sensitivity to find distractor effects in Experiment 2.  For example, these 
forms of attentional capture might be dependent on a fuller processing of features which is made 
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possible at more central locations.  In order to allow a more direct comparison of the two 
distractor categories used in Experiments 1 and 2, a third experiment was conducted in which 
both motivationally salient faces and animal distractors were presented in identical locations.   
Experiment 3 
The aim of Experiment 3 was to (1) replicate Experiment 1’s finding of goal-driven 
attentional capture by affective stimuli, and (2) further test the possibility that this goal-driven 
attentional capture might generalise beyond the specific stimulus category (e.g. ‘threatening 
animals’) to the broader affective category (e.g. ‘threat’).  To allow direct comparison of these 
potential specific and more generalised goal-driven attentional capture effects, we incorporated 
both distractor categories into the task, removing any differences in stimulus location which 
could affect attentional capture.  Participants performed the same central animal search task as 
in Experiments 1 and 2, while ignoring distractors that were either threatening animals, fearful 
faces, or neutral animals and faces. We chose to focus on threatening stimuli rather than both 
positive and threatening stimuli, in order to compare to previous literature which has focused 
particularly on threat (cf. Yiend, 2010; Cisler & Koster, 2010). We expected to replicate 
Experiment 1’s finding that threatening animal distractors would interfere with target 
identification, but only in the threatening animal search condition.  It was unknown whether, 
having controlled for differences in distractor location, these contingent capture effects would 
now also generalise to the fearful faces (i.e. revealing interference from these stimuli 
exclusively in the threat search condition).   
 
Methods 
Participants. Twenty participants were initially recruited, though one participant was 
excluded prior to analysis for accuracy being 3 SDs below the group mean, and another because 
of a programming error (12 female, 6 male; Age: M = 20.89, SD = 2.65).  The mean accuracy 
prior to data transformation was 52% (SD = 15.52%).  Participants’ trait anxiety was higher than 
the expected range given participants’ age, state: M = 36.83, SD = 8.77; trait: M = 47.17, SD = 
10.62.  Participants were remunerated with course credits or a small cash payment.   
Stimuli and procedure. The stimuli and procedure in Experiment 3 were identical to 
Experiments 1 and 2, though in order to compare the effect of emotional faces and threatening 
animals within a single experiment, the following changes were made to the design; a 2×2×2 
within-subjects design was used: Target type (cute/ threat) × Distractor type (animal/ face) × 
Distractor valence (threat/ neutral).  Additionally, all images were reduced in size in order to 
place them in a parafoveal vision (>2.5° eccentricity), rather than peripheral vision (> 5°; cf. 
Toet & Levi, 1992).  This meant that images in the central RSVP stream measured 3.44°×2.29°, 
and distractors measured 2.98°×4.58° visual angle at 59cm viewing distance from the screen.  
The distractors were presented to the left and right of the central RSVP stream with a gap of .5° 
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between the central image and the distractor.  The order of distractors and targets was pseudo 
randomly generated in order to prevent the distractor being the same animal as the target, or 
regular pairings of distractor and target emerging by chance. 
 Stimuli were taken from the same pool of images as Experiments 1 and 2.  The neutral 
animal distractors were six images of six different animals (capybara, sheep, pig, catfish, goose, 
pigeon), these exemplars never appeared as part of the central stream.  Similarly, six separate 
threatening animals were selected from those used in Experiment 1.  Six fear and six neutral 
faces were selected to be distractors from those used in Experiment 2.  Both fear and neutral 
faces shared the same individual identities, meaning that the only difference was their emotion.  
As in Experiments 1 and 2 one distractor image appeared per trial - the opposite side distractor 
location was occupied with an oval patch of skin or animal texture (e.g. fur or feathers).  Twelve 
skin and twelve animal texture exemplars were created from close up images of faces and 
animals.  Texture patches were presented only alongside their congruent distractor type (i.e. skin 
patch alongside face distractor), and were randomly selected across the block.  To remove size 
differences between the animal and face distractors, all distractors were ovalled leaving only the 
key features of both animals and faces.  They were both presented in an upright position during 
the experiment. 
Six threatening animal images and six cute animal images were selected to be targets 
from those used in Experiment 1 and 24.  Each target category was made up of the same six 
different animals presented in Experiments 1 and 2.  192 neutral filler images were selected to 
appear in the central RSVP.  All target and distractor images were rated by participants from 
Experiments 3, 4 and 5 (N = 54) along dimensions of arousal and valence using a self-
assessment manikin (see Table 2; Bradley & Lang, 1994).  Ratings from each individual 
experiment produced a similar pattern of results. 
 
 Mean arousal (SD) Mean valence (SD) 
Threatening animals 6.48 (2.26) 3.24 (1.82) 
Cute animals 3.61 (2.3) 7.83 (1.44) 
Neutral animals 2.82 (1.73) 5.56 (1.79) 
Fearful faces 4.73 (2.22) 3.1 (1.25) 
Happy faces 3.9 (1.98) 7.19 (1.51) 
Neutral faces 2.61 (1.58) 4.6 (1.24) 
 
Table 2: Ratings of target and distractor images by participants within Experiments 3-5 for stimuli 
included in their respective experiment. Ratings of each category represent the average of both distractor 
and targets together. Maximum positive valence was 9, maximum negative valence was 1, 5 reflects 
neutral valence. The highest arousal rating was 9, whilst an arousal rating of 1 was reflects low arousal. 
All motivationally salient stimuli were significantly more arousing, and either more positive or negative 
than their neutral counterparts in the expected directions, all p’s < .005.  
                                                             
4 The crocodile stimuli were replaced due to very poor performance in identifying these targets in 
Experiment 1 and 2.  These were replaced with images of crocodiles which were more visible. 
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Procedure. Participants completed four blocks of 48 trials each, with the cute search 
blocks and threat search blocks were structured in an alternating format (i.e. cute-threat-cute-
threat-cute-threat), the order of which was counterbalanced between participants.  Rest periods 
occurred after every two blocks.  Prior to the beginning of a block a warning was presented for 
3000ms, alerting participants that the search category was changing from the previous block.  
Within both cute and threat search blocks the four types of distractor were presented with equal 
probability, these appeared equally to the left and the right of the target.  The target could 
appear at position five, six, seven or eight in the RSVP stream, whilst the distractor was always 
presented at Lag 2, two stimuli prior to the target position.  Except for search goal, all within 
subject variables were counterbalanced within each block.  After the experiment was completed 
the participants were asked to rate the images using the 9-point self-assessment manikin for 
arousal and valence (cf. Bradley & Lang, 1994).  All distractors and target images were rated in 
a random order.  Finally, participants completed the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983). 
Results and Discussion 
Identification accuracy across the eight conditions (see Table 3) was analysed in a 
2×2×2 repeated measures ANOVA: search goal (cute/threatening) × distractor type 
(face/animal) × distractor valence (threat/neutral).  The analysis revealed that there was a 
nonsignificant difference between accuracy in the cute animal search goal versus threatening 
animal search goal, F(1, 17) = 1.37, p = .259, ƞ2p = .07.  Additionally, there was no significant 
difference between face distractors and animal distractors, F(1, 17) = .42, p = .524, ƞ2p = .02.  
There was, however, a marginally significant effect of distractor valence, F(1, 17) = 4.24, p = 
.055, ƞ2p = .2, with threatening distractors resulting in lower performance relative to neutral 
distractors.  Search goal did not significantly interact with distractor type, F(1, 17) = .69, p = 
.417, ƞ2p = .04, however, it did significantly interact with distractor valence, F(1, 17) = 7.14, p = 
.016, ƞ2p = .30.  Distractor type also interacted with distractor valence, F(1, 17) = 6.36, p = .022, 
ƞ2p = .27.  Importantly, the three way interaction was significant, F(1, 17) = 7.25, p = .015, ƞ2p = 
.299.  In order to clearly illustrate the interactions, we plotted results as a motivational distractor 
effect score (see Figure 8); unlike previous Experiments the motivationally salient distractor 
was only subtracted from the neutral distractor of the same type.  This clearly demonstrated that 
threatening animal distractors resulted in lower performance relative to neutral animal 
distractors, but only when participants were searching for threatening animals, not when they 
were searching for a cute target.  Conversely, fearful face stimuli did not interfere with target 
identification relative to neutral faces in either search condition.   
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Table 3: Mean and Standard error for accuracy across all target and search conditions within experiment 
3-5. Data for Experiment 3 and 5 is untransformed, whilst data from Experiment 4 has been arcsine 
transformed to account for significant skewness. 
 
To investigate whether there was any evidence of stimulus-driven capture, comparisons 
were made between each motivationally salient distractor and the matched neutral distractor of 
the same type.  This was performed across both search conditions.  The pairwise comparisons 
revealed that threatening animal distractors resulted in lower performance relative to neutral 
animals in the threatening animal search condition, t(17) = 5.46, p < .001, BH(0,13) = 109073.60, 
but there was no evidence of attentional capture in the  cute search condition, t(17) = 1.27, p = 
.221, BH(0,13) = .07.  There was, also, no difference between fearful face and neutral face 
distractors in either the threatening animal search condition or the cute animal search condition, 
t(17) = .27, p = .787, BH(0,13) = .17 and t(17)= .34, p = .737, BH(0,13) = .17, respectively.   
 Search goal Distractor  
Mean 
(% accuracy) 
SE 
Experiment 3 
(n = 18) 
Cute search 
Fear face 51.62 4.42 
Neutral face 50.69 4 .51 
Threatening animal 50.69 4.61 
Neutral animal 48.38 4.21 
Threat search 
Fear face 53.94 3.68 
Neutral face 53.24 3.99 
Threatening animal 47.92 3.30 
Neutral animal 59.49 4.4 
Experiment 4 
(n = 18) 
 
 
Cute search 
Fear face 69.46 4.35 
Neutral face 67.99 3.88 
Threatening animal 64.93 3.87 
Neutral animal 64.85 3.62 
Threat search 
Fear face 58.83 3.57 
Neutral face 59.09 4.16 
Threatening animal 32.92 2.39 
Neutral animal 64.16 3.36 
Experiment 5 
(n = 18) 
Happy search 
Fear face 81.00 2.70 
Neutral face 87.5 1.65 
Threatening animal 88.00 1.87 
Neutral animal 88.56 1.83 
Fearful search 
Fear face 76.61 2.89 
Neutral face 87.39 2.64 
Threatening animal 89.28 2.23 
Neutral animal 91.94 1.73 
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All Bayes factors were below .33, thus revealing that there was substantial evidence that 
there was no involuntary attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli, relative to neutral 
stimuli, independent of goal-driven capture effects.  
 
Figure 8. Motivational distractor effects (% correct neutral distractor - % correct motivationally salient 
distractor) for fearful face and threatening animal distractors across both cute and threatening animal 
search conditions in Experiment 3. Error bars represent within-subjects standard error.  
 
Experiment 4 
The results of Experiment 3 replicated the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, showing 
that motivationally salient threatening stimuli only involuntarily captured attention when they 
were congruent with current search goals.  Again, this was only found for threatening stimuli 
which matched the specific category of the searched for target; incongruent fearful faces did not 
capture attention at all.  The lack of interference from goal-incongruent threat distractors in 
Experiments 1 - 3 contrasts with previous affective blink studies, which found evidence for 
apparently stimulus-driven attentional capture by threatening and positive images within the 
context of a similar RSVP task.  One potential reason for this could be that all previous 
investigations presented the motivationally salient distractor in the central RSVP stream, and it 
may therefore be that these stimuli only involuntarily capture attention when participants can 
fully perceive the distractor stimulus.  Belopolsky and Theeuwes (2010) found that when 
participants focused their attention on a central RSVP stream, peripheral salient distractors did 
not cause an attentional blink; however, when participants had to broaden their ‘attentional 
window’ by focusing on peripheral target locations, a salient distractor captured attention.  
Further, in other visual search tasks when participants were instructed to focus attention to a 
specific location away from a fearful face or a threat associated stimulus, there was no evident 
attentional capture effects (Reeck, LaBar & Egner, 2012; Notebaert, Crombez, Van Damme, 
Durnez & Theeuwes, 2013). 
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It may be, therefore, that stimulus-driven capture only occurs when it appears within the 
attentional window (cf. Notebaert et al, 2013; Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2010).  To my 
knowledge, this would be consistent with all previous research on attentional capture by 
motivationally salient stimuli; previous paradigms including the dot-probe, exogenous cueing 
task, pictorial Stroop task, visual search task, and affective blink task have all presented the 
distractor within the attentional window and in a potential target location (see General 
Discussion (section 7.3) for further discussion of these tasks).  If motivationally salient stimuli 
which are incongruent with current search goals only capture attention when they appear within 
the attentional window, then my current design would not detect this.  To test whether this could 
explain the lack of stimulus-driven effects within my task, we replicated Experiment 3 using 
centrally presented rather than peripheral distractors. 
Methods 
Participants. Nineteen participants were initially recruited, though one participant was 
excluded prior to analysis for accuracy being 3 SDs below the group mean (16 female, 2 male; 
Age: M = 22.44, SD = 4.83).  The mean accuracy, prior to data transformation, was 55.79% (SD 
= 8.52%).  Participants’ state and trait anxiety were within expected range given participants’ 
age, state: M = 37.84, SD = 9.2; trait: M = 39.5, SD = 9.87, Participants were remunerated with 
course credits or a small cash payment. 
Stimuli and procedure. The task and procedure were nearly identical to Experiment 3 
with the exception that the distractor appeared in the central stream.  These distractors were 
marked as task-irrelevant by being presented as a 1.53°×2.29° oval which was presented within 
a grey rectangle amongst the other stimuli which were all complete rectangular images.  This 
change resulted in one fewer neutral filler image per trial, leaving a total of 168 neutral animals 
images selected to appear across the experiment.  Additionally, for the purposes of 
counterbalancing, the number of target locations in the RSVP stream was reduced to positions 
six, seven and eight.  As in previous Experiments, the distractor appeared two slides prior to the 
target position (i.e. Lag 2).   
Results and Discussion 
As in Experiments 3, a 2×2×2 ANOVA was performed.  The main effect of search goal 
was significant, F(1, 17) = 14.88, p = .001, ƞ2p = .47, with cute animals identified more 
accurately than threatening animal targets.  The main effect of distractor type was also 
significant, F(1, 17) = 12.03, p = .003, ƞ2p = .41, with animal distractors resulting in lower 
performance overall compared to face distractors.  Additionally, the main effect of distractor 
valence was also significant, F(1, 17) = 22.57, p < .001, ƞ2p = .57, revealing that threat related 
distractors resulted in lower performance than neutral distractors.  The interaction between 
search goal and the different distractor type was marginally significant, F(1, 17) = 3.89, p = 
.065, ƞ2p = .19. Current search goal also significantly interacted with distractor valence, F(1, 17) 
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= 28.78, p < .001, ƞ2p = .63, as did distractor type and distractor valence, F(1, 17) = 26.26, p < 
.001, ƞ2p = .61. 
 Importantly, the three way interaction between target category, distractor type, and 
distractor valence was significant, F(1, 17) = 29.13, p < .001, ƞ2p = .63.  As in Experiment 3, 
fearful faces were no more distracting than neutral faces in either search condition, whilst 
threatening animal distractors resulted in a significant reduction in accuracy, but only in the 
threatening animal search condition.  The large magnitude of this single effect appears to 
account for all other significant interaction terms, as clearly shown in the motivational distractor 
effect plot (see Figure 9).   
 
Figure 9. Motivational distractor effects (% correct neutral distractor - % correct motivationally salient 
distractor) for fearful face and threatening animal distractors across both cute and threatening animal 
search conditions in Experiment 4. Error bars represent within-subjects standard error.  
 
To investigate whether central presentation of the distractors resulted in any evidence 
for stimulus-driven capture of attention, comparisons were made between motivationally salient 
distractors and neutral distractors of the same type across both search conditions, as they had 
been in Experiment 3.  This revealed substantial evidence for the null hypothesis (B < .33) 
across all conditions when the distractor was incongruent with the specific category which was 
searched for: in both cute and threatening animal search conditions fearful faces were no more 
distracting than neutral faces, t(17) = .61, p = .549, BH(0,13) = .12 and t(17) = .002, p = .998, 
BH(0,13) = .23, respectively.  The same was true for the threatening animal distractors which were 
no more distracting than the neutral animal distractors when participants were searching for the 
cute animal, t(17) = .02, p = .986, BH(0,13) = .24.  When the threatening animal distractor was 
presented in the threatening animal search condition there was substantial evidence for 
attentional capture relative to matched neutral stimuli, t(17) = 8.05, p < .001, BH(0,13) = 
92539632336. 
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Experiment 4 replicates the previous results by demonstrating that attentional capture 
by motivationally salient stimuli, specifically threatening animals, was entirely dependent upon 
goal-driven search conditions.  Interestingly, the magnitude of the motivational distractor effect 
score for the goal-congruent threatening animals was significantly larger than that found in 
Experiment 3, t(34) = 3.97, p < .001, BU(0,27) = 474.24; all other p’s > .432, BU(0,27) < .19.5  This 
is in keeping with previous evidence that centrally presented distractors interfere more with task 
performance than more peripheral distractors (Beck & Lavie, 2005).  It would appear, therefore, 
that the more visible the distractor features, the greater the effect of goal-driven capture.  It is 
notable that, despite this apparent advantage, no evidence for stimulus-driven attentional capture 
was found.  
I have interpreted the contingent capture effects seen in Experiment 1, 3 and 4 as 
support for the goal-driven account of involuntary capture by motivationally salient stimuli.  
However, an alternative account of contingent capture effects has previously been proposed in 
terms of low-level priming of the visual features from previous trials (cf. Theeuwes, 2013; 
Lamy & Kristjansson, 2013; Belopolsky, Schreij, Theeuwes, 2010).  The selected target features 
on one trial is argued to transiently prime the same low-level features on the subsequent trial, 
causing attention to be directed towards these features because of their ‘selection history’ as a 
previous target.   
It is important to consider whether this ‘selection history’ account might alternatively 
explain the results.  The relatively long duration of the trials (~5s) makes inter-trial priming 
effects somewhat less plausible, as there would likely be time for transient priming to dissipate.  
Moreover, as the motivationally salient stimuli were composed of multiple visually 
heterogeneous animals, on many trials the target features would be unlikely to prime the 
features of the subsequent distractor stimulus, e.g. a lion target would be unlikely to prime a 
spider distractor.  However, given that some of the targets did share features (e.g., bared teeth or 
open mouth for the threatening animals; large eyes and fluffy fur for the cute animals), it was 
important to directly test an alternative explanation of the effects in terms of low-level inter-trial 
priming.   
To this end, we conducted an additional analysis of the results from Experiments 1, 3 
and 4 examining interference only from the spider distractors, which did not share any features 
with the other threatening animals.  In order to preclude any transient priming effect, we 
excluded the trials which had been preceded by a spider target within the previous two trials, 
                                                             
5 BU signifies a uniform distribution where small effects are equally probable as large effects, which was 
selected due to the lack of previous knowledge about this specific comparison (cf. Dienes, 2008; 2011).  
We expected a directional effect, with centrally positioned distractors yielding higher distractor costs.  
The minimum effect size was set to zero, whilst the maximum plausible effect size was selected based on 
the greatest difference which we found in the current investigation: 27%, taken from the transformed data 
of Experiment 4.   
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thus precluding any transient priming effect.  This led to the removal of 26.2% of the spider 
distractor trials from the threat search condition.  Even with the potentially primed trials 
removed, we found that the motivational distractor effect score was significantly greater in the 
threat search condition than the cute search condition, thus, a highly significant goal-driven 
contingent capture effect still remained when primed distractors were excluded (M = 33.96, SE 
= 3.11 vs M = 6.46, SE = 3.2; t(54) = 6.75, p < .001; BH(0,13) = 84381753).  Furthermore, we note 
that this effect was consistent across all three experiments: Experiment 1 t(18) = 2.45, p = .025, 
BH(0, 13) = 7.01;  Experiment 3 t(17) = 3.68, p = .002, BH(0, 13) = 96.17, and Experiment 4 t(17) = 
6.71, p < .001, BH(0, 13) = 1999083.   
The above analysis demonstrates that the contingent capture effects are not dependent 
on inter-trial priming. We note that this does not rule out the possibility that selection history 
can influence attention in other paradigms and contexts, but it does discount it as an account of 
the current results.   
Experiment 5 
Experiments 2-4 found no evidence of attentional capture from emotional faces, despite 
using the exact same face stimulus set that has previously elicited involuntary attentional 
capture in a multitude of experimental tasks (Tottenham et al., 2009).  However, in the current 
experiments, the faces never directly matched the task’s top-down goal.  Experiment 5 sought to 
test whether the face stimuli would be capable of capturing attention in the current paradigm 
when they match top-down task goals.  To this end, we modified the task search goals, so that 
instead of searching the central stream for cute or threatening animals, participants were now 
instructed to search for happy or fearful emotional faces. We presented the identical distractor 
stimuli to those used in Experiments 3 and 4, in order to see whether current search goals could 
induce involuntary attentional capture by emotional faces which was absent in the previous 
experiments.   
Methods 
Participants. Eighteen participants were recruited for this experiment (11 female, 7 
male; Age: M = 21.06, SD = .54). The mean accuracy, prior to data transformation, was 86.28% 
(SD = 1.16%).  Participants’ trait anxiety was above the expected range given participants’ age, 
state: M = 36.72, SD = 2.31; trait: M = 43.39, SD = 3.18.  Participants were remunerated with 
course credits or a small cash payment. 
Stimuli and procedure.  The experiment structure was similar to Experiment 3, with 
the exception of the following changes.  Firstly, participants were instructed to search for happy 
faces, instead of cute animals, and scared faces instead of threatening animals.  There were two 
blocks of 96 trials, one for the happy face search, and one for the fearful face search.  The order 
of these blocks was counterbalanced between participants.  An additional change to the 
paradigm was that participants had to identify whether the emotional face was present or absent 
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on each trial.  They responded using the ‘c’ and ‘m’ keys, the key-response assignment was 
counterbalanced between participants.  The target was present on half of trials, when it was 
absent the target was replaced by an upright neutral face.  Pilot testing revealed that participants 
were performing at ceiling, thus the stimulus presentation time was reduced to 83ms per frame 
with no inter-stimulus interval.  Unlike the RSVP of previous Experiments which were 
composed entirely of animal images, the neutral filler stimuli were composed of two neutral 
animals selected from the previous pool of neutral images, three inverted faces, and either three 
or four upright faces, depending on whether the target was present or absent.  The multiple 
types of filler stimuli were presented in a random order in each trial, their purpose was to 
increase the difficulty of the task.  In total, 48 neutral animals were presented in the central 
RSVP stream, alongside 72 upright faces and 72 inverted faces all with different identities.  The 
neutral face stimuli were taken from the Productive Aging Laboratory Face database (Minear & 
Park, 2004).  The target stimuli consisted of three happy faces and three fearful faces of the 
same identities.  These were taken from the NimStim database (Tottenham et al., 2009).  These 
target images could appear at positions six, seven or eight in the RSVP, appearing equally at 
each position.  As before, the distractors appeared two frames prior to the target.  Distractor and 
target faces were selected so that different ethnicities and genders appeared equally across 
distractors and targets in each individual condition.  Additionally, neutral filler images were 
selected so that male and female faces were equally represented, and that different ethnicities 
were presented approximately equally.  Thus, the face stimuli appeared as a heterogeneous 
stream of facial features.  An eight-trial practice block preceded the task with equal happy and 
fearful targets and equal present and absent trials.  Stimuli presented in the practice were not 
presented in the rest of the experiment, and distractors in the practice block consisted of black 
ovals.   
Results and Discussion 
As in Experiments 3 and 4weconducted a 2×2×2 ANOVA, although the search goal 
factor was changed to happy/fearful search conditions.  The main effect of search goal was non-
significant, F(1, 17) < .01, p = .983, ƞ2p < .01.  The main effect of distractor type was, however, 
significant, F(1, 17) = 12.3, p = .003, ƞ2p = .42; in a striking reversal of previous results, the face 
distractors resulted in lower performance overall compared to animal distractors.  The main 
effect of distractor valence was also significant, F(1, 17) = 15.57, p = .001, ƞ2p = .48, with threat 
related (i.e. fearful face or threatening animal) distractors resulting in lower performance than 
neutral distractors.  Critically, the distractor type interacted with distractor valence, F(1, 17) = 
6.09, p = .025, ƞ2p = .26, revealing that while significant interference was observed from fearful 
versus neutral faces, t = 3.7, p = .002, BH(0,13) = 120.72 there was no effect of valence in relation 
to the animal distractors, t = 1.15, p = .267, BH(0,13) = .35, the Bayes factor appeared to favour a 
true null finding.   
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The interaction between distractor type and current search goal failed to reach 
significance, F(1, 17) = 3., p = .094, ƞ2p = .16.  Current search goal also did not significantly 
interact with distractor valence, F(1, 17) = 2, p = .175, ƞ2p = .11, although as can be seen in 
Figure 10 the numerical trend was in the direction of contingent capture (i.e. greater attentional 
capture by threat in the fearful face versus happy face search condition).  Additionally, unlike 
previous experiments the three way interaction between search goal, distractor type, and 
distractor valence was nonsignificant, F(1, 17) = .3, p = .593, ƞ2p = .017.   
Rather, fearful faces resulted in lower accuracy relative to neutral faces, across both the 
fearful face and the happy face search conditions, t(17) = 3.86, p = .001, BH(0,13) = 219.77, t(17) 
= 2.18, p = .044, BH(0,13) = 3.3, respectively.  The Bayes factor showed stronger evidence for 
attentional capture within the congruent search condition, as predicted by a goal-driven effect, 
although there was still evidence of capture in the incongruent search condition. 
 
 
Figure 10. Motivational distractor effects (% correct neutral distractor - % correct motivationally salient 
distractor) for fearful face and threatening animal distractors across both happy and fearful face search 
conditions in Experiment 5. Error bars represent within-subjects standard error.  
 
The unexpected significant attentional capture by fearful faces in the happy search 
condition might at first glance be assumed to be evidence of stimulus-driven attentional capture.  
However, it is hard to reconcile a stimulus-driven interpretation of this effect with the fact that, 
across four experiments, we only observed this effect when the task search categories were 
changed from animals to faces.  This dependence of the attentional capture effect on the central 
task stimulus category points to a goal-driven rather than stimulus-driven mechanism.   
Why then we did not find a significant within subject goal-driven effects on attentional 
capture in Experiment 5? We speculate that this may be due to the increased overlap in visual 
features between the two face affective categories.  Unlike the visually distinct cute and 
threatening animal categories used in previous experiments, happy and fearful faces share 
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common features such as visible teeth.  It has been found that when possible, participants search 
for a single salient visual feature of an emotional face in a perceptually demanding task (Calvo, 
Fernandez-Martin & Nummenmaa, 2012).  Participants would only have to hold a top-down 
search goal for salient mouths or eyes to complete the task.  This, therefore, would lead all 
emotional faces to capture attention due to goal-driven effects.   
Regardless of Experiment 5’s lack of within subject goal-driven effects, the results of 
the experiments taken together demonstrate that by switching the participants’ search goal 
category from animals (Experiments 2-4) to faces (Experiment 5),we were able to alter which 
category of motivationally salient distractors captured attention.  To directly test this goal-
driven effect we conducted a further ANOVA, comparing the results of Experiment 5 with those 
of Experiment 3.  These two experiments were identical in all aspects of distractor presentation 
but differed in terms of the central task (Experiment 3 involving search for cute and threat 
animals, while Experiment 5 involved search for happy and fearful faces).  A 2×2×2 mixed 
ANOVA was conducted with the within subject factors of distractor valence and distractor type, 
and the between subject factor of goal category (animals, faces).   
This ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of valence, reflecting that across 
Experiments threat related distractors capture attention more than neutral distractors, F(1,34) = 
19.43, p < .001, ƞ2p = .36.  There were also significant main effects of goal category, reflecting 
generally higher accuracy during the face search task (Experiment 5) than the animal search task 
(Experiment 3), F(1,34) = 79.82, p < .001, ƞ2p = .7; and of distractor category, F(1,34) = 6.76, p 
= .014, ƞ2p = .17, reflecting overall increased distraction from faces versus animals.  
Importantly, there was a significant interaction between goal category and distractor category 
F(1,34) = 10.9, p = .002, ƞ2p = .24, reflecting greater attentional capture by faces during the face 
search task and greater attentional capture by animals during the animal search task.  
Furthermore, and critically, there was a significant three way interaction of goal category × 
distractor category × valence, F(1,34) = 12.17 p = .001, ƞ2p = .26.  As can be seen from plotting 
the motivational distractor effects in Figure 11, fearful faces captured attention relative to 
neutral faces only during the face search task, t(17) = 3.7, p = .002, BH(0,13) =   120.72, while 
threatening animals captured attention relative to neutral animals only during the threatening 
search task, t(17) = 3.5, p = .003, BH(0,13) =  47.17.  When the motivationally salient distractor 
type did not match the goal category no evidence of threat related attentional capture was found, 
and the Bayes factors confirmed these null results to be sensitive for both distractor types: For 
threatening animals, t(17) = 1.15, p = .267, BH(0,13) =  .35, for fearful faces, t(17) = .53, p = .603, 
BH(0,13) =  .09.  No other interactions reached significance (all p’s > .66), with the exception of a 
trend for goal category and distractor valence, F(1,34) = 4.06, p = .052, ƞ2p = .11, which was 
driven by the three way interaction reported above. 
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The above analysis demonstrates that the attentional capture by fearful faces seen in 
both affective search conditions of Experiment 5 was contingent on the top-down search goal 
for emotional faces: Despite having identical distractors in Experiments 3 and 5, face distractors 
only captured attention when the search task goal was modified in Experiment 5 to include 
faces. The fact that attentional capture by fearful faces in the happy search condition was 
contingent upon the stimulus category of the central task strongly undermines any account of 
these effects in terms of purely stimulus-driven processes. 
Figure 11. Motivational distractor effects (% correct neutral distractor - % correct motivationally salient 
distractor) for fearful faces and threatening animal distractors across both animal (Experiment 3) and face 
(Experiment 5) search goal conditions. Motivational distractor scores were computed after collapsing 
across search conditions for both Experiment 3 and 5. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
As in previous Experiments, we investigated the possibility of inter-trial priming.  To 
do this we took advantage of the present/absent response required in Experiment 5.  The 
rationale being that when a target stimulus was absent on a trial, the features of the target would 
not be primed for the subsequent trial, whilst when the target was present the target features 
would be primed on the next trial. We compared the accuracy on fearful face distractor trials 
which had not been primed by the preceding trial (M = 78.9, SE = 4.66) to the accuracy when 
the distractor was neutral (M = 87.39, SE = 2.64), both in the threat search condition.  Primed 
trials made up 50% of the total trials. This comparison revealed that even when primed trials 
were discounted the fearful face distractor was associated with significantly poorer accuracy 
compared to the neutral face distractor in the fearful face search condition, t(17) = 4.04, p < 
.001, BH(0,13) = 395.43.  In order to detect any evidence of inter-trial priming, we compared the 
fearful face distractor trials which had been preceded by a fearful face present trial (M = 75.03, 
SE = 3.47) to fearful face distractor trials which had been preceded by a fearful face absent trial, 
and were therefore unprimed (M = 78.9, SE = 4.66).  If inter-trial priming had influenced 
performance, then we would expect the unprimed trials to be significantly more accurate than 
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the primed trials, however, this was not the case, t(17) = .77, p = .452, BH(0,11) =  .816. The Bayes 
factor favoured the null hypothesis but showed the data were insensitive, although we cannot 
conclude that there was no inter-trial priming, we can conclude that inter-trial priming did not 
significantly influenced the current findings. 
Internal meta-analysis. Finally, in order to investigate the cumulative evidence for 
stimulus-driven capture and goal-driven capture across all experiments we conducted an internal 
meta-analysis using the data across Experiments 1-5 (cf. Goh, Hall & Rosenthal, 2016; 
Cummings, 2007).  To do this, we created three values for each participant using the 
untransformed data.  These consisted of the mean accuracy when the distractor was 
motivationally salient and congruent with the current search goal, the mean accuracy when the 
distractor was motivationally salient and incongruent with the current search goal, and all trials 
when the distractor was neutral. 
I computed the Hedges’ g as the effect size using a DerSimonian-Laird random 
effects model in order to take into account variation between distractor type and position across 
experiments (Lakens, 2013; DerSimonian & Laird, 1986). This was conducted using the 
Metafor package in R which weighted each experiment by its sample size (as described in Aloe 
& Becker, 2012; Viechtbauer, 2010). Additionally, a meta-Bayes factor was calculated based on 
the overall estimated population mean and standard error across all Experiments, the prior for 
this analysis reverted to the original 15% taken from Wyble et al.  (2013).  The overall 
population mean and standard error were formulated sequentially using Zoltan Dienes online 
calculator, first combining the effect sizes of Experiments 1 and 2, then combining this posterior 
mean with the effect size of Experiment 3, then continuing iteratively for all 5 Experiments 
(Dienes, 2008; see Rouder & Morey, 2011 for discussion of the meta-Bayes factor).   
The goal-congruent vs neutral accuracy (k = 4, N = 73) effect revealed that there was 
substantial evidence that goal-congruent motivationally salient distractors were more distracting 
than neutral distractors, Hedges’ g = 1.22, p = .008, 95% CI [.31, 2.12], BH(0,15)  = 7824360×1010.  
Comparing the goal-incongruent motivationally salient distractor accuracy versus neutral 
distractor accuracy (k = 5, N = 91) revealed a small effect size which suggested some attentional 
capture, though the Bayes factor showed an insensitive null effect across Experiments, Hedges’ 
g = .14, p = .352, 95% CI [-.15, .43], BH(0,15)  = .79.  However, removing the data from 
Experiment 5 (N = 73 remaining participants), where we found evidence of goal-driven effects 
in the incongruent condition, resulted in a reduction in effect size and a conclusive null finding, 
Hedges’ g = .05, p = .747, 95% CI [-.27, .38], BH(0,15)  = .14. 
                                                             
6 We set the prior of this comparison to a plausible effect size of 11% with half-normal distribution.  The 
rationale being that if the goal-driven effect was actually due to inter-trial priming, then there should be a 
difference in accuracy between primed and unprimed trials similar to the magnitude of the total 
motivational distractor effect, which was 11% in this task. 
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Thus far, we have not addressed the issue of individual differences.  The current task 
was designed to detect within-subjects differences between goal congruent and incongruent 
conditions, rather than correlational differences between individuals.  To explore whether any 
differences were apparent across the different tasks, we conducted a Hunter-Schmidt random 
effects meta-analysis of the distraction between trait anxiety and the motivational distractor 
effects (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990).  Meta-Bayes factors were computed iteratively, sequentially 
combining the pairs of effect sizes and standard errors.  Before analysis we normalised the 
correlation coefficients with Fisher’s z transformation (Dienes, 2008).   
The expected effect size was taken from Most et al. (2005) who found a correlation 
between the attentional bias towards threatening stimuli, in a similar RSVP task, and harm 
avoidance, a construct strongly related to trait anxiety (Cloninger, 1986). The effect size was r = 
.58, which when standardised with a Fisher’s z transformation resulted in a prior of rz = .66.  
This revealed that across experiments (k = 4) the cumulative relationship between trait anxiety 
and the distractor effects for the threatening animals for both goal congruent and incongruent 
conditions was non-significant, r = .08, p = .521, CI 95% [-.15, .31], BH[0, .66] = .34, and r = .10, 
p = .409, CI 95% [-.14, .34], BH[0, .66] = .41, respectively.  The cumulative correlation (k = 4) 
between fearful face distractor effects and trait anxiety revealed a non-significant relationship 
when congruent with the general affective content of the search goal, r = .01, p = .937, CI 95% 
[-.23, .25], BH[0, .66] = .24.  However, when the fearful faces were incongruent with the affective 
content of the current search goal, a significant positive correlation emerged with trait anxiety 
and the fearful face distractor effect, r = .27, p = .019, CI 95% [.04, .5], BH[0, .66] = 4.23. This 
final exploratory analysis produced a sensitive Bayes factor (B > 3), although it must be 
interpreted cautiously, especially given that the effect did not survive corrections for multiple 
comparisons (α = .013), and the sample sizes collected were small and more sensitive to 
influence from extreme cases. 
General Discussion 
The present study reveals that involuntary attentional capture by motivationally salient 
stimuli can be induced by manipulating current top-down search goals.  Additionally, in the 
current paradigm there was no robust evidence of stimulus-driven attentional capture 
independent of these top-down goals.  This pattern was observed across the visual field, with 
peripheral, parafoveal, and centrally positioned distractors, and with both positive and 
negatively valenced stimuli.  Involuntary attentional capture occurred only when the distractor 
matched the specific category the individual was searching for (e.g. affective animals), but not 
when the distractors were conceptually unrelated to the goal, even though they were congruent 
with the general affective content of the search goal (e.g. threat related).   Traditionally, theories 
of attention have focused on goal-driven and stimulus-driven mechanisms.  In this dichotomy, 
goal-driven attention is operationalised as that which serves the detection of a target specified 
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by the experimenter; whilst stimulus-driven attention is directed towards perceptually salient 
stimuli, which disrupt detection of the target.  Attentional prioritisation of motivationally salient 
stimuli was not explicitly accommodated by this dichotomy (Awh et al., 2012), leading to calls 
for revised theories including a third independent mechanism.  However, the current findings 
raise the possibility that attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli could be 
accommodated within the top-down/bottom-up dichotomy, as an involuntary phenomenon 
driven by top-down attention.  Across five experiments, we demonstrated that involuntary 
attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli only occurred when they were congruent 
with the participants’ current search goals.  This was true for both threatening and positive 
stimuli.  Thus, top-down search goals appeared to be the primary driver of the attentional 
capture effects observed in the current study.   
Interestingly, the goal-driven distractor effects appeared to be rather specific to the 
particular category of the search target.  When an affectively similar stimulus was not part of the 
current searched-for category, it was no more distracting than a neutral stimulus.  The current 
results therefore suggest that goal-driven attention does not automatically confer priority on the 
basis of purely affective associations such as ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ emotion.  This contrasts 
with previous studies that have found contingent capture from stimuli semantically associated 
with a target category (e.g. other clothing images capturing attention during a search for jeans; 
Nako, Wu, Smith & Eimer, 2014).  This might suggest a distinction between the effects of 
semantic versus affective categories on attention.  On the other hand, it could be that the 
semantically related stimuli used in previous studies shared more low-level visual features than 
the affectively related stimuli used in the present study.   
I note that sematic categories may capture attention through activation of their low-level 
features.  Features that are common across exemplars, or features of stereotypical exemplars, 
appear to be activated during search for conceptual categories (Nako, Smith & Eimer, 2015; Yu, 
Maxfield & Zelinsky, 2016; Reeder & Peelen, 2013).  However, for more heterogeneous 
categories, such as the threatening animals in the current investigation, participants are required 
to maintain several of these category diagnostic features active as a current search goal (see 
Berggren & Eimer, 2016 for discussion of multiple feature search goals).  Importantly, however, 
the current effects were contingent upon these low-level features being part of a voluntary top-
down goal, rather than involuntarily activated through priming effects.   
Conventionally, in both attention and emotional regulation literatures, top-down 
mechanisms have often been characterised as being synonymous with voluntary attention and 
control (Theeuwes, 2010; Connor, Egeth & Yantis, 2004; Awh et al., 2012; Hopfinger, 
Buonocore & Mangun, 2000; Pinto, van der Leij, Sligte, Lamme & Scholte, 2013; Oschner & 
Gross, 2005; Walter et al., 2009; Phan et al., 2005).  The current findings highlight that top-
down attention should not be conflated with voluntary attention.  By recognising that attentional 
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settings initiated in a top-down manner can have involuntary consequences, it allows the 
phenomenon of capture by motivationally salient stimuli to be accommodated within existing 
models based on the top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy.  Alternative recent approaches to 
accommodating motivationally salient stimuli into traditional models of attention have involved 
proposals of a third mechanism based on ‘selection history’ (Awh et al., 2012) or value 
(Anderson, 2014; Le Pelley et al., 2015).  Neither of these third mechanism accounts appear to 
fit the current data.  The notion of involuntary capture reflecting the strength of the learned 
Pavlovian association between a stimulus and a valued outcome is at odds with the finding that 
both positive and threat related stimuli captured attention only when congruent with current 
search goals; despite these distractors all having consistent affective associations, as revealed by 
the valence and arousal ratings for these stimuli.  Neither can the effects be accounted for in 
terms of low-level inter-trial ‘selection history’ (cf. Awh et al, 2012, Theeuwes, 2013).  In 
previous investigations, removing primed trials substantially reduced the ‘goal-driven’ 
distractor effect (Lamy & Kristjansson, 2013).  However, in each of the present experiments the 
significant goal-driven effects were unaffected by the removal of trials which could potentially 
been argued to have been primed by the previous target.  Further, perhaps due to the relatively 
long trial duration in the current paradigm (~5s), we found no evidence of inter-trial priming in 
any of these experiments.  the results are hence inconsistent with ‘third mechanism’ models, at 
least in terms of accounting for capture by motivationally salient stimuli.  This is not to say that 
selection history is not found in previous tasks, in which unfamiliar coloured shapes are used as 
stimuli.  It may be that the more complex images and scenes used in the current task are less 
susceptible to low-level feature priming relative to these simpler stimuli.  Nevertheless, the 
results support a parsimonious account of involuntary attentional capture by motivationally 
salient stimuli, which positions it within the existing top-down bottom-up framework. 
In the current investigation we found that two classic threatening stimulus types, as well 
as a class of positive stimulus, captured attention in a goal-driven fashion.  In future, the results 
should be replicated with other stimuli, such as reward associated objects or those which are 
personally relevant to the participant.   
The Role of Goals in Clinical Attentional Capture 
Viewing attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli as a form of goal-driven 
attentional capture also has interesting implications for understanding the attentional capture 
seen in relation to anxiety, addiction, and eating behaviours.  Such rapid orienting biases have 
traditionally been accounted for in terms of the clinical syndrome or behaviour increasing 
‘bottom-up’ responsivity to certain stimuli (e.g. Bishop, 2007; 2008; Mogg & Bradley, 2016; 
Cisler & Koster, 2010; Field & Cox, 2008; Robinson & Berridge, 1993; 1998; Wiers & Stacy, 
2006; Castellanos et al., 2009).  However, it seems plausible that some individuals, such as 
those who are highly anxious or reward sensitive, would consider certain motivationally salient 
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goals to be highly important, and hence be more likely to voluntarily adopt these goals in 
response to contextual cues.  Note that attentional capture does not appear unique to 
conventional affective stimuli – Purkis, Lester and Field (2011) found that attentional capture 
effects akin to those found among spider phobics in relation to images of spiders, were found 
among fans of the television show ‘Dr Who’ in relation to ‘Dr Who’ related images.  This 
finding is at odds with the traditional view of attentional capture by threat as being hard-wired 
and stimulus-driven, but is compatible with the view of these capture effects reflecting an 
involuntary consequence of goal-driven attentional settings. 
The specificity of goal contingent capture in the present study is consistent with patterns 
observed in relation to attentional capture: A recent meta-analysis of the attentional bias to 
threat in anxiety disorders concluded that threatening stimuli were prioritised more when they 
were congruent with an individual’s specific anxiety disorders (e.g. angry face for social 
anxiety) compared to when they were incongruent (Pergamin-Hight, Naim, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, van Ijzendoorn  & Bar-Haim, 2015).  Moreover, a meta-analysis using positive and 
rewarding stimuli (e.g. food, financial reward, smiling faces) found that the relevance of these 
stimuli to a participant’s personal concerns was one of the strongest predictors of attentional 
capture by these stimuli (e.g. food when hungry or attractive faces when not in a committed 
relationship; Pool, Brosch, Delplanque & Sanders, 2016).  Hence, my proposed goal-driven 
account of attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli neatly accommodates 
established patterns of attentional capture, and has the important implication that these could 
plausibly be driven by personal concerns and goals rather than unconditional capture effects 
dictated merely by affective associations.   
Can Capture by Motivationally Salient Stimuli Ever be Purely Stimulus-Driven? 
I note that although we did not find evidence of stimulus-driven attentional capture, 
across the experiments, the current data cannot rule out the possibility that this might occur 
under some circumstances.  Certain features of the paradigm may have reduced sensitivity to 
stimulus-driven effects.  First, across all of the experiments the targets were always 
motivationally salient faces or animals.  The main focus of the current investigation was the 
motivational salience of the distractors, although previous research suggests that the 
motivational value of targets can also influence task performance.  Specifically, motivationally 
salient stimuli such as spiders, snakes, and stimuli associated with financial reward have been 
found to “survive" the attentional blink more than neutral images when they appear as targets 
(Reineke, Rinck & Becker, 2008; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009; Yokoyama, Padmala & Pessoa, 
2015).  It, therefore, might be argued that the motivational salience of the targets could have 
overridden the stimulus-driven effect of the distractors.  This point, however, highlights the 
strength of the goal-driven effect in the current paradigm.  If the affective content of the search 
targets in any way enhanced the probability of target detection, the current results clearly 
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demonstrate that the goal-driven capture was substantial enough to override this effect.  As 
such, any stimulus-driven form of capture obscured by the affective targets would appear to be 
rather more fragile than the goal-driven capture effects seen here.   
Another feature of the design that might conceivably have reduced sensitivity to reveal 
stimulus-driven effects is the perceptually demanding nature of the central task. Given that 
higher perceptual task demands are established to reduce attentional capture by distractors (e.g., 
Lavie, 2005, Forster & Lavie, 2008, Bishop, Jenkins & Lawrence, 2007), it remains possible 
that a less demanding version of the current task might have revealed stimulus-driven effects in 
addition to the goal-driven effects observed here.  However, if this were the case, then the 
robust top-down attentional capture effects seen in the current study would imply that goal-
driven, but not stimulus-driven, forms of attentional capture are immune to perceptual load 
effects.  For now, we conclude simply that goal-driven attention appears to be more pervasive 
and effective as a driver of involuntary attention to motivationally salient stimuli, relative to any 
stimulus-driven mechanism.   
Finally, it might be argued that ‘stimulus-driven’ effects are only found among certain 
individuals.  Bar-Haim et al.  (2007) found that in a meta-analysis of 172 studies, threat only 
reliably captured attention in anxious individuals.  The sample sizes of the present experiments 
were chosen to address within-subjects research questions and as such are underpowered to test 
for individual differences.  Nevertheless, we note that there was a modest cumulative correlation 
between trait anxiety and goal-incongruent attentional capture from fearful faces.  Given the 
exploratory nature of this analysis we urge caution in interpreting this effect, however, it 
appears possible that with a larger sample size the current task might reveal similar anxiety 
related attentional capture by those found in previous research.  However, such capture effects 
are not necessarily indicative of stimulus-driven attentional capture – as discussed above, 
attentional capture could in fact reflect the participant’s own long-term top-down goals resulting 
in the momentary prioritisation of these stimuli over the current task goals. 
Conclusions 
To conclude, we have demonstrated that current search goals for motivationally salient 
stimuli can induce involuntary attentional capture by these stimuli.  As such, the data provides 
direct experimental evidence for a goal-driven account of this form of involuntary attentional 
capture. We propose that contextual cueing could account for how goal-driven attention is 
deployed in real-world contexts, and how variation in these factors could account for attentional 
capture observed in clinical populations.  The current findings have implications both for 
theoretical models of attention, and for understanding the attentional capture seen in relation to 
clinical disorders such as anxiety and addiction. 
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Abstract 
Recent research has found that attentional capture by a category of threat can be induced by a 
top-down search goal, when this goal is congruent with the category of threat. we sought to test 
the boundary conditions of this goal-driven effect, and determine whether a broad search goal 
for threat could induce a attentional capture by all threat. Within Experiments 1a and 
1b,weinstructed participants to search a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream for all 
types of threatening stimuli, the search targets consisted of three types of visually dissimilar 
threat-related categories. Prior to the target, task-irrelevant threat or neutral distractors were 
presented. Contrary to my predictions, and in contrast to prior results, affective overlap between 
search goal and threat distractor did not induce goal-driven attentional capture. In Experiment 
2,wereplicated this sensitive null finding even when the threat distractor category was included 
as one of the three categories of threat-related stimuli in the search set. In Experiment 3, 
however, the same threat distractors resulted in poorer performance versus neutral distractors 
when participants searched for the same specific category of threat as the distractor. The results 
suggest that goal-driven capture by threat cannot be induced by a broad threat search goal, 
defined only by affective content, and that only prioritisation of specific category features can 
result in involuntary capture by threat. This highlights an important boundary condition that 
must be considered in any goal-driven account of attentional capture by motivationally salient 
stimuli.  
 
  
Over the past several decades, threatening stimuli have often been implicated as a 
category of information capable of automatically and involuntarily attracting attention (e.g., 
Carretie, 2014). Traditionally, this automatic prioritisation of threat was seen as reflecting a 
hard-wired and inflexible stimulus driven mechanism (e.g. Öhman, 1995). However, the 
stimulus-driven account has been challenged by increasing recent evidence that the automatic 
attentional priority of threat (attentional capture) is not unconditional, as a stimulus-driven 
account would suggest (Everaert, Spruyt & De Houwer, 2013; Vogt, De Houwer, Crombez & 
Van Damme, 2013, Lichtenstein-Vidne, Henik & Safadi, 2012), but may instead depend on 
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some kind of task-relevance of the threatening stimuli (e.g. resemblance to target stimuli or 
presentation in a potential target location). Such findings have raised the question of whether the 
attentional capture by threat might reflect a goal-driven, rather than stimulus-driven mechanism. 
A goal-driven account appears plausible given that it may often be adaptive to voluntarily look 
out for potential dangers. For instance, walking home late at night we might act to protect our 
own safety by looking out for broken glass on the floor, a speeding taxi, or a stranger lurking in 
the shadows.  
Recently, we directly tested this goal-driven account of involuntary attentional capture 
by threat, using an experimental manipulation of attentional goals (Brown, Berggren & Forster, 
under review – Chapter 2). Across four experiments we found that involuntary attentional 
capture by irrelevant threatening stimuli could be consistently induced when participants were 
required to adopt a top-down attentional goal for threat, and eliminated when participants were 
required to adopt a competing goal. Participants were asked to identify or detect an image from 
either a threatening or non-threatening target category in a centrally presented rapid stream of 
visual stimuli (i.e. RSVP task; e.g. Most, Chun, Widders & Zald, 2005). Threatening distractors, 
including fearful faces and threatening animals only captured attention when they were 
congruent with the current affective category being searched for. There was no difference in 
attentional capture when participants were not searching for a category different from the 
distractor condition. This finding builds on a long line of research which reveals that when 
individuals search for a specific feature or object, all stimuli which match the contents of this 
search goal capture attention, regardless of whether they are the intended target (cf. Folk, 
Remington & Johnson, 1992). My findings extend this research by revealing that a search goal 
for threatening stimuli can induce an involuntary attentional capture by affective distractors 
which are congruent with this search goal. This introduces the idea that the involuntary 
attentional capture by these stimuli, previously observed in models of attention to threat (e.g. 
Bishop, 2007; 2009), could plausibly be caused by a goal-driven mechanism. 
One unexpected finding from the study was that there did not appear to be any 
generalisation of this goal-driven effect across affective categories. When participants were 
searching for threatening animals (among other animals), fearful faces were no more distracting 
than neutral faces, despite these categories of stimuli being related to the defining affective 
feature of the search goal (i.e. threat). This seeming specificity of the goal-driven attentional 
capture is somewhat at odds with previous evidence. For example, work by Wyble and 
colleagues (2013) has demonstrated that participants can hold a search goal for a wide variety of 
conceptual categories in a very similar RSVP task, and that this can result in contingent capture 
by distractor which are drawn from the same broad conceptual category despite the exact 
features of the target and distractor being unknown. Further, evidence that even when there is 
low visual overlap between the goal and distractor, the search goal can induce involuntary 
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attentional capture. For instance, when participants learnt an artificial category of heterogenous 
everyday objects, instructions to search for this category resulted in greater interference from a 
peripheral distractor object which was also from this same learned category, but objects 
associated with a different artificial category did not (Giammarco, Paoletti, Guild & Al-Aidroos, 
2016). Based on this prior evidence, we ask the question: is there a possibility that individuals 
can search for threat as a general affective category consisting of multiple types of threatening 
stimuli?  
I note that in the previous study participants were asked to search for a specific category 
of threat stimuli (e.g. threatening animals). It may be that this search goal manipulation was too 
specific to induce generalised contingent capture by threatening stimuli (i.e. participants may 
have adopted a goal for the specific subordinate category of threat, hence excluding other types 
of threat from top-down attention). The proposed study therefore sought to provide a more 
extensive test of the possibility that adopting a general attentional goal for the broad affective 
category of threat would result in contingent capture from all threat stimuli, regardless of their 
subordinate category. To this end, we used the same RSVP task as Brown et al. (under review – 
Chapter 2), however, instead of instructing participants to identify a target from a specific 
category of threat (i.e. fearful faces or threatening animals),we instructed participants to search 
for “anything which could cause or show pain, death, or signal danger”. For the comparative 
non-threat search goal condition, we asked participants to search for “anything which makes 
people happy or portrays positive emotion”. We predicted that when participants searched for 
the general category of threatening stimuli in the central stream, peripheral or parafoveal task-
irrelevant threat-related distractors, not part of the target set, would capture attention more than 
a neutral category of distractor. However, when participants are searching for the general 
positive category this difference should be eliminated.   
Experiment 1a and 1b 
Methods 
For Experiment 1a and 1bweused near identical methods, however, for Experiment 1a 
the images were larger and appeared in peripheral locations of the visual field; whilst in 
Experiment 1b the images were smaller and appeared in parafoveal locations of the visual field, 
in line with previous investigations which have found conceptual generalisation of contingent 
capture (Wyble et al., 2013). 
Participants.  
Experiment 1a. 29 participants were initially recruited from the subject pool at the 
Birkbeck University of London, though two participants were excluded prior to analysis for 
accuracy being 2 SDs below the group mean (M = 61.78%, SD = 15.05), thus participants who 
scored below 31% accuracy were excluded (17 females, 10 males; Age: M = 25.48, SD = 6.87).  
The sample size was based on the maximum number of participants that could be recruited 
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within a week.  The final sample size had the statistical power of β = 1 to detect the effect size 
previously found for the interaction between search goal and distractor conceptual category in a 
previous investigation of goal-driven attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli (α = 
.05; ƞp2 = .48; from Brown, Berggren & Forster, under review – Chapter 2; Experiment 1).  
Given the well-established correlation of anxiety with attentional capture by threat, we 
measured both state and trait anxiety in order to compare sample characteristics across previous 
research and the current experiments (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).  Participants’ state and trait 
anxiety were in line with the expected range given participants’ age (norms: M  = 36, SD = 10; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983), state: M = 33.7, SD = 7.68; trait: M = 
41.23, SD = 9.3.  Participants were remunerated with course credits or a small cash payment.   
Experiment 1b. 21 participants were originally recruited from the subject pool at the 
University of Sussex.  We, however, excluded 5 participants due to poor performance, for 
consistency across the replication we excluded participants who scored below 31% accuracy 
which was the cut-off from Experiment 1a. To ensure sensitivity to interpret potential null 
effects, the sample size was determined through a Bayes stopping rule, in which we stopped 
collecting data once the Bayes factor measuring the difference between neutral distractor and 
the threat distractor in the threat search condition was either above 3 or below .33, as this was 
the condition in which threat generalisation would occur. The final sample of 16 participants 
consisted of 12 females and 4 males, with a mean age of 20.94 (SD = 3.36). The mean state and 
trait anxiety scores were, M = 44.38, SD = 8.35; M = 44.13, SD = 11.44, respectively. 
Stimuli.  
Experiment 1a. The stimuli were presented using E-prime 2.0 software on a Dell 
OptiPlex 780 PC, displayed on a 16inch monitor with a screen resolution of 800×600.  The 
experiment was conducted in a dimly lit room.  In total there were nine positive targets and nine 
threat-related targets, each made up of equal numbers of objects, animals, and faces: three in 
each category. 
The animal images were all sourced from a previous investigation by Brown et al. 
(under review – Chapter 2). The threatening animals selected for targets were a snake, a spider, 
and an attacking dog (this final image was sourced from the International Affective Picture 
System database (IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2005). The positive animals included a 
kitten, a puppy, and a duckling. All of these images were previously rated along dimensions of 
arousal and valence to confirm their respective associations. 
The object images were taken from the IAPS image database or sourced from Google 
images. The threatening images included a gun, a knife, and a syringe. The knife and the syringe 
were sourced from online due to them having better visual quality compared to the IAPS images 
of the same objects. The positive images were all sourced from Google images and were based 
on general positive categories that did not depend on extensive personal history with the object 
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(e.g. cigarettes in smokers) but still fitted in with the search goal instruction: “anything which 
makes people happy or portrays positive emotion”. We sourced three images including a bunch 
of flowers, money in pounds, and a gift wrapped present. 
The final subcategory of target stimuli were emotional faces, all these stimuli were 
sourced from the NimStim database which have previously been used in experiments which 
found attentional capture by emotional faces (Tottenham et al., 2009; Hodsoll, Viding & Lavie, 
2011). The identities of the faces were the same for both happy and fearful targets, meaning that 
they only differed in their emotional content. These identities included two male faces and one 
female face. As in previous investigations which found attentional capture of emotional faces 
we ovalled these faces to remove non-emotional identifying features (i.e. hair).   
The neutral filler images presented in the task were also objects, animals, and faces. The 
neutral faces were an equal split of male and female faces, and were composed of a mixture of 
different ethnicities. In total there were 48 neutral faces which were sourced from both the 
NimStim image database (Tottenham et al., 2009) and the Productive Aging Laboratory Face 
database (Minear & Park, 2004). The neutral objects selected were everyday house hold items, 
such as shoes, cutlery or furniture. There were a total of 48 of these neutral objects which were 
sourced from the IAPS image database (Lang et al., 2008). The neutral animal images were 
sourced from Brown et al. (under review – Chapter 2) and were selected based on their affective 
ratings being neither threatening or cute. The chosen exemplars consisted of animals such as 
fish, cows, pigs, and camels. All unlicensed images are listed online via the Open Science 
Framework (osf.io/ju87s). All images presented in the centre of the screen, measured 6°×4.02°, 
at a viewing distance of 59cm maintained using a chin-rest. 
The distractor images were always human scenes consisting of individuals or groups. 
These distractor images measured, 8.09°×5.35°, and appeared both above and below the central 
RSVP stream with a gap of .5° separation from the central image. The positive distractors 
consisted of nine images depicting people celebrating a marriage or sporting victory, or children 
playing. The threat-related distractors consisted of nine images of death or mutilation, such as 
those in a murder scene or a car accident. These affective images were all sourced from the 
IAPS database (Lang et al., 2005). Such images have all been found to capture attention in 
similar RSVP tasks (e.g. Most et al., 2005; de Oca, Villa, Cervantes & Welbourne, 2012). The 
neutral distractor images consisted of 24 different scenes of people doing everyday activities 
(e.g. people shopping or on public transport). 12 of these were sourced from the IAPS images 
set (Lang et al., 2005) and 12 from Google images, those taken from online were selected based 
on their similarity to the neutral images taken from the IAPS database, that is they included 
different images of the same content (e.g. people at work).  
Experiment 1b. The stimuli were identical to Experiment 1a but were resized to fit into 
parafoveal positions of the visual field. The central image was resized to 3.44×2.29 visual angle, 
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whilst the distractors were resized to 4.58×2.98° visual angle. The distance between central and 
distractor images was kept at .5°. 
Procedure. See Figure 12 for an example trial sequence in the experimental paradigm.  
In each block of the search task participants were instructed to search an RSVP stream for either 
a positive or threatening stimulus. Positive stimuli were described as “any which makes people 
happy or portrays positive emotion”. The threatening stimuli were described as “anything which 
could cause or show pain, or death, or signal danger”. Text search goal cues (i.e. “Positive”, 
“Threat”) were also presented at the beginning of each trial for 400ms. The positive or 
threatening target stimulus was presented in a nine frame RSVP stream consisting of eight other 
neutral stimuli which were randomly selected from the total pool of neutral stimuli. 
 
Figure 12. An example trial sequence from Experiment 1a and 1b. The first frame which appeared was a 
400ms cue for the search goal for that block, this was either “THREATENING” or “POSITIVE”. This 
was followed by nine frame RSVP stream, with each frame appearing for 100ms. Eight of the images 
were neutral, and one was the target which appeared at one of four locations (five, six, seven, or eight) in 
the RSVP stream, and was either a positive image (e.g. smiling children) or threat-related (e.g. mutilation 
or death). Distractors appeared above and below the RSVP stream and always two frames prior to the 
target. At the end of the trials, participants typed what they thought the positive or threatening target was 
using the keyboard. In Experiment 2 and 3, the response was present/absent judgment, which participant 
made at the end of the trial.  
 
The nine images on a particular trial were made up of three objects, three animals, and three 
faces, one of which was the target. This meant that when a target was from a particular category, 
only two neutral fillers were presented from that category.   
Each stimulus frame was presented for 100ms with no inter-stimulus interval.  The 
target stimulus appeared at positions four, six, or eight in the RSVP stream an equal number of 
times, and was counterbalanced across conditions.  The peripheral distractor stimulus was 
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consistently presented two slides prior to the target at Lag 2.  These peripheral distractors were 
two images presented above and below the central stimulus position. One distractor image was 
always a neutral distractor, randomly selected from the pool of neutral images. The other 
distractor stimulus could either be a threat-related distractor, positive distractor, or another 
neutral distractor. Within each condition the distractor image appeared an equal number of times 
above and below the central stream.  
At the end of each trial, the participant typed out the positive or threatening image they 
identified as the target using the keyboard and pressed the ‘Enter’ key, this triggered the 
beginning of the next trial. The dependent variable was the percentage of trials that participants 
accurately reported the correct cute or threatening animal which had been presented. In total 
there were four blocks of 54 trials each, with a period of rest every two blocks, the duration of 
which was determined by the participant.  The search condition blocks were presented in an 
alternating format (e.g. positive-threatening-positive-threatening).  The block order was 
counterbalanced between participants, with half the participants completing a threat search 
block first.  When blocks were not separated by a rest period, a text warning was presented for 
3000ms alerting the participant that the search goal had changed.  Other than search goal, which 
was manipulated between blocks, all within participant factors were fully counterbalanced 
within each block.  
 Before the main task, participants completed a six-trial practice block, which required 
them to search for house images amongst a stream of cars, shoes, bricks, and trees, and type out 
a specific feature of each house.  The specific images used in these practice trials were different 
from the set used in the main experiment.   
Scoring. In order to determine the percentage of trials which were correct, the 
participants’ responses were checked against the correct answer using an Excel formula which 
marked a trial as correct when the spelling of the response corresponded to the spelling of the 
correct answer. In order to account for spelling and approximate responses, the experimenter 
coded the participants’ responses prior to the Excel formula being applied. The experimenter 
was blind to both the distractor conditions and the correct answers during this process.  
Prior to scoring, the following coding rules were applied to all responses: Incorrectly 
spelt answers were corrected to the most similar target included in the set of images.  Vague 
descriptions of objects were not allowed, despite being similar to the target if it could also 
describe another target, e.g. “sharp object” was marked incorrect when the target was a syringe 
due to it also being descriptive of the knife target. Animals judged to be subordinate to the 
potential target animal were changed to the superordinate animal (e.g. “black widow” was 
accepted for spider; “cobra” was accepted for snake).  The block context was taken into 
account, meaning that if the search condition was positive, the answer of “dog” was changed to 
“puppy”, despite dog also being accepted as an answer in the threat search block. Due to 
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difficulty distinguishing the different faces apart, any description of a fearful face was accepted 
for all three fearful face targets, i.e. “scared”, “shocked”, “fear” were all accepted. To remain 
consistent across answers, changes were made universally to all answers made by a single 
participant, meaning that once a change was made to an answer it was also made for all identical 
answers that individual participant had made.  The percentage of correctly identified animals 
was recorded as the outcome measure for analysis.   
Bayes factors. To supplement the main analysis, we computed Bayes factors in order to 
determine whether any null effects were due to insensitivity or a true null effect.  A Bayes factor 
compares evidence for the experimental hypothesis (motivationally salient stimuli will result in 
greater attentional capture) and the null hypothesis (motivationally salient stimuli will not result 
in attentional capture).  The Bayes factor ranges from 0 to infinity, values less than 1 indicate 
that there is support for the null hypothesis, whilst values of greater than 1 indicate that there is 
support for the experimental hypothesis.  The strength of this evidence is indicated by the 
magnitude of the Bayes Factor; values greater than three or less than .33 indicate substantial 
evidence for either the experimental or null hypothesis.  A value closer to 1 suggests that any 
nonsignificant result is due to insensitivity and any difference is ‘anecdotal’ (Jeffrey, 1961; 
Dienes, 2008; 2011; 2014; 2016). 
The Bayes factor was computed using a modified version of Baguley and Kaye’s (2010) 
R code (retrieved from Dienes, 2008).  To compute the factor, we used a half-normal 
distribution which estimates that smaller differences are more probable than large differences. 
This half-normal set with a mean of zero which reflects the null hypothesis of zero difference. 
We used a half-normal distribution due to the previous evidence in the literature that the effect 
would be directional; specifically, that threatening stimuli would capture attention more than 
neutral stimuli 7.  The standard deviation of this distribution was set to 8%, which reflects the 
plausible effect size taken from Brown et al. (under review – Chapter 2; Experiment 1). This 
effect size was taken from the comparisons between neutral baseline distractor and the 
threatening distractor condition when participants were searching for threatening animals. All 
direct comparisons between conditions were tested using Bayes factors, however, p-values were 
also computed using two-way paired samples t-tests to facilitate comparison to previous results. 
Results and Discussion 
For both Experiment 1a and 1b the identification accuracy for each condition was 
entered in a 2×3 repeated measures ANOVA with target type (threatening/ positive) and 
distractor conceptual category (threatening/ positive/ neutral) as the two factors (see Table 4). 
The main effect of target was significant for both Experiment 1a and 1b, with threat-related 
                                                             
7 Following Dienes (2008; 2011), an adjusted standard error was applied based on the sample sizes 
collected. This adjustment was done using the following equation:  SE*(1 + 20/df*df). 
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targets being more accurately identified than positive targets, Experiment 1a: F(1,22) = 21.33, p 
= 21.33, ƞ2p = .45; Experiment 1b: F(1,15) = 7.73, p = .014, ƞ2p = .34. There was, however, no 
significant difference between the three distractor conceptual categories in either experiment, 
Experiment 1a: F(2,52) = .63, p = ; ƞ2p = .02; Experiment 1b: F(2,30) = .74, p = .486, ƞ2p = .05. 
Further, against my hypothesis, we found no significant interaction between the current search 
goal and the distractor conceptual category in these two experiments, Experiment 1a: F(2,52) = 
.57, p = .568, ƞ2p = .02; Experiment 1b: F(2,30) = .96, p = .394, ƞ2p = .06.  
In order to test the sensitivity of this null effect we conducted Bayesian pairwise 
comparisons between the motivationally salient distractor and the neutral distractor in each 
condition for both experiments. This revealed that when participants were searching for positive 
targets there was a non-significant difference between positive and neutral distractors, 
Experiment 1a t(26) = 1.08, p = .291, BH[0,8] = .68; Experiment 1b: t(15) = 1.21, p = .245, BH[0, 8] 
= .75, and that there was a nonsignificant difference between threatening and neutral distractors, 
Experiment 1a: t(26) = 1.25, p = .222, BH[0,8] = .84; Experiment 1b: t(15) = 1.36, p = .194, BH[0, 
8] = .76. Therefore, there was inconclusive evidence against distraction by both mutilation and 
pleasant scenes for the positive search goal. However, when participants were searching for the 
conceptual category of threat, there was a sensitive null difference between positive and neutral 
distractors, Experiment 1a: t(26) = .29, p = .773, BH[0,8] = .21; Experiment 1b: t(15) = .36, p = 
.727, BH[0, 8] = .26. Importantly, there was also a sensitive null difference between threatening 
and neutral distractors, Experiment 1a: t(26) = .30, p = .766, BH[0,8] = .28; Experiment 1b: t(15) 
= .36, p = .503, BH[0, 8] = .13, thus revealing that there was evidence in favour of the null 
hypothesis: searching for threat as a conceptual category did not induce a capture by all threat-
related images.  
 
Table 4: Mean and standard deviations for percentage accuracy across all distractor and search goal 
conditions within Experiment 1a and 1b. 
 
The results from Experiment 1a and 1b revealed that despite the threat-related distractors 
sharing the same affective category as the broad threat-related search goal, participants were no 
more distracted by these images than the neutral images. These images are highly arousing and 
unpleasant and have been found to capture attention in previous investigations. (e.g. Koster, 
Crombez, Verschuere & De Houwer, 2004). 
  
Positive scene 
distractor 
Mutilation scene 
distractor 
Neutral scene 
distractor 
Experiment 1a 
(n = 27) 
Positive search goal 53.70 (19) 53.40 (21.29) 55.76 (19.67) 
Threat search goal 69.86 (16.50) 68.72 (16.73) 69.24 (18.07) 
Experiment 1b 
(n = 16) 
Positive search goal 51.91 (13.60) 52.08 (17.73) 54.17 (16.91) 
Threat search goal 63.19 (12.19) 64.76 (12.03) 63.72 (12.52) 
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Experiment 2 
In the previous experiments the threat-related distractor was never part of the target set, 
meaning that there was no feature overlap with the search goal, only affective overlap. 
Experiments 1a and 1b suggest that involuntary attentional capture cannot be caused purely by 
affective overlap. However, it might be argued that the search goal induced in Experiment 1 was 
still rather specific, and cannot rule out the possibility that a broader affective search goal that 
includes all possible types of threatening stimuli could produce involuntary capture by threat. 
Experiment 2 therefore examined whether a search goal for multiple threatening objects could 
result in involuntary attentional capture by one of these objects.  
To test this, we included one of the target categories – fearful and neutral faces - as 
distractor conditions, alongside the mutilation and neutral scene distractor condition (which as 
in Experiment 1 were not part of the target set). We expected that the fearful faces would 
interfere more with the task than the neutral faces in this Experiment. We also expected to 
replicated Experiments 1a and 1b and find no difference between the mutilation and neutral 
scenes. In this Experiment we also switched the response to a present/absent judgement in order 
to provide a more time efficient method of measuring target detection across the task.   
Methods 
Participants. As in Experiment 1b, participants were recruited until all Bayes factors 
for the pairwise comparisons between neutral and the affective goal-congruent threat-related 
distractors were sensitive. This being either 3 and above or .33 and below. This led to 16 
participants being recruited, of which 12 were female and 4 male. The average age of the 
participants was 24.31 (SD = 4.29). Participants were remunerated with course credits or a small 
cash payment. Participants’ state and trait anxiety were in line with the expected range, State: M 
= 45.44, SD = 8.57; trait: M = 45.82, SD = 13.1.   
Stimuli. All stimuli were similar to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions: Due to 
the present/absent judgement task requiring more images for the increased number of trials, 
additional images were collected for presentation in the RSVP stream. Further, all images 
within this task were taken from existing databases with valence ratings in order to exclude any 
possibility that the previous result was influenced by the inclusion of any stimuli from 
unestablished system sets. These images included 136 neutral animal images, 136 neutral face 
images, and 136 neutral objects. The neutral animals were taken from a previous investigation 
conducted by myself which had been rated along dimensions of threat, cuteness, positive, and 
negative and were not rated highly on any of these dimensions (Brown et al., under review – 
Chapter 2). The neutral faces were sourced from the Lifespan Adult Facial Stimuli Database 
(Minear & Park, 2004). The neutral objects were taken from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005), 
Nencki Affective Picture System (NAPS; Marchewka et al., 2014) and the Geneva Affective 
Picture Database (GAPED; Dan-Glauser & Scherer, 2011) image sets which are all rated along 
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dimensions of arousal and valence, and were considered low on arousal and were considered 
neither pleasant or unpleasant.  
For the threat target category, eight threatening animal stimuli, eight fearful faces 
stimuli, and eight threatening objects were presented. The threatening animals were also taken 
from the previous investigation and had also been rated as moderately arousing and unpleasant, 
the different types of animal were identical to those presented in Experiments 1a and 1b (Brown 
et al., under review – Chapter 2). The fearful faces were taken from the NimStim database 
(Tottenham et al., 2009) and included an equal balance of male and female faces, as well as a 
range of ethnicities. As with the neutral faces, these were also ovalled.  The majority of the 
threatening objects were taken from the IAPS and NAPS databases, however, to increase the 
number of stimuli four images were sourced from Google images. These were objects which 
were part of the IAPS and NAPS image sets but with slightly different features (e.g. orange 
syringe instead of blue). The exact objects presented were a burning car, knives, syringes, and 
guns. 
For the distractor images, twelve neutral faces and twelve fearful faces were taken from 
the NimStim database, these shared the same identity and retained the same balance of genders 
as Experiment 1a and 1b. The mutilation and neutral scene distractor images consisted of twelve 
neutral scenes and twelve threatening scenes, all taken from the IAPS image set, these included 
those presented in Experiments 1a and 1b (Lang et al., 2008).  
As before, when the distractors were presented above or below the RSVP stream, the 
opposite distractor location was occupied with another image. For the face stimuli this was a 
patch of skin texture taken from a closeup of the distractor faces and contained no facial 
features. Twenty-four of these skin texture patches were presented, and included a range of 
different skin tones which were matched to the distractor faces. For the scene distractors the 
opposite target location was occupied with an inverted and blurred social scene taken from 
online. Twenty-four of these images were created, and contained a similar range of colours to 
the neutral and threatening scenes, but without the affective or conceptual content. 
All images were the same size as in Experiment 1b, with the exception of the fearful 
and neutral face distractor images presented in parafoveal locations which were resized to 
1.57°×2.29°. In order to match the size of these face stimuli to the other distractor images, faces 
were presented on a grey rectangle which was the same size as the other stimuli in the same 
position (i.e. 3.44°×2.29°).  
Procedure. The task was similar to Experiment 1a and 1b, with the following 
exceptions. Across all trials participants were instructed to search for anything threatening. 
Participants were given verbal instructions that some of the images may be emotional faces, 
predatory or poisonous animals, or dangerous objects. It was left deliberately vague what 
exactly these images would be, and whether these were the only threatening images presented.  
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At the start of each trial participants were given a 400ms saying cue “Threat-related” to 
prompt the start of the trial. This was followed by the nine frame RSVP stream, with three 
objects, three, animals, and three faces, one of which was the target which could appear at 
position five, six, seven, or eight in the stream. On half the trials the threat-related target was 
present, on the other half absent. On absent trials, the target position was replaced by a neutral 
image. This replacement neutral stimulus was selected so that there were always three of each of 
the different conceptual categories (object, animal, face). All the different targets appeared 
equally in each within-subjects condition, further, all other within-subject’s variables were 
counterbalanced within each block.  At the end of the RSVP stream, a screen with a “?” 
appeared, after this prompt, participants had to indicate whether they believed a threatening 
image had been presented on that trial, using the ‘c’ and ‘m’ keys, with the response-answer 
association counterbalanced between participants. In total there were four blocks of 64 trials. At 
the start of the task participants completed an eight-trial practice block which used the same 
stimuli as Experiment 1a and 1b.  
Results and Discussion 
Unlike Experiment 1a and 1b, A-prime (A’) detection sensitivity index was the 
dependent variable, rather than accuracy (see Table 5). A’ is a non-parametric analogue of d’, 
this was computed using hit rate and false alarm rate from the present/absent task response 
(Stanislaw & Todoroff, 1999; Zhang & Mueller 2005). A′ ranges from .5, which indicates that a 
signal cannot be distinguished from noise, to 1, which corresponds to perfect performance. This 
measure removes potential response bias which can influence binary response measures such as 
this. A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using A’ as the dependent variable, and 
distractor conceptual category (face/ scene) and distractor affect (neutral/ threat-related) as the 
within-participants factors. This revealed that there was no significant difference between the 
two types of distractor image, F(1,15) = .001, p = .98, ƞ2p < .01. Further, there was no difference 
between the detection sensitivity on trials when the distractor was threat-related compared to 
when it was neutral, F(1,15) = .46, p = .456, ƞ2p = .04. Additionally, against my original 
hypothesis, there was no interaction between the distractor conceptual category and distractor 
emotion, F(1,15) = .08, p = .785, ƞ2p = .01.  
  
Fear face 
distractors 
Neutral face 
distractors 
Mutilation scene 
distractor 
Neutral scene 
distractors 
Experiment 2 
(n = 16) 
Threat search  .75 (.07) .75 (.08) .74 (.07) .76 (.08) 
Experiment 3 
(n = 24) 
Fear face search .79 (.08) .83 (.03) .85 (.03) .84 (.03) 
Mutilation search .82 (.05) .83 (.02) .78 (.08) .84 (.02) 
 
Table 5. Mean and standard deviations for A’ detection sensitivity across all distractor and search 
conditions within Experiment 2 and 3. 
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To determine whether the null finding was sensitive and there truly was no difference 
between the threat-related and neutral distractors, we conducted Bayesian pairwise comparisons. 
The prior in this case was A’ = .10, which was the largest A’ raw effect size taken from a similar 
task using fearful faces as a search goal (Brown et al., under review – Chapter 2; Experiment 5). 
This revealed that, as in Experiment 1, there was no difference between the detection sensitivity 
of threat-related scenes relative to neutral scenes, t(15) = .59, p = .567, BH[0, .10] = .348. Further, 
the Bayes factors revealed that there was no difference between the fearful faces and the neutral 
faces, t(15) = .73, p = .479, BH[0, .10] = .17. This is despite the fearful faces being part of the 
target set. It, therefore, appears that even when participants adopted a general search goal for 
threat, composed of several subordinate conceptual categories of threat, threat-related distractors 
did not interfere with target detection versus a matched neutral image, even when these images 
were congruent with one of the subordinate categories of threat.  
Experiment 3 
The lack of evidence for any goal-driven attentional capture by the fearful faces, even 
while they were part of the attentional set, strikingly contrasts with my previous findings using a 
similar paradigm (Brown et al., under review – Chapter 2). Within this previous investigation 
we found that searching for threatening animals and fearful faces consistently resulted in a 
strong attentional capture by these categories of stimuli when they appeared in task-irrelevant 
locations. In these previous experiments, however, participants searched for a single category of 
threatening stimuli, rather than three. This suggests that goal-driven attentional capture may 
require participants to be searching for a single category of stimuli rather than multiple 
categories.  
 To confirm this, we conducted a final experiment using the same distractors used in 
Experiment 2, but restricting the search goals to a single category per block. Participants were 
given search goals for each of the two distractor categories (fearful faces and the mutilation 
scenes) in separate blocks. we predicted that these threat-related categories would only capture 
attention, relative to the neutral stimuli, when participants were searching for that specific 
category in the central stream. 
Methods 
Participants. Participants were recruited until all Bayes factors for the pairwise 
comparisons between neutral and threat-related distractors were sensitive. This lead to 24 
participants being recruited, of which 18 were female and 6 male. The average age of the 
participants was 23.5 (SD = 3.49). Participants’ state and trait anxiety were in line with the 
                                                             
8 For convenience, the stopping rule was checked using Zoltan Dienes online calculator (Dienes, 2008) 
which produced a Bayes factor of .33 for the fearful face distractor versus the neutral face distractor in the 
threat-related scene search. The subsequent analyses were computed using an R code version of Baguley 
and Kayes’ (2010) calculator, and produced a Bayes factor of .336, and was thus rounded up to .34. 
Hence the difference with this Bayes factor and the stopping rule of .33 and below. 
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expected range given participants’ age, state: M = 46.92, SD = 9.9; trait: M = 46.25, SD = 13.29.  
Participants were remunerated with course credits or a small cash payment.   
Stimuli and procedure. The task was identical to the Experiment 2 with the exception 
of the following. Participants were instructed to search a specific category of threatening 
stimuli. These targets were fearful faces, and scenes of mutilation and death, which participants 
searched for in different blocks. In total there were six blocks which were made up of 64 trials, 
with three blocks where participants searched for “Fearful faces” and three where they searched 
for “Injury and death”. These blocks were presented in a mixed order (i.e. Fear – Mutilation – 
Fear – Mutilation – Fear - Mutilation) with the order counterbalanced between participants. 
Before each block participants were instructed what the upcoming target category would be, 
they would then press the space bar to continue to the next block. Additionally, before each trial 
began participants would be prompted with a text warning for the category, either “Fearful 
faces” or “Injury and death”. The face target set consisted of 12 faces, meaning that in addition 
to the eight faces used in Experiment 2, four additional fearful face targets were added from the 
NimStim and Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set (ADFES; Van Der Schalk, Hawk, 
Fischer & Doosje, 2011). The stimulus set for scenes of mutilation and death consisted of 12 
images that were taken from the IAPS and the GAPED stimulus sets.  
Due to the inclusion of mutilation scenes in the central stream we replaced the neutral 
animal filler images with neutral human scene filler images. These neutral scene images 
consisted of 140 images, 19 were sourced from the IAPS database, 41 were sourced from the 
NAPS database, or and 80 were sourced from Google images, these included the images 
presented in Experiment 1a and 1b. The images taken from Google were selected based on their 
similarity to the images from the IAPS and NAPS; they included scenes of people shopping, on 
public transport, or at work. The neutral objects consisted of 128 neutral objects, which were the 
same as in Experiment 2, though 8 were removed. The neutral faces consisted of 140 faces, with 
four male and four female faces from the lifespan database added to those used in Experiment 2 
(Minear & Park, 2004). The stimuli presented in distractor locations were identical to those 
presented in the previous experiment.  
Results and Discussion 
I conducted a 2×2×2 repeated measures ANOVA on the A’ score (see Table 5), using 
search goal (fearful faces/ death and injury), distractor conceptual category (faces/ scenes), and 
distractor valence (neutral / threat-related) as factors. This revealed that there was a significant 
effect of search goal, F(1,23) = 5.66, p = .026, ƞ2p = .2, with participants more accurately 
detecting the fearful faces than the scenes of death and injury. There was also a marginally 
significant effect of distractor conceptual category, F(1,23) = 3.32, p = .081, ƞ2p = .13, whereby 
face distractors resulted in lower detection sensitivity relative to the scene distractors.  
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The type of distractor did not significantly interact with the valence of the distractor, 
F(1,23) = .01, p = .956, ƞ2p < .01. However, the current search goal of the participant did 
significantly interact with the type of distractor presented, F(1,23) = 10.48, p = .001, ƞ2p = .37, 
with both scenes and face distractors resulting in lower detection sensitivity when congruent 
with the current search goal, relative to when they were incongruent. Current search goal also 
marginally interacted with the valence of the distractors, F(1,23) = 4.10, p = .055, ƞ2p = .151, 
such that when participants were searching for scenes of injury and death, participants were 
worse at detecting the distractor was threatening, relative to searching for the fearful faces. 
Importantly, both of these interactions were qualified by a highly significant three-way 
interaction between current search goal, distractor conceptual category, and distractor threat-
relevance, F(1,23) = 15.71, p = .001, ƞ2p = .41.  As can be seen in Figure 13, this interaction 
reflected interference from the threat (versus neutral) distractors only when these matched the 
current type of threat being searched for.   
Figure 13. A graph depicting the threat-related distractor effect across both search goal conditions. The 
motivational distractor effect reflects the difference between the matched neutral distractor and the threat-
related distractor on target detection sensitivity (A’). Larger distractor effects depict a greater decrement 
in target detection sensitivity. Error bars reflect within-subjects standard error. 
 
In order to break down the three-way interaction we conducted four Bayesian pairwise 
comparisons. These contrasted A’ when the distractor was threat-related compared to its 
matched neutral counterpart, within each search goal conditions. This revealed that when 
participants were searching for the threat-related scenes, the detection sensitivity did not differ 
between fearful face distractors and the neutral face distractor, t(23) = 1.25, p = .224, BH[0, .10] = 
.33. Additionally, the threat-related scene did not differ from neutral scenes in their influence on 
detection sensitivity of the fearful faces, t(23) = .88, p = .386, BH[0, .10] = .04. Therefore, when 
incongruent with the current search goal, there was no evidence of attentional capture by threat-
related distractors. However, when the distractors were congruent with the current search goal, 
the threat-related distractors produced a significant decrement in detection sensitivity relative to 
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the neutral counterpart. This was true for both faces and the mutilation scenes, t(23) = 3.36, p = 
.003, BH[0, .10] = 37.34; t(23) = 3.85, p = .001, BH[0, .10] = 200.12, respectively.  
To demonstrate the consistency and strength of the goal-driven involuntary attentional 
capture by threat-related categories of stimuli, we conducted a meta-analysis of all conditions 
from Brown et al. (under review – Chapter 2) and the current investigation where participants 
were searching for a singular category of threat (see Figure 14). The Hedges’ g effect sizes were 
computed using a DerSimonian-Laird (1986) random effects model in R’s Metafor package, and 
were weighted by sample size (as described in Aloe & Becker, 2012; Viechtbauer, 2010). One 
cumulative effect size was computed for the threatening distractor when they were congruent 
with the specific contents of the search goal versus a neutral control distractor. This included 
Experiments 1, 3, 4 and 5 from Brown et al. and Experiment 3 in the current investigation. This 
random effects meta-analysis (DerSimonian-Laird) revealed a strong and significant cumulative 
effect, Hedges’ g = -1.07, Z = 3.76, p < .001, 95% CI[-1.62, -.51]. This, therefore, highlights the 
very consistent phenomena of goal-driven attentional capture by individual categories of 
threatening stimuli when a single category is the search goal. 
 
Figure 14. Forest plot depicting the individual and cumulative Hedges’ g effect sizes and 95% confidence 
intervals for the pairwise comparisons between the threat-related distractor versus the neutral control 
distractor. The comparisons are from conditions where the task-irrelevant distractor was congruent with 
the participants’ current search goal. Effects are separated into conditions where participants searched for 
a broad category of threatening stimuli, and conditions where participants searched for a specific category 
of threatening stimuli. Experiments are taken from Brown et al. (under review – Chapter 2) and the 
current investigation. Cumulative effect size was calculated using DerSimonian-Laird random effects 
model. 
 
In comparison, a meta-analysis conducted on data from Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2 in the 
current investigation, where participants were given a broad threat search goal and distractors 
were from this same broad category, there was no significant evidence of a cumulative goal-
driven effect, Hedges’ g = -.04, Z = .25, p = .805, 95% CI[-.37, .29]. It, therefore, appears that 
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there is no evidence of attentional capture by threatening stimuli being induced by general threat 
associations of the search goal, independent of the specific conceptual category. 
General Discussion 
Across three experiments, we found that when participants assumed a broad attentional 
set for threat there was no evidence for attentional capture by threat-related distractors, despite 
these sharing the same general affective properties. No goal-driven capture was observed even 
when a third of the targets which made up this search goal were the same as a distractor 
category; that is, when participants searched for fearful faces, threatening objects, and 
threatening animals, fearful faces did not interfere with detection of these targets more than 
neutral faces. However, these same distractors produced striking attentional capture effects 
when participants searched for a single category of threat-related stimuli, consistent with my 
previous investigation (Brown et al., under review – Chapter 2). Meta-analyses across 
experiments conducted in my previous research further confirmed that while searching for a 
specific category of threat resulted in a large and consistent attentional capture effect by threat, 
searching for a broad threat category did not. Therefore, based on the current evidence, it 
appears that involuntary goal-driven attentional capture does not occur when the goal and 
distractor only overlap along an affective dimension. We, however, did discover that 
participants could search for multiple conceptual categories of threatening stimuli at one time, 
and either detect or identify different stimuli from across these visually heterogenous categories. 
This suggests that at some level, participants were able to hold multiple threat-related category 
features active as a broad search goal. Critically, however, these did not induce involuntary 
attentional capture by other task-irrelevant threatening stimuli.  
The absence of conceptual generalisation of the threat search goal contrasts with 
previous research, which has found, in a similar RSVP paradigm, that instructing participants to 
search for a conceptual category resulted in attentional capture by irrelevant distractor stimuli 
which were part of this conceptual category (Wyble et al., 2013). One intriguing explanation for 
the difference between the current results and those of Wyble and colleagues could be a 
distinction between conceptual and affective processing. Evidence suggests that the gist of 
conceptual information can be extracted pre-attentively in a reflexive manner, even when the 
stimuli are presented extremely briefly (e.g. 13ms, Potter, Wyble Hagmann & McCourt, 2014). 
By contrast, there is some recent support that emotional processing is no longer considered to be 
preattentive – rather, the emotional content of an image is not always automatically processed, 
and that instructing participants to search for a non-emotional feature can block processing of 
the affective content of the image from influencing attention (Everaert, Spruyt & De Houwer, 
2013). Further, electrophysiological evidence has demonstrated that the divergence in neural 
activity between meaningful scenes and scrambled images had an earlier onset compared to the 
difference between neutral and emotional scenes, thus suggesting that semantic extraction 
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occurred earlier, and that emotional processing is dissociable from conceptual processing (Attar, 
Anderson & Mueller, 2010).  
It might alternatively be argued, that the results simply show that only a single set of 
features can be prioritised to induce an involuntary capture (cf. van Moreselaar, Theeuwes & 
Olivers, 2014; Berggren & Eimer, 2016). If this were the case, then it may be that although 
threat does exist as a superordinate category, only a small subset of features from this category 
can be prioritised at one time. Indeed, the mainstream attention literature suggests that 
individuals search conceptual categories by tuning attention towards a specific set of features 
which are typical of that category. In support of this idea, Yu, Maxfield and Zelinksky (2016) 
determined the prevalence of category consistent features across stimuli using computational 
techniques, they found that participants were faster to detect a target from a category if it 
contained more of these consistent features.  Further, participants are faster to detect targets 
from categories with a lot of similar features compared to those that are more varied (Hout, 
Robbins, Godwin, Fitzsimmons & Scarince, 2017). Therefore, there may be mechanistic 
limitations on how an individual may search for a conceptual category comprised of multiple 
different features. By this argument, then the reason that Wyble et al. (2013) found goal-driven 
capture effects by a conceptual category, when we did not, may have been because the 
conceptual categories the targets and distractors were drawn from were more homogenous and 
contained more common features, thus allowing participants to search for common features 
which overlapped with both these stimuli (see appendix within Wyble et al. for full list of search 
goal categories). 
On the other hand, this would not explain why Giammarco et al. (2016) discovered 
goal-driven capture by a heterogenous artificial category; in this second case, however, 
Giammarco et al. trained participants on an artificial category learning task until they could 
report each object’s category at 90% accuracy. The participants then searched for these 
heterogenous categories in an RSVP task, it was found that a task-irrelevant distractor only 
interfered with target detection if it was from the same category as the current search goal, even 
though these categories had only been learnt in the same session. It may have been that, due to 
the extensive training, participants may have learned common features within the category, thus 
a specific feature based account cannot be discounted. Future research could investigate whether 
there are differences when participants have undergone extensive training to detect multiple 
threatening categories, and whether after this training goal-induced attentional capture does 
occur.  
Regardless the above, the present work highlights an important boundary condition that 
presents a challenge to recently proposed goal-driven accounts of attentional capture by 
affective stimuli. Growing recent research has pointed to a goal-driven account of attentional 
capture by affective stimuli, highlighting that this capture often depends on task-relevance 
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rather than occurring unconditionally (e.g. Lichtenstein-Vidne et al., 2012, Stein, Zwickel, 
Ritter, Kitzmantel & Schneider, 2009). For instance, by presenting threatening stimuli as a 
target without explicitly instructing participants to assume a search goal for threat, Lichtenstein-
Vidne et al. (2012) found that threatening distractors interfered with target detection, and that 
this was not the case when the target was neutral. Similarly, in tasks where participants are 
instructed to judge whether a stimulus is threatening or neutral, an attentional capture by these 
threatening images is found, conversely, this difference is absent if participants have to judge 
the same images on non-affective features such as gender (e.g. Stein, Zwickel, Ritter, 
Kitzmantel & Schneider, 2009; see also, Vromen, Lipp & Becker, 2016; Everaert, Spruyt & De 
Houwer, 2012). Feature-Specific attention allocation theory (cf. Everaert et al., 2012) has 
attempted to explain this task-relevance effect by suggesting that all visual information which is 
currently relevant to an individual captures attention, and that the affective content of a stimulus 
captures attention because participants are more likely to find it relevant to their aims.  
Our current results, however, clearly demonstrate that relevance to an affective top-
down attentional goal is not sufficient to induce goal-driven attentional capture: if this were the 
case then participants should have been distracted by all threatening stimuli when adopting a 
search goal for this category. Instead, the results suggest that goal-driven capture by irrelevant 
threatening stimuli may only occur when that specific type of threatening stimuli (e.g. fearful 
faces, or threatening scenes) is adopted as an attentional goal. we propose that as well as 
relevance of a distractor to the current aims, in order for involuntary attentional capture to 
emerge, there has to be the intention to search for that specific stimulus category, as well as 
knowledge of what specific features define that category. In the light of the present findings, it 
appears possible that previous demonstrations of relevance effects could be explained by 
relevance cueing participants to adopt a top-down search goal for the specific type of threat-
related stimuli that also appeared as distractors. For example, in Lichtenstein-Vidne’s study 
participants may have noticed that the targets were all threatening scenes, and adopted a specific 
attentional goal for threatening scenes.  
An interesting question is how such a specific goal-driven form of attentional capture 
could work in a real-world setting, where participants would be unlikely to search for a specific 
threat across all situations at the cost of all other search goals. we have recently proposed how 
such a specific search goal mechanism could operate in a real-world setting (Brown & Forster, 
under review – Chapter 6). In this novel account we propose that participants use prior 
knowledge of the associations between a context and the objects that may appear there, in order 
to determine what specific category to search for. For example, a range of different threatening 
stimuli might be deemed important to detect (e.g. broken glass, speeding taxi, potential 
attacker), but contextual cues (e.g. engine noises) would allow prioritisation of specific 
categories of threat which are likely to appear (e.g. a taxi hurtling in your direction). 
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The current experiments were designed to investigate a within-participants experimental 
question, rather than individual differences in attentional capture. However, the specificity of 
goal-driven attentional capture seen in the present results appears to parallel patterns seen in 
recent anxiety disorder research. A recent meta-analysis revealed that across a range of anxiety 
disorders (e.g. phobias, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, social anxiety), specific sub-categories 
of threatening stimuli which were particularly relevant to that disorder (e.g. angry faces in social 
anxiety) captured attention more than other threatening stimuli (Pergamin-Hight, Naim, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, van Ijsendoorn & Bar-Haim, 2015). These rather specific clinical 
attentional biases, along with the present evidence, are consistent with the notion that 
individuals assume search goals only for the specific threatening stimuli which are relevant to 
their concerns. A caveat is that there are conditions such as Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD) which seemingly contradict this specific bias, because individuals exhibit anxious 
symptoms for a range of threatening stimuli across contexts, and produce a more general 
attentional bias (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). This could be the result of a more stimulus-driven 
mechanism which result in bottom-up sensitivity to all threatening stimuli; or alternatively, it 
could reflect a broader goal-driven mechanism where these individuals attempt to search for 
multiple threatening objects, simultaneously. Indeed, in the current investigation we have shown 
that it is possible for individuals to search for multiple categories of threat at once, it may be 
that individuals with GAD are able to prioritise multiple threatening stimuli at once to induce 
capture across a range of stimuli. 
In conclusion, we found no evidence that involuntary attentional capture by threatening 
stimuli can be induced by a broad threat search goal. Although individuals may be able to 
search for multiple threat-relevant categories of stimuli at once, we only found involuntary 
attentional allocation to task-irrelevant threatening distractors when individuals assumed a 
search goal for that specific category of threat. This finding highlights a boundary condition for 
goal-driven attentional capture, which must be considered in any goal-driven account of 
attentional capture by threatening stimuli.  
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Chapter 4: Attentional Capture by Alcohol Related Stimuli May be Activated 
Involuntarily by Top-Down Search Goals 
 
Chris R.H.  Brown+, Theodora Duka+, & Sophie Forster+ 
+ School of Psychology, University of Sussex, UK 
 
Abstract 
Previous research has found that the attention of social drinkers is preferentially oriented 
towards alcohol related stimuli (attentional capture). This is argued to play a role in escalating 
craving for alcohol that can result in hazardous drinking. According to Incentive theories of 
drug addiction, the stimuli associated with the drug reward acquire learned incentive salience, 
and capture attention. However, it is not clear whether the mechanism by which this capture 
effect is created is a voluntary or an automatic one, although some evidence suggests a 
stimulus-driven mechanism. Here we test for the first time whether this attentional capture 
effect could reflect an involuntary consequence of a goal-driven mechanism. Across three 
experiments, participants were given search goals to detect either an alcoholic or a non-
alcoholic object (target) in a stream of briefly presented objects unrelated to the target. Prior to 
the target, a task-irrelevant parafoveal distractor appeared. This could either be congruent or 
incongruent with the current search goal. Applying a meta-analysis, we combined the results 
across the three experiments and found consistent evidence of goal-driven attentional capture; 
whereby alcohol distractors impeded target detection when the search goal was for alcohol. By 
contrast, alcohol distractors did not interfere with target detection while participants were 
searching for a non-alcoholic category. A separate experiment revealed that the goal-driven 
capture effect was not found when participants held alcohol features active in memory but did 
not intentionally search for them. These findings suggest a strong goal-driven account of 
attentional capture by alcohol cues in social drinkers. 
 
Images of alcohol have been found to automatically capture the attention of individuals 
who regularly consume alcohol (Field & Cox, 2008; see Rooke, Hine & Thorsteinsson, 2008 for 
meta-analysis). This attentional capture has been causally implicated in problem drinking: The 
bias correlates with craving for alcohol (Field, Munafo & Franken, 2009), and training 
individuals to adopt the bias directly increases craving (Field & Eastwood, 2005).  This suggests 
that attentional bias towards alcohol cues may play a role in the maintenance of hazardous 
drinking behaviour through elevating the craving for alcohol (Field et al., 2016; although see 
Christiansen, Schoenmaker & Field, 2015).  
Within the prominent attention literature, it is established that the rapid biasing of 
attention toward a particular stimulus can reflect either stimulus-driven mechanisms, resulting 
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from the inherent attention-grabbing properties of the stimulus itself, or goal-driven 
mechanisms, resulting from the voluntary prioritisation of that class of stimulus (Corbetta & 
Schulman, 2002). Understanding the underlying mechanism which causes attentional capture by 
alcohol has important implications for understanding models of addiction and for prevention 
and treatment of alcohol abuse.  
A dominant theory of addiction, Incentive Sensitisation Theory (IST), proposes that the 
attentional capture by alcohol-related stimuli develops as a consequence of the repeated pairings 
between stimulus and the rewarding effects of alcohol (Robinson & Berridge, 1993; 2001; 
Berridge & Robinson, 2016). Through the repeated pairings with reward, the alcohol-related 
features take on a learned incentive salience, meaning that the features are now imbued with the 
ability to ‘grab’ attention. The exact attentional mechanism is often left ambiguous; however it 
is often assumed that this capture effect occurs in a stimulus-driven manner. Whereby the 
incentive salient stimulus induces dopaminergic activity which directly influences selective 
attention, possibly independent of the intentions of the individual (Berridge & Robinson, 2016; 
Hickey & Peelen, 2015).  The current investigation, will, however, present evidence that the 
attentional capture could alternatively be accounted for by a goal-driven attentional mechanism. 
Evidence for the alcohol attentional capture comes from paradigms such as the dot-
probe task, in which participants are instructed to respond to a dot in one of two locations, 
which are filled prior to the appearance of the dot by one alcohol image and one non-alcohol 
image (Townsend & Duka, 2001). Heavy drinkers are typically slower to respond to the dot 
when it does not appear in the location that was previously occupied by the alcohol image, even 
when this image was presented only for 50ms (Noel et al., 2006). This effect, amongst many 
others, occurs despite participants being instructed to ignore the alcohol image, which now acts 
as a distractor, and focus on detecting the target (e.g. Field, Mogg, Zetteler & Bradley, 2004).  
It is important to note that the involuntary nature of the alcohol attention capture does 
not necessarily point to a stimulus-driven mechanism. In fact, over the past 26 years, evidence 
from the mainstream attention literature has highlighted that involuntary attention should not 
always be assumed to reflect stimulus-driven mechanisms.  Rather, paradoxical as it may seem, 
involuntary attention can actually be a direct consequence of voluntary top-down goals – a 
phenomenon known as ‘contingent capture’ (cf. Folk, Remington & Johnson, 1992). For 
instance, Folk, Leber and Egeth (2002) found that when participants were given a task goal to 
search for a specific colour in a stream of briefly presented stimuli (i.e. rapid serial visual 
presentation - RSVP), only irrelevant distractors which matched the search goal captured 
attention and interfered with target identification. Equally salient stimuli which did not match 
the current search goal did not interfere with target identification. Note that this goal-driven 
capture occurs despite participants being aware that the peripheral distractors were entirely task-
irrelevant, and despite the fact that attending to the distractors resulted in failure to identify the 
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subsequent target. Hence, automatic and entirely involuntary attentional capture can result from 
a voluntary goal-driven attentional setting.  
An involuntary yet goal-driven alcohol attentional capture effect could therefore 
plausibly occur among individuals who attentionally prioritise the detection of alcohol. Thus, 
the question raises whether social drinkers are ‘on the lookout’ for alcohol in their environment, 
with the result that they automatically notice it even when they are meant to be completing 
another task. Evidence suggests that heavy drinkers find viewing alcohol stimuli pleasant (Field 
et al., 2004). Regular social drinkers report enjoying thinking of alcohol, and report that being a 
drinker is part of their explicit identity (Martino et al., 2017; Lindgren et al., 2013). Given that 
drinkers find alcohol pleasant to view, and personally relevant, we argue that they may also be 
likely to adopt a voluntary goal to look out for it.  
In terms of IST, the motivational effect of craving has also been found to influence 
voluntary goal-directed choice (e.g. Mackillop et al. 2010). There is also some evidence that 
dopaminergic activity is implicated in the voluntary maintenance of top-down goals, not just 
bottom-up automatic processing of stimuli (e.g. Frank, Loughry & O’Reilly, 2001). Thus, social 
drinkers who have learnt the incentive value of alcohol may be more motivated to search for 
alcohol features than non-drinkers, leading to involuntary contingent capture by alcohol stimuli.   
 A stimulus-driven account would predict that the alcohol attentional capture effect 
would be found regardless of the current attentional goals. It is notable, however, experimental 
evidence favouring the stimulus-driven account, is derived from paradigms in which the task 
cannot be performed without some degree of intentional allocation of attention to the alcohol 
images. For instance, in previous tasks, (e.g. the widely used dot-probe), the distractors are 
always presented in an attended location (i.e. the same location as the potential targets). To my 
knowledge, no evidence has suggested, nor has any theory of attention proposed, that it is 
possible to entirely ignore the features of a stimulus presented in an attended location. Thus, 
presenting alcohol images in a potential target location, that must be attended in order to 
perform the task, would make attentional processing unavoidable. Furthermore, it is notable that 
no actual cost is incurred by consistently attending to the alcohol images in the dot-probe. 
Because the images are predictive of the location of the target on 50% of the trials, attending to 
these images doesn’t slow the overall reaction time. Favouring one set of images would give the 
same overall reaction time as if participants ignored those images, meaning that there is little 
incentive to try and ignore them. This raises the possibility that previous findings of attentional 
capture by alcohol might be accounted for by social drinkers voluntarily attending to the alcohol 
images, given that they find these pleasant and personally relevant and there is no cost for doing 
so. In fact, when the target probe is consistently presented in a separate location from the 
alcohol images (e.g. 96% of trials), then attention can be effectively trained away from the 
alcohol cues (Schoenmakers, Wiers, Jones, Bruce & Jansen, 2007). Thus, for a completely 
80 
 
involuntary attentional capture to be measured the alcohol images must appear in a distinct task-
irrelevant location. 
In the current investigation, we aim to establish whether the extent to which social 
drinkers adopt a top-down goal for alcohol can determine whether or not attention is captured 
by completely task-irrelevant alcohol distractors. To test this, we adapted the RSVP paradigm 
used by Folk et al. (2002) to include alcohol images. Specifically, we instructed participants to 
search a stream of rapidly presented everyday objects for either alcohol, or a category of non-
alcoholic stimuli, in different blocks. We presented alcohol and non-alcoholic distractor images 
in completely task-irrelevant parafoveal locations, which participants were instructed to ignore. 
Note that within this paradigm it is not only possible to completely ignore the distractors, but 
attending to the distractors would result in the complete failure to detect the subsequent target. 
Therefore, participants are strongly motivated to avoid any voluntary allocation of attention to 
the alcohol distractors.  
If a goal-driven mechanism can account for involuntary capture of attention in social 
drinkers, alcohol distractors should selectively disrupt task performance (target detection) when 
participants are currently searching for alcohol. Conversely, a stimulus-driven attentional 
capture, operating independent of the current goals of the individual, would result in attentional 
capture regardless of whether the participant currently holds an alcohol or a non-alcohol search 
goal. 
Experiment 1 a, b, c 
I conducted three versions of Experiment 1 to test the replicability of the effect while 
adjusting for differences in task difficulty. Experiments 1a and 1b were identical, with the 
exception of the presentation speed which was slowed down from 83ms (1a) to 100ms (1b) in 
an attempt to equate task difficulty between the alcohol and non-alcoholic goals. Experiment 1c 
changed the non-alcohol stimulus category from pots/pans to shoes, for the same reason. 
Additionally, a larger sample was collected for Experiment 1c in order to allow sensitivity to 
detect a potentially smaller effect.  
Methods 
Participants. Table 6 presents participants’ characteristics from all Experiments. 
Participant’s self-reported drinking related scores were within the range of previous 
investigations which found attentional capture by alcohol cues (Tibboel, De Houwer & Field, 
2010; Ramirez, Monti & Colwill, 2015; Sharma, Albery & Cook, 2001; DePalma, Ceballos & 
Graham, 2017). Additionally, we note that the sample contained a large number of participants 
who considered alcohol to have a positive effect, and showed hazardous drinking behaviours: 
98% of participants reported expecting some degree of positive arousing outcome from 
consuming alcohol (scored > 5; Morean, Corbin & Treat, 2012); 78% of the sample were 
classed as problem drinkers by the AUDIT, and therefore at risk of substance dependence 
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(scored > 8; Saunders et al. 1993), and 52% were classified as binge drinkers on the AUQ 
(scored > 24; Townshend & Duka, 2005). 
Participants were all members of the University of Sussex student subject pool. Only 
participants who had consumed alcohol in the last month, and were not currently abstaining, 
were recruited. All participants were remunerated with either partial course credit or small cash 
payment.  Informed consent was collected prior to participation, and ethics were approved by 
the University of Sussex ethics committee in accordance with the 1964 declaration of Helsinki. 
Sample size calculations were conducted prior to data collection using Gpower software 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2009). This revealed that to detect an effect size of d = .92 
(two-tailed; α = .05; 1 – β = .8), a sample of 12 participants was required to detect the goal-
driven effect. The expected effect size was taken from a similar task which found goal-driven 
attentional capture using emotional face stimuli (Brown, Berggren & Forster, under review – 
Chapter 2).  The sample size of Experiment 1b was increased to 16 participants in order to 
increase the chance of detecting neutral goal-driven capture which was non-significant in 
Experiment 1a (four additional participants allowed an addition of one participant to each 
counterbalanced condition). One participant was excluded from Experiment 1a due to a 
programming error, another from Experiment 1b due to currently abstaining from alcohol. In 
order to increase the power to detect even small stimulus-driven alcohol capture effect, 
Experiment 1c used a larger sample of 60 participants based on a power analysis in which the 
expected effect was based on the 95% lower bound confidence interval of the meta-analytically 
computed relationship between alcohol consumption and an ‘implicit’ cognitive bias towards 
alcohol, as reported by Rooke et al. (2008; d = .37, two-tailed; α = .05; 1 – β = .8). 
 Sex Age Units (AUQ) AUDIT 
Positive 
Arousal 
(AEAS) 
Experiment 1a 
7 female 
5 male 
22 (2.45) 21.43 (25.43) 8.0 (3.77) 7.19 (1.34) 
Experiment 1b 
13 female 
3 male 
20.44 (2.06) 12.68 (14.74) 11.94 (6.2) 7.48 (.95) 
Experiment 1c 
46 female 
14 male 
21.6 (3.91) 16.49 (11.13) 12.18 (6.0) 7.79 (1.09) 
Experiment 2 
24 female 
19 male 
21.37 (2.25) 18.91 (15.05) 13.21 (5.35) 7.71 (1.32) 
      
Table 6. The mean demographic and questionnaire data from across all four experiments, standard 
deviations are presented in brackets. Units of alcohol was measured by the Alcohol Use Questionnaire 
(AUQ; Mehrabian & Russell 1978), and reflects the number of units drank in a typical drinking week. 
The Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders, Aasland, Babor, De la Fuente & 
Grant, 1993) reflects the number of units drank per week, but also the frequency of negative outcome 
from drinking alcohol. A score of 8 or above suggests a hazardous relationship with alcohol, the 
maximum score is 40. The positive arousal reflects the mean expectancy of a positive and high arousing 
outcome (e.g. feeling ‘lively’) immediately after consuming an acute dose of alcohol, recorded on a scale 
of 1 to 10. The score is a subscale taken from the Anticipated Effects of Alcohol Scale which reflects the 
reward stimulation from consuming alcohol (Morean et al., 2012; Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert & Lang, 
2001). 
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 Questionnaires. 
Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ). The AUQ is a 12-item questionnaire which 
measures the frequency and speed of the weekly consumption of specific alcoholic drinks, 
which allows the computation of the number of units drank per week and binge score 
(Mehrabian & Russell, 1978). 
Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT). The AUDIT is a 10-item scale 
which measures both the frequency and amount of alcohol consumed, but also the negative 
behavioural consequences from alcohol, e.g. when drinking is concerning to others (Saunders et 
al., 1993).   
Anticipated Effects of Alcohol Scale (AEAS). The AEAS is a 22-item scale that 
measures the expected emotions immediately after consuming an imagined amount of alcohol 
(4 drinks for females, and 5 drinks for males). The scale is composed of 4 subscales varying 
along dimensions of arousal and valence (Morean et al. 2012). The main subscale of interest 
was the positive high arousal factor, as this factor will indicate whether individuals perceived 
alcohol to be rewarding (cf. Bradley et al., 2001). 
Stimuli. Across all experiments stimuli were presented using E-prime 2.0 software on a 
Dell 1707FP. The resolution was set to 1280×1024 and the viewing distance was maintained at 
59cm using a chin-rest. Example stimuli are presented in Figure 15, and all stimuli are available 
online via the Open Science Framework (osf.io/9n8yq).  
All target and distractor stimuli were images of single objects on a plain white 
background. The images within each category were selected so that they formed a heterogenous 
visual category with multiple features, textures, and shapes. The alcohol stimuli were selected 
so that there were equal numbers of exemplars of spirits, wine, and beers – and half of these 
stimuli were presented in glasses, the other half in bottles. Pots/pans images were selected so 
that there were a variety of materials and colours which formed the category (e.g. ceramic, steel, 
copper). Approximately half the exemplars were frying pans, the other half pots. The shoes 
were selected so that there were multiple different types of shoe (e.g. sports trainers, high heels, 
boots, men’s formal shoes). Men’s shoes and women’s shoes were presented approximately 
equally, though there were some unisex shoes presented. These image selection criteria thus 
encouraged participants to form a search goal for a general category of objects, rather than any 
single feature. 
The angles which the shoe and alcohol images appeared was more uniform than the 
pots/pans, we therefore rotated several exemplars from these categories so that these categories 
were matched on the variability of stimulus orientation. The alcohol target category contained 
12 full colour images of different types of alcohol. In Experiments 1a and 1b the non-alcohol 
target category contained 12 images of different types of pots/pans. In Experiment 1c the non-
alcohol target category contained 12 images of shoes. 
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Three categories of distractor images were presented in each experiment: alcohol, 
pots/pans, and shoes. In Experiments 1a and b the shoe category was included as a completely 
goal-incongruent category (i.e. not matching either task search goal), while in Experiment 1c the 
pots/pans were the goal-incongruent category. Each distractor category was composed of 16 
images which were visually similar to the target images of the same category, but were never 
the same exemplars. All distractor and target images appeared an equal number of times within 
each condition. The distractors appeared to the left and right of the central stream with a gap of 
.5° between them. All centrally presented distractors measured 3.44°×2.29°, whilst the 
parafoveal distractors measured 2.98°×4.58°. 
Figure 15. Structure of a single RSVP trial and stimuli used across the 4 experiments. At the start of each 
trial participants were presented with a 400ms prompt, with the target type for that block: alcohol or 
pots/pans (Experiment 1a, 1b) or alcohol or shoes (Experiment 1c). Each of the subsequent 9 images in 
the RSVP appeared for 83ms (Experiment 1a) or 100ms (Experiments 1b, 1c and 2) without inter-
stimulus interval. In Experiment 2 there was no prompt because they always had to detect cars in the 
RSVP stream; however, a pots/pans image or alcohol image was presented at the start of each trial for 
participants to retain in memory for the duration of the trial. At the end of each trial participants identified 
whether a target had been present or absent. The irrelevant distractors were identical across all 
experiments, whilst the target type varied depending on what the search goal was (Experiment 1a: 
pots/pans, alcohol; Experiment 1b: pots/pans. Alcohol; Experiment 1c: shoes, alcohol, Experiment 2: 
cars). 
 
In total 408 non-alcoholic filler images were selected to appear in the central stream. 
These were composed of 24 different everyday household objects with 17 different exemplars 
of each of these objects (see Appendix for full list of non-alcoholic items stimuli). An additional 
48 non-alcoholic object images were selected to appear as fillers in the parafoveal locations, 
these were composed of the same 24 object categories with two exemplars from each category. 
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The parafoveal filler served to fill the other distractor location not occupied with an alcohol, 
shoe, or pot/pan distractor. All stimuli were sourced from Google images and appeared in 
isolation from other objects on a white background. During the task, these images were 
presented on a grey coloured screen (RGB: 192, 192, 192). All images appeared four times 
across the experiment. Due to potential similarity to the shoe targets, in Experiment 1c socks 
were removed from the filler stimuli and were replaced with 19 lamp images; 17 in the central 
set, two in the parafoveal set.  
RSVP task. In Experiment 1a participants were instructed to search in a central RSVP 
stream of nine images for an object from a specific category, each image appeared for 83ms. 
The task consisted of two blocks of 96 trials, in one block participants were instructed to search 
for “ALCOHOL”, in the other “POTS + PANS”, and this search order was counterbalanced 
between participants. Participants received 400ms reminders of what the search goal was before 
each trial, i.e. “alcohol” or “pots and pans”. At the end of each trial participants had to report 
whether they believed the stimulus from target had been present or absent. Responses were 
made using the ‘c’ and ‘m’ keys, with the key-response assignment counterbalanced between 
participants. On half of the trials the target was present, the other half it was absent. The 
response screen contained only the words “present/absent?”, and disappeared once the 
participants had responded.  
When present, the target image could appear at positions five, six, seven or eight in the 
RSVP stream. When absent that particular position in the stream was filled with a filler image. 
Distractor images appeared to the left and right of the central stream, one position was filled 
with either a shoe, pot/pan, or an alcohol distractor, whilst the other position was occupied with 
a filler image of the same size. Shoe, pot/pan, and alcohol distractors each appeared on a third of 
the trials in each block. These distractors always appeared two images prior to the target (i.e. 
Lag 2). All within participants’ variables were counterbalanced within each block. 
Before the task started participants completed a 16-trial practice block of equal alcohol 
and pot/pans targets, randomised within this block. Participants were verbally instructed before 
the main task, that the target category would only vary between blocks, not between trials, and 
that the participants should ignore every image outside of the central stream. 
 Changes were made to Experiment 1b due to the pot/pans targets being more difficult to 
detect than the alcohol targets in Experiment 1a. We, therefore, slowed the stimulus presentation 
time down to 100ms per image. This is more in line with previous RSVP tasks which have 
found stimulus-driven attentional capture by affective stimuli (Most, Chun, Widders & Zald, 
2005).   
 Despite the slower presentation time in Experiment 1b, pot/pan targets were still 
detected less accurately than alcohol targets, therefore we switched the non-alcoholic targets in 
Experiment 1c to salient shoe images. The trials now started with an instruction to search for 
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“SHOES” instead of “POTS + PANS”. The prompt for the response screen was also changed 
from “Present/absent?” to a single ‘?’ to avoid any influence of word order on responding. 
Procedure. For Experiment 1a and 1b, participants were tested in a dimly lit testing 
room at the University of Sussex. After providing informed consent, participants were given 
task instructions, and then completed the practice block with supervision from the experimenter, 
after which they completed the RSVP task on their own. Participants then completed a pen and 
paper versions of the AUDIT, AUQ, and AEAS in a random order. The experiment took 
approximately 25 minutes to complete. In Experiment 1c the procedure was identical to 
Experiment 1a and 1b, with the exception that the questionnaires were presented using Inquisit 
5 in order to automate randomisation of the questionnaire order. Half the participants completed 
the questionnaire prior to the RSVP task, and half afterwards.  
Analytic strategy. Across Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1cweconducted the same analyses. 
The dependent variable we used was A prime (A’) detection sensitivity index, a non-parametric 
analogue of d’, this was computed using hit rate and false alarm rate from the present/absent 
task response (Stanislaw & Todoroff, 1999; Zhang & Mueller 2005). A′ ranges from .5, which 
indicates that a signal cannot be distinguished from noise, to 1, which corresponds to perfect 
performance. In order to determine whether there was any significant difference in A’ across 
conditions, each individual study was initially analysed using a 2×3 repeated measures 
ANOVA, using current goal type (alcohol / non-alcohol) and distractor type (alcohol/ goal-
congruent non-alcohol/ irrelevant non-alcohol) as the factors.   
To follow up these comparisons, and to determine the consistency of the effect, we 
conducted pairwise comparisons across the three studies using an internal meta-analysis. Four 
pairwise comparisons were computed, these were between the goal-congruent distractors and 
the non-alcohol distractor, in both search goal conditions. Metafor statistical package for R was 
used to conduct the meta-analysis (Viechtbauer 2010). In all Experiments, the A’ scores were 
significantly skewed; therefore, a DerSimonian-Laird random effects model was used to 
compute the cumulative effects (Hedges’ g; Lakens, 2013) and confidence intervals, which is 
robust to violations of normality and is suitable for calculating cumulative effects from a small 
number of studies (DerSimonian & Laird, 2014; Kontopantelis & Reeves, 2012). Each study’s 
contribution to the cumulative effect was weighted by sample size.  
Bayes factors were calculated for all pair-wise comparisons across Experiments, as well 
as the cumulative effect.  A Bayes factor compares evidence for the experimental hypothesis 
(positive attentional capture by alcohol versus an irrelevant distractor) and the null hypothesis 
(zero capture by alcohol versus an irrelevant distractor).  The Bayes factor ranges from 0 to 
infinity. The strength of this evidence is indicated by the magnitude of the Bayes Factor; values 
greater than three or less than .33 indicate substantial evidence for either the experimental or 
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null hypothesis, respectively. A value closer to 1 suggests that the data are insensitive and any 
difference is ‘anecdotal’ (Dienes 2008, 2011, 2014, 2016). 
The Bayes factor was computed using a modified version of Baguley and Kaye’s (2010) 
R code (retrieved from Dienes 2008). To compute the factor, we used a half-normal distribution 
with a mean of zero to reflect the null hypothesis. The standard deviation of the distribution for 
all pairwise comparisons was set to .10, which is the plausible raw effect size for a difference 
between goal-congruent distractor and irrelevant distractor 9. For meta-Bayes factors, used for 
the overall population mean, the effect was computed sequentially using Zoltan Dienes online 
calculator; first, combining the raw effect sizes and standard error of Experiment 1a and 1b, 
then combining this cumulative posterior value with the mean and standard error of Experiment 
1c (Dienes 2008; Rouder and Morey 2011).  
Results and Discussion 
See Table 7 for the means and standard deviations from each condition across all 
experiments, and see Figure 16 for the distractor effects, which show the subtraction of A’ 
scores when the distractor is goal relevant from the distractor which is never congruent with the 
search goal. 
Experiments 1a and 1b both showed a significant effect of search goal, p’s < .007, thus 
revealing that the pot target was harder to detect than the alcohol target (Experiment 1a: Alcohol 
M = .81, SD = .07 vs Pots/pans M = .73, SD = .1; F(1,11) = 17.42, p = .002; Experiment 1b: 
Alcohol M = .80, SD = .10 vs Pots/pans M = .73, SD = .15; F(1,15) = 9.76, p = .007). The effect 
of search goal was however non-significant for Experiment 1c, confirming that my adjustments 
to the task were successful in equating the accuracy level for detection of shoes versus alcohol 
targets, M = .80, SD = .09 vs M = .80 SD = .09; F(1,59) = 1.34, p = .252.  
 Search goal Distractor type 
 Alcohol Pots Shoes 
Experiment 1a 
(n = 12) 
Alcohol .76 (.10) .83 (.04) .84 (.05) 
Pots/pans .74 (.10) .71 (.11) .73 (.10) 
Experiment 1b 
(n = 16) 
Alcohol .73 (.14) .83 (.05) .84 (.03) 
Pots/pans .74 (.16) .68 (.16) .75 (.11) 
Experiment 1c 
(n = 60) 
Alcohol .74 (.14) .83 (.04) .83 (.04) 
Shoes .82 (.06) .82 (.05) .76 (.13) 
Experiment 2 
(n = 43) 
Alcohol .82 (.07) .82 (.07) .82 (.08) 
Pots/pans .83 (.06) 81 (.08) .83 (.07) 
 
Table 7.  The mean A’ scores and standard deviations from across all conditions in the 4 experiments. A’ 
was computed from the frequency of hits and false alarms made during the present/absent judgement. A’ 
is a detection sensitivity index which ranges from .5 to 1, with .5 reflecting chance detection and 1 
reflecting perfect detection of the target. 
                                                             
9 The prior was based on a previous investigation in my previous research which investigated capture 
effects by emotional faces in an identical RSVP task (Brown, Berggren and Forster, under review – 
Chapter 2). 
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Figure 16. Graph depicting the mean distractor effects across Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c. The distractor 
effect reflects the subtraction of the A’ detection sensitivity score when the distractor was of the same 
category as one of the search goals, from the distractor which is never searched for. This distractor effect 
was calculated for both search goal conditions. Error bars reflect within-participants’ standard error. 
 
Regardless of any main effect of search goal, the pattern of results concerning the 
distractors was identical across all three experiments. In each, the distractor effect was 
significant, showing that some distractors had reduced detection sensitivity of the targets 
(Experiment 1a: F(2,22) = 5.22, p = .014; Experiment 1b: F(2,30) = 11.09, p = .001 (Huynh-
Feldt corrected); Experiment 1c: F(1,118) = 26.59, p < .001). Critically, all three experiments 
revealed the main effect of distractor to be qualified by a significant interaction between search 
goal and distractor type, thus suggesting that some distractors interfered more with the task 
when participants were searching for a congruent target (Experiment 1a: F(2,22) = 5.79, p = 
.019; Experiment 1b: F(2,30) = 12.47, p = .001 (Huynh-Feldt corrected); Experiment 1c: 
F(1,118) = 25.12, p < .001). Specifically, as can be seen in Figure 16, and as predicted by a 
goal-driven account of alcohol-related attentional capture, distractor interference was observed 
only during search conditions that involved a goal for that distractor type.  
Internal Meta-Analysis. To further delineate these distractor effects, and their 
interactions with search goal, we computed pairwise comparisons between goal-congruent and 
goal-incongruent distractors meta-analytically (see Figure 17).  For this analysis Hedges’ g 
effect size (Lakens, 2013) and confidence intervals, as well as Bayes factors, were computed. 
As hypothesised, when comparing the alcohol distractor effect versus the completely task-
irrelevant distractor, there was a consistent and large effect size (Hedges’ g = .95) across all 
three experiments, with Bayes factors also showing very strong evidence in favour of the 
experimental hypothesis. Similarly, when the non-alcohol distractor was congruent with the 
contents of the current non-alcohol search goal there was a medium sized decrement (Hedges’ g 
= .56) in detection sensitivity versus the completely task-irrelevant non-alcohol distractor. The 
Bayes factors revealed that overall there was strong evidence favouring the experimental 
a b c 
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hypothesis, although this was not true across all experiments, with evidence favouring the null 
in Experiment 1a. 
 
Figure 17. Forest plots presenting the random effect model of the cumulative Hedges’ g effect sizes, 
confidence intervals, and Bayes factors. Values for each individual study are also presented. 2a reflects 
the distractor effect for the goal-congruent alcohol distractor versus a completely irrelevant non-alcoholic 
distractor, when searching for alcohol (top), and when searching for a non-alcoholic object category 
(bottom). 2b reflects the distractor effect for a goal-congruent non-alcohol distractor versus a completely 
irrelevant non-alcohol distractor, whilst searching for alcohol (top) a non-alcoholic object category 
(bottom). 
 
Interestingly, the goal-congruent alcohol distraction was larger than the non-alcoholic 
goal-congruent distraction: Experiment 1a: t(11) = 2.44, p = .031; Experiment 1b: t(15) = 1.96, 
p = .068; Experiment 1c: t(59) = 2.97, p = .004. There are multiple potential causes for this 
difference, though it could hint at an interaction between the qualities of stimulus features and 
participants’ current goals (see General Discussion). 
In contrast to the large and consistent goal-congruent distractor effect, when the alcohol 
distractor was incongruent with the current search goal there was a non-significant and 
negligible effect size, when comparing it to the goal-incongruent non-alcohol distractor 
(Hedges’ g = .09). Overall, the Bayes factors showed evidence for the null hypothesis (B < .33). 
When the non-alcohol distractor was incongruent with the current search goal there was also a 
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negligible and non-significant effect size, when compared to the completely task-irrelevant 
distractor (Hedges’ g = .07). The Bayes factor also showed evidence favouring the null 
hypothesis (B < .33). The evidence, therefore, suggests that a distractor only resulted in 
interference when it was congruent with the current search goal, regardless of whether it was an 
alcohol or a neutral category. The same distractors which capture attention under these 
conditions had no effect upon performance when they were incongruent with the current search 
goal. This was true for both non-alcohol stimuli and alcohol stimuli. 
Exploratory Correlations. An exploratory correlational analysis was conducted using 
the alcohol relevant questionnaire measures and the subtraction of detection sensitivity when the 
distractor was alcohol from when it was neutral category, from Experiment 1c. Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients between alcohol related self-report measures and both goal-congruent 
and goal-incongruent alcohol distractor effects were calculated. Bayes factors were computed to 
test whether the results favoured the null or the experimental hypothesis. The prior for all 
correlational analysis was set as .27 as the upper-limit of the expected effect size based on the 
Fisher’s Z transformed effect size (r = .26) taken from a meta-analysis of the correlation 
between attentional capture by addictive substances and substance use (Rooke et al., 2008). This 
relatively small expected effect size was selected based on the relationship being taken from 
multiple types of experiment, and should therefore generalise to the current novel task.  
 
 
Table 8. Pearson’s r correlation coefficient, p-values, and Bayes factors for the relationship between 
distractor effects when congruent or incongruent with the current search goal, and alcohol related self-
report measures. These measures include the number of units drank per week and the binge score derived 
from the AUQ (Mehrabian & Russell, 1978). The AUDIT (Sanders et al., 1993), and the positive high 
arousal subscale of the AEAS (Morean et al., 2012).  
 
The alcohol relevant self-report measures included the number of units drank per week 
and the binge score, derived from the Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ; Mehrabian & Russell, 
1978), the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Sanders et al., 1993), and the 
positive high arousal subscale of the Anticipated Effects of Alcohol Scale (AEAS; Morean et 
al., 2012). All p-values showed a non-significant effect, which the Bayes factors revealed to be 
an inconclusive null effect, being neither lower than .33 nor higher than 3, and can only be 
described as a weak anecdotal relationship (see Table 8).  
 Goal-congruent alcohol distraction Goal-incongruent alcohol distraction 
 Pearson’s r p-value 
Bayes 
factor 
Pearson’s r p-value 
Bayes 
factor 
Units -.1 .44 .27 .15 .245 1.32 
Binge score .06 .643 .63 .03 .811 .53 
AUDIT .03 .852 .51 .16 .213 1.42 
AEAS – positive arousal -.05 .698 .34 -.05 .7 .34 
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Experiment 2 
The internal meta-analysis across the first experiment suggests that attentional capture 
by alcohol stimuli in the current task can be accounted for by a goal-driven mechanism. 
Experiment 2 sought to further clarify the precise mechanism underlying these effects. Note that 
my manipulation of goal-driven attention in Experiment 1 is also likely to have manipulated the 
contents of visual working memory (VWM), in that participants may have maintained a 
representation of their search target throughout the search. Previous research suggests that 
merely holding information in VWM can bias attention (for review see Soto, Hodsoll, Rotshtein 
& Humphreys, 2005). For example, when participants were instructed to hold an image of 
palatable food active in VWM, task-irrelevant food images which matched this representation 
captured attention during a concurrent visual task (Higgs, Rutters, Thomas, Naish & 
Humphreys, 2012; Kumar, Higgs, Rutters & Humphreys, 2016). As such, it was important to 
consider whether the results of Experiment 1 might reflect the role of more passive top-down 
VWM maintenance rather than resulting from a deliberate top down attentional goal. 
To address this, Experiment 2 modified the original paradigm so that the contents of 
VWM were manipulated while the primary search goal remained constant. Participants 
performed the RSVP task searching for an alcohol irrelevant category (cars), while also 
maintaining either alcohol-related or alcohol-unrelated (pots/pans) imagery in VWM as part of a 
separate memory task. If VWM maintenance alone can explain the findings of Experiment 1, 
similar results would be expected in this new experiment.  
Methods 
Participants. 48 participants were initially recruited, though 5 were excluded from the 
analysis due to performing at chance on either the pots/pans or alcohol condition of the memory 
task. Sample size was based on the maximum number of participants that could be recruited 
over a two-month period (see participant details in Table 6). A post hoc power analysis using 
Gpower revealed that on the basis of size of the interaction effect between VWM contents and 
distractor type observed in the present study (ƞ2p = .015) the power was at adequate levels to 
detect an effect, 1-β = .8 (Faul et al., 2009; Cohen, 1988). 
Stimuli and procedure. The task and stimuli were identical to Experiment 1b, with the 
following exceptions. At the start of each trial a 1000ms fixation cross was presented, which 
was followed by a 500ms memory cue, measuring 5.14°×3.35°, which participants were 
instructed to hold in memory throughout the RSVP search task. This was followed by a 400ms 
ISI that preceded the RSVP stream. The RSVP task was similar to previous studies, except that 
the search target was a car (selected from one of 24 different car images). After the participant 
had responded to the present/absent judgement, a memory probe was presented from the same 
category as the memory cue. Participants had to judge whether the memory probe was the same 
or different from the memory cue they held in memory, they responded with ‘s’ for same and 
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‘d’ for different. On half the trials the cue and probe matched. After this second response, 
participants were presented with feedback for the memory task, which appeared for 600ms. 
Trials were separated with 100ms of white noise filling the screen. All within participants’ 
variables were counterbalanced within each block, there were two blocks which were made up 
of 96 trials.       
In one block, the memory cue was one of 24 alcohol images, on the other block the 
memory cue was one of 24 pots/pans images. Each image consisted of different alcohol types or 
different pots/pans in a single scene10. All additional images in this task were sourced from 
Google images. The order of these blocks was counterbalanced between participants. At the 
beginning of the task participants were given a 16-trial practice block without any distractors. 
Half the participants completed the questionnaires prior to the task, half after. 
Results and Discussion 
In order to ensure that a VWM representation was active in the trials analysed, we 
removed all trials (10%) where participants incorrectly reported whether the probe was 
same/different from the cue. Rerunning the analyses with all trials included did not change the 
pattern or significance of the results. The RSVP target detection sensitivity (A’) was entered as 
the dependent variable in a 2×3 ANOVA, with active memory type (pots/pans, alcohol) and 
distractor (pots/pans, alcohol, shoes) as factors. For means and standard deviations see Table 7. 
The main effect of memory contents was non-significant, F(1,42) = .36, p = .55, ƞ2p = .01, as 
was the main effect of distractor type, F(1,84) = 1.17, p = .316, ƞ2p = .03. Importantly for my 
hypothesis, the interaction between memory contents and distractor type was also non-
significant, F(2,84) = .64, p = .529, ƞ2p = .02, thus suggesting that there was no difference 
between the distractor type when it was congruent with the contents of VWM compared to 
when it was incongruent. To further test the sensitivity of this analysis we conducted Bayesian 
pairwise comparisons. The data were significantly skewed; therefore, follow-up analyses were 
supplemented with bootstrapped confidence intervals which are robust to violations of 
normality (Field, 2013). 
Follow-up Bayesian comparisons revealed no evidence of interference from alcohol (vs 
shoe) distractors, regardless of whether VWM contained alcohol images, t(42) = .21, p = .838, 
95% CI [-.02, .2], BH[0, .10] = .10; or pots and pans, t(42) = .04, p = 859, 95% CI [-.02, .02], BH[0, 
.10] = .11. Note that this result meets the < .33 criteria for a sensitive null result (Dienes 2008). It 
therefore appears that despite the alcohol imagery being active in working memory, there was 
no biasing effect towards visually similar alcohol distractors. There was also no evidence of 
                                                             
10 In order to match the pots/pans to the alcohol memory images, which had a greater variety of colours 
within each image, the selected exemplar within each image were colourised to another colour that was 
suitable for a pot or pan. For example, with an array of stainless steel pans, several pans were changed to 
a copper colour; nine images were changed in this way. 
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interference from pot (versus shoe) distractors either during the alcohol VWM condition, t(42) = 
.18, p = .859, 95% CI [-.01, .01], BH[0, .10] = .09, or the pot search condition, t(42) = 1.71, p = 
.094, 95% CI [ > -.01, .03], BH[0, .01] = .62.   
General Discussion 
Across three experiments the findings demonstrated that when participants held a search 
goal for alcohol related targets there was a consistent attentional capture by alcohol distractors. 
This occurred at presentations as brief as 83ms and when the distractors were completely task-
irrelevant, thus suggesting that an early and automatic bias was induced by the search goal. 
Furthermore, Bayesian analyses revealed that this capture effect was absent when participants 
were searching for a non-alcoholic category of objects. Additionally, a null effect was found 
when participants held the alcohol features in VWM but did not prioritise them as a search goal. 
Taken together, these results provide a clear demonstration that an involuntary attentional 
capture by alcohol stimuli can be induced by the deliberate prioritisation of alcohol as a top-
down search goal.   
Our results are inconsistent with a stimulus-driven effect independent of the current 
search goal, as predicted by IST (Berridge & Robinson, 2016). The present series of 
experiments cannot rule out the possibility that purely stimulus-driven effects might be 
observed in certain contexts (e.g. less perceptually difficult tasks, cf. Lavie, 2005), although the 
present data provide an alternate suggestion, that a seemingly stimulus-driven effect may in fact 
be dependent on search goals driven by the individual’s desire to consume alcohol. Note, 
alcohol capture effects have exclusively been found among a group of individuals (i.e. drinkers) 
known to find alcohol imagery to be pleasant and personally relevant, who might hence 
reasonably choose to attend to these images. Furthermore, previous evidence for the alcohol 
capture effect is derived from tasks such as the dot-probe, in which not only is there little 
motivation to follow the instruction to ignore the alcohol (in that there is no performance cost to 
doing so), but in which the task instructions necessitate the allocation of attention to the location 
of the images (effectively making them impossible to completely ignore). Taken together with 
the demonstration that the bias can be induced by manipulating goal-driven mechanisms, it 
appears that the stimulus-driven account should be questioned.  
A goal-driven account of attentional capture by alcohol stimuli could explain some 
previous inconsistencies in the literature. Overall attentional biases are found towards alcohol 
(Field & Cox, 2008), although more recently the attentional bias towards alcohol has been 
found to fluctuate over the duration of a dot-probe task (Gladwin, 2017). Such a fluctuation 
effect could potentially be explained by the ebb and flow of goal priority, as individuals may 
switch between searching for alcohol cues and following the instruction to detect the dot-probe, 
which does not require much attentional engagement.  
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Integrating the current results into IST, it appears that the incentive value may not 
directly influence early attentional selection of the stimuli, independent of the current search 
goal. Rather, it may be that the incentive associations of a stimulus increase the likelihood that 
that object will be searched for. It would make sense that a person who values alcohol would be 
likely to intentionally search for alcohol in their environment.  
An interesting but unexpected feature of the results is that while my manipulation of 
search goal induced attentional capture by alcohol and non-alcohol stimuli alike, the alcohol 
attentional capture effect was consistently stronger than the non-alcoholic goal-driven effect. 
This finding cannot reflect a purely stimulus-driven effect, because there was no evidence of 
distraction by the same stimuli when they were incongruent with the search goal, however, it 
may still indicate that high incentive salience of the stimuli interacts with the search goal, 
amplifying the goal-driven effect. Alternatively, perhaps the attentional capture was goal-
driven, but the level of disruption was magnified due to craving induced by the alcohol stimuli. 
Future research could adopt the current paradigm to follow up this intriguing possibility, for 
example by comparing non-drinkers and heavy drinkers, by manipulating the level of craving, 
or by using eye tracking to disentangle initial capture from delayed disengagement. 
 The term ‘goal-driven attention’ is often discussed primarily in terms of the voluntary 
direction of attention in line with the task instructions (e.g. Theeuwes, 2010). The results, 
however, highlight that goal-driven attention is more complex, and should not be conflated with 
voluntary attention. A voluntary attentional goal can have involuntary attentional consequences. 
the current results are a clear demonstration of this; when participants searched for alcohol in 
one location they could not ignore alcohol in another (irrelevant) location, despite clear 
instructions to do so, and despite an obvious performance cost to attending to the irrelevant 
alcohol. It therefore appears that there is a distinction between declarative task rules and goal-
driven attention which is often ignored in models of attention and addiction. In relation to 
alcohol, a heavy drinker may declare that they want to reduce their intake of alcohol when 
visiting the doctors, but they would likely exhibit different behaviour when in a bar where 
alcohol is present and the incentive value more apparent, leading them to prioritise the goal to 
search for alcohol in their environment.  
In the current investigation, we found attentional capture only when the alcohol image 
was the primary search goal, but not when it was held in VWM. This finding appears to 
somewhat conflict with previous results that holding imagery in VWM can involuntarily bias 
external attention (e.g., Kumar et al., 2016). One reason for this could be that the current task 
required participants to search for a complex category of images in a perceptually demanding 
RSVP task. It has recently been found that a secondary stimulus active in VWM only biases 
attention when the primary task is simple, such as when the target is a simple shape repeated 
across trials (Gunseli, Olivers & Meeter, 2016). What this does reveal is that alcohol cues are 
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not automatically prioritised in attention, and if an individual is sufficiently engaged with a 
competing goal, this individual would not orient attention to congruent alcohol cues despite 
those being active in memory. 
In terms of applications, the current results suggest that attentional capture by alcohol 
was eliminated when the individual was searching for a non-alcoholic object, even when they 
held an alcohol image in memory. This therefore suggests that interventions which encourage 
problem drinkers to pursue a competing attentional goal could be effective in disrupting 
attentional capture by alcohol, and hence preventing this attentional bias from leading to the 
escalation of craving (Field & Eastwood, 2005). This idea is consistent with evidence that 
individuals who were more satisfied with their non-alcohol related life goals were less prone to 
hazardous drinking, when compared to those who found their non-alcohol related goals 
unsatisfying (Cox et al., 2002). Further, the absence of a goal-incongruent distraction by alcohol 
suggests that attentional bias retraining might be improved by training participants to search for 
a single competing pleasant category (i.e. training participants to search for smiling faces in the 
presence of alcohol cues), rather than attempting to train avoidance of alcohol (i.e. training 
participants to search for a target away from an alcohol image and towards random non-
alcoholic objects; Schoenmakers et al., 2007).  
In summary, we have demonstrated that a consistent involuntary attentional capture by 
alcohol in social drinkers can be induced, or blocked, through a goal-driven mechanism. The 
present study is not definitive evidence of a goal-driven mechanism as the only driver of 
involuntary attention to alcohol cues; however, the clear demonstration of goal-driven alcohol 
attentional capture raises the possibility that effects previously assumed to be stimulus-driven 
could actually occur as an unintended outcome of voluntary top-down processes. 
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Chapter 5: Goal-Driven Attentional Capture by Appetitive and Aversive Smoking-Related 
Cues in Nicotine Dependent Smokers 
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Abstract 
Conventionally, automatic attentional capture by tobacco cues in smokers are seen as an implicit 
bias, operating independently of an individual’s current search goals.  Mainstream attention 
research, however, has suggested that current search goals can actually induce an involuntary 
attentional capture. In the current investigation, we tested whether appetitive and aversive 
smoking images affected attention through such a mechanism, and whether there were any 
group differences based on nicotine dependence. we instructed non-smokers, occasional 
smokers (low dependence), and nicotine dependent smokers (moderate-high dependence), to 
hold search goals for either an aversive smoking category, appetitive smoking category, or a 
category of non-smoking images. These images were presented in a stream of briefly appearing 
filler images, whilst task-irrelevant distractors were presented outside the stream. Distractors 
could be aversive or appetitive smoking images, or a category of non-smoking images. 
Therefore, in some conditions, the distractors matched the current category being searched for, 
whilst in others it was incongruent. Task-irrelevant smoking distractors, compared to the non-
smoking distractors, reduced target detection only when they were congruent with the specific 
category being searched for. There was no effect on performance from either aversive or 
appetitive smoking distractors when participants were searching for the non-smoking targets. 
Distractor interference did not differ between smokers and non-smokers. The results support a 
goal-driven mechanism underpinning involuntary attentional capture by smoking cues. These 
findings can be used to inform models of addiction and attention, as well as the display of 
graphic health warnings on tobacco packaging. 
 
 
Attentional theories of Pavlovian associative learning suggest that drug-related cues, 
including smoking-related cues, command the focus of selective attention (Mackintosh 1975; 
Pearce and Hall 1980). Several studies have provided evidence that smoking-related cues attract 
attention. Smokers but not non-smokers show greater interference on a primary task when a 
secondary task includes the presentation of a smoking cue vs control cue (e.g. Cepeda-Benito 
and Tiffany, 1996; Jarvik, Gross, Rosenblatt & Stein, 1995). Furthermore, smokers but not non-
smokers show slower detection latencies for targets that appear in a different location from a 
smoking image compared to a control image (Mogg, Bradley, Field & De Houwer, 2003; Field, 
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Mogg & Bradley, 2008; Field, Mogg & Bradley, 2004). In recent years, such attentional capture 
by drug related cues have been thought to perpetuate maladaptive behaviours which underpin 
substance dependence (Stacy & Wiers, 2010).  
It has often been assumed that the attention to cues which are associated with drug use 
is under the control of an automatic mechanism, which operates independent of the current 
goals of the individual (Berridge & Robinson, 2016; Robinson & Berridge, 1993). In smokers, 
evidence would initially appear to support a stimulus-driven account of attention to smoking 
related cues.  For instance, in a dot-probe task, smokers show an attentional capture by the 
smoking image (i.e. automatic orienting of attention to a stimulus) even when the smoking 
stimuli are only briefly presented (e.g. 200ms; Bradley, Field, Mogg & De Houwer, 2004). 
There is, however, the alternative possibility that smokers may voluntarily choose to 
search for smoking cues, and this is why they are distracted by them. It has been found that 
when some individuals search for a specific feature in their environment, attention is 
automatically allocated to all stimuli which match that feature, despite interfering with the 
individual’s current task (cf. Folk, Remington & Johnson, 1992). For instance, when 
participants were instructed to search for a specific colour in a rapid serial visual presentation 
(RSVP task) stream of images, task-irrelevant distractors only caused participants to miss the 
subsequent target when they matched the current search goal (Folk, Leber & Egeth, 2002). This 
phenomenon, known as contingent capture, reveals that the current goals of an individual can 
actually induce an involuntary attentional capture by specific cues. It may be that because 
smokers consider smoking images rewarding and explicitly rate them as pleasant, they may 
choose to voluntarily attend to these images (Mogg et al., 2003). 
Previous research investigating attentional capture by smoking cues has not yet directly 
tested whether the capture occurs through a stimulus-driven mechanism, or a goal-driven 
mechanism. Furthermore, certain features of the paradigms typically used to demonstrate 
attentional capture by smoking cues mean that a goal-driven account of prior findings cannot be 
ruled out. For instance, in one investigation, Chanon, Sours and Boettiger (2010) used an RSVP 
task to investigate attentional capture to smoking images, this task required participants to 
identify two separate alphanumeric characters embedded in an RSVP stream. It was found that 
when the first character was embedded in a smoking image, smokers missed the second 
character more frequently than non-smokers. It is not clear whether this finding shows a 
stimulus-driven or a goal-driven effect on attention, because the smoking image was task-
relevant; participants had to voluntarily attend to the smoking relevant features in order to 
process the target character. Similarly, in the dot-probe task (e.g. Bradley et al., 2004), the 
distractor always appears in a potential target location, meaning that in order to process the dot-
probe, participants cannot avoid intentionally attending to the smoking images that appear in 
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this location. Under these conditions, it is impossible to disentangle which mechanism is driving 
attention. 
For this reason, in the current investigation, we tested whether a goal-driven 
mechanism, activated by an instruction to search for a target, could account for distraction by 
completely task-irrelevant smoking images. Smoking distractors were task-irrelevant as they 
were presented in parafoveal locations to the RSVP stream, where the target never appears. If 
these images interfere with task performance, then it would be evidence of an involuntary 
attentional capture. A goal-driven account would predict that attention would be captured by 
these images only when the distractor features matched the features currently being searched 
for, whilst a stimulus-driven account would predict that smoking stimuli should capture 
attention regardless of the current search goal.  
As well as using cigarette smoking cues, we took the opportunity to investigate 
attentional capture by aversive smoking cues, to compare the mechanisms of attentional capture 
for smoking images with differing motivational outcomes (avoidance versus approach). 
Examining this would have practical importance, because in an effort to curb smokers’ cigarette 
intake, UK tobacco packaging has been labelled with a graphic health warning (e.g. respiratory 
disease), and cigarette branding has been removed (see Department of Health, 2016 for current 
guidelines). Recent evidence suggests that pictorial graphic warnings increase intentions and 
attempts to quit smoking, as well as the reported number of occasions forgoing a cigarette 
(Brewer et al., 2016; Noar et al., 2015; 2016).  
Research seems to suggest that these unbranded packets with graphic aversive smoking 
images are highly salient to some smokers, as indexed by greater activation of the visual cortex 
and higher number of eye-movements towards the images during free-viewing (Maynard, 
Brooks, Munafo & Leonards, 2017; Munafo, Roberts, Bauld & Leonards, 2011). However, free-
viewing tasks cannot determine whether participants automatically orient attention to these cues 
because of a goal-driven or stimulus-driven mechanism. The mechanism by which these images 
capture attention would have a bearing on how to improve the effectiveness of this intervention 
(see Applications). We therefore presented task-irrelevant aversive smoking images alongside 
appetitive smoking images, which could be congruent or incongruent with the content of the 
participants’ current search goal. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were recruited based on their level of dependence and self-reported 
smoking status.  Non-smokers (n = 25) were individuals who reported never having previously 
smoked.  Occasional smokers (n = 25) were individuals who were active smokers but scored 
below three on the Fagerstrom nicotine dependence test (FNDT) thus showing very low nicotine 
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dependence.  Dependent smokers (n = 20) were participants who scored 3 and above on the 
FNDT. Cut-offs were based on those reported by Fagerstrom, Heatherton & Kozlowski (1991).   
One participant was excluded for using inconsistent responses on the irrelevant 
distractor RSVP task.  All the groups’ demographic, trait, and state variables are reported in 
Table 9.  The sample size was based on that of Chanon et al.  (2010) who found significant 
smoker versus non-smoker differences in an RSVP task with a sample of 23 participants within 
each condition. 
 
 
Table 9. Participant demographic information, as well as state and trait measures across three 
experimental groups.  Numbers reported are the mean with standard deviations in brackets.  FNDT = 
Fagerstrom Nicotine Dependence Test; Craving = current craving prior to the task measured on a visual 
analogue scale ranging 0 – 100; SPQ – PR = Smoking Consequences Questionnaire average expectancy 
of positive reinforcement, ranging from 1 – 9; SPQ –NR= Smoking Consequences Questionnaire average 
expectancy of negative reinforcement, ranging from 1 – 9; SPQ-NC = Smoking Consequences 
Questionnaire average expectancy of negative consequences, ranging from 1 – 9; Impulsivity was 
measured with the Barratt impulsiveness scale; AUDIT = Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test. 
Group differences were measured with a one-way ANOVA, or Chi-squared test for gender differences. 
 
Questionnaires 
Barrett Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton & Stanford, 1995). Trait impulsivity 
has been linked to attentional biases towards addictive substances (for meta analyses see 
Coskunpinar & Cyders, 2013).  We, therefore, measured trait impulsivity using the 30 item BIS-
11 scale.   
Fagerstrom Nicotine Dependence Test (FNDT; Heatherton, Kozlowski, Frecker & 
Fagerstrom, 1991). The FNDT is a six-item questionnaire which measures different aspects of 
nicotine dependence. The total dependence score is 10, with a score below 3 suggesting very 
low nicotine dependence.   
 NS 
(n = 25) 
OS 
(n = 25) 
NDS 
 (n = 20) 
Group differences 
(p-values) 
Gender 19 females 21 females 11 females .085 
Age 20.20 (1.58) 20.84 (1.77) 23.15 (5.67) .013 
FNDT 0 .72 (.79) 4.72 (.75) < .001 
Craving < 1 (1.06) 27.48 (21.39) 45.75 (33.05) < .001 
SPQ-PR 1.71 (1.06) 4.88 (2.14) 6.05 (2.50) < .001 
SPQ-NR 2.74 (2.32) 5.73 (1.95) 6.01 (2.21) < .001 
SPQ-NC 7.59 (2.17) 7.39 (1.96) 7.85 (1.41) .721 
Impulsivity 62.04 (11.38) 71.40 (11.66) 80.20 (8.40) < .001 
AUDIT 13.68 (5.98) 13.96 (7.94) 14.50 (7.49) .929 
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Short Form Smoking Consequences Questionnaire (S-SCQ; Myers, MacPherson, 
McCarthy & Brown, 2003). The S-SCQ is a 21-item measure that records participants 
expectancy of positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, aversive outcomes, and appetite 
suppression from smoking. Responses range from very unlikely to very likely on a nine-point 
scale. 
Craving visual analogue scale (VAS). The task was programmed in E-prime, and 
require participants to select, using the mouse, a position on a visual analogue scale ranging 
from “No craving what so ever” to “Highest possible craving imaginable”. The scores ranged 
between 0 and 100. 
Other measures. Thirty-two of the participants completed the Profile of Mood States 
(POMS; McNair, Lorr & Droppleman, 1971) and the behavioural activation and inhibition 
scales (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994).  However, due to time constraints these measures 
were dropped from the procedure.   
Stimuli  
The experiment was run using E-prime 2.0 on a Dell Optiplex 7010 PC, and was 
displayed on a 13inch monitor with a screen resolution of 1280 x 1024.  Participants viewed the 
screen at a distance of 59cm, maintained using a chin rest. 
A total of 396 images were sourced for the task from the IAPS image database and 
Google images (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001).  The task required a total of 18 appetitive 
smoking images, six as the targets and 12 as the distractors.  These images showed individuals 
or groups enjoying cigarettes.  A total of 18 aversive smoking outcome images were collected, 
again six as the target in the central stream and 12 as the distractors.  These depicted images 
often included on graphic health warnings on tobacco products (i.e. gangrene, mouth or throat 
cancer, and tooth damage).  A neutral category of six targets was also collected, which depicted 
individuals and groups reading books.  A group of 12 distractor images were also collected 
which showed individuals and groups gardening, these were selected due to them depicting non-
aversive or appetitive situations and so that none of their features overlapped with the other 
smoking and non-smoking target features.   
The filler images presented in the central RSVP stream included 81 images of neutral 
everyday scenes (e.g.  people on the bus).  In order to prevent participants from searching purely 
for generally positive and negative information in the RSVP and neglect the smoking related 
features, 72 positive scenes (e.g. people smiling), and 72 general negative scenes (e.g. people 
arguing), were sourced.  In order to prevent participants in the negative search condition simply 
searching for close-ups of body parts, which constituted the majority of the negative smoking 
image category, 72 close-up images of healthy body parts (e.g. close-ups of healthy limbs) were 
also sourced. Alongside the smoking or gardening related distractor images which appeared on 
each trial, a neutral filler image was selected to appear in the opposite distractor location.  For 
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this purpose, 18 additional neutral everyday scenes and 18 additional close-ups of healthy body 
parts were selected to appear in distractor locations.  From all categories, no image which 
appeared in the central RSVP stream appeared in a parafoveal distractor location. 
All images in the central RSVP stream measured 3.44°×2.29° visual angle and the 
distractors measured 4.58°×2.98° at a 59cm viewing distance.  Distractors appear above and 
below the central stream with a gap of .5° from the central images. 
RSVP Task 
See Figure 18 for a diagram of a single trial of the RSVP task. Each trial began with a 
400ms cue for upcoming target category: ‘POSITIVE SMOKING’, ‘NEGATIVE SMOKING’, 
or ‘READING’.  This was followed by a nine image RSVP stream, with each image appearing 
for 100ms without an interval. The filler images were made up of two neutral, two positive, two 
negative, and two healthy body part images.  The order of these different filler images was 
randomised for each trial.  The target image appeared equally at positions five, six, seven and 
eight in the RSVP stream.  The distractor frame always appeared 2 frames prior to the target 
(i.e.  Lag 2).  There were three types of distractor image, appetitive smoking scenes, aversive 
smoking outcome scenes, and gardening scenes, these appeared in equal number of times across 
the block.  The distractors appeared above and below the RSVP stream, with one of the 
distractor positions being occupied by the appetitive smoking, aversive smoking, or gardening 
distractor and the other by a neutral filler distractor.  At the end of the trial a screen appeared 
with a question mark prompting participants to report whether they thought the target category 
was present or absent on the trial, using the ‘c’ and ‘m’ keys, with the response-answer 
assignment counterbalanced between participants. In total there were three blocks of 120 trials.  
In half of the trials the target was present. In the other half it was replaced by another neutral 
filler image. Each search category was presented in an individual block which was preceded by 
a 4s warning of what the target category would be.  All within-participants variables were 
counterbalanced, and the order of blocks was counterbalanced between participants. The task 
was preceded by a twelve-trial practice block.  Within the practice block participants were 
instructed to search for houses, and distractor were two black rectangles. No practice block 
images were repeated in the main task. 
Image Arousal and Valence Ratings 
All distractor and target images were rated along dimensions of valence and arousal 
using a nine-point self-assessment manikin, which presents the scale alongside a human figure 
which depicts each level of valence and arousal (see Bradley & Lang, 1994).  The images were 
presented using Inquisit 5 presentation software, and appeared in a random order. 
Procedure 
Participants were given the opportunity to view an example aversive image (severed 
hand) prior to consent, which was in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki. This specific 
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image was never presented in the task. Half the participants completed the questionnaires prior 
to the task, in a random order. All participants completed the craving VAS before the RSVP 
task.  All participants were supervised through the instructions and practice trials, before they 
completed the task on their own. Those that had not completed the questionnaires completed 
them after the task. 32 of the participants completed the questionnaires using pen and paper, 
whilst 39 completed a computerised version programmed on Inquisit 5 software in order to fully 
automate the random presentation order. Finally, all participants rated the images for valence 
and arousal, before being debriefed. 
 
Results and General Discussion 
Image Ratings 
One-way ANOVA’s revealed that there was a significant linear effect across groups of 
valence ratings for appetitive smoking stimuli, F(1,69) = 13.64, p < .001 (see Table 10 for 
ratings data), with non-smokers viewing them as unpleasant (< 4.5), occasional smokers 
neutrally (~ 4.5), and dependent smokers pleasantly (> 4.5). Arousal ratings of these stimuli also 
showed a significant linear effect in the same direction, F(1,69) = 11.34, p = .001. There were 
no group differences in either valence or arousal ratings of aversive smoking images (valence: 
F(2,69) = .96, p = .386; arousal: F(2,69) = .61, p = .549). Also, there were no group differences 
in either valence or arousal ratings of the non-smoking images (valence: F(2,69) = .14, p = .873; 
Figure 18. Structure of a single RSVP trial and stimuli used in the RSVP task. At the start of each trial 
participants were presented with a 400ms prompt, with the target type for that block. Each of the subsequent 9 
images in the RSVP appeared for 100ms without inter-stimulus interval. At the end of each trial participants 
identified whether a target had been present or absent. The distractors consisted of appetitive smoking images, 
aversive smoking images, and gardening images. The targets consisted of appetitive and aversive smoking 
images, and reading images. Images’ sizes are not proportional to how they appeared in the task. 
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arousal: F(2,69) = .61, p = .325). The image ratings did reveal that the non-smoking distractors 
were seen as more pleasant than the appetitive smoking images. Importantly, however, these 
non-smoking images were rated lower on arousal, versus the smoking related images, which is 
the affective dimension previously associated with attentional capture (Vogt, De Houwer, 
Koster, Van Damme & Crombez, 2008).  
 
Table 10.  Mean valence and arousal ratings across the three experimental groups, standard deviations are 
reported in brackets.  Valence and arousal range from 1 – 9, ranging from unpleasant to pleasant, and 
calm to high arousal. Asterisks denote a significant one-way ANOVA linear effect across groups, * =  p < 
.05; ** = p < .001. 
 
RSVP Task 
 Using the number of hits and false alarms from the RSVP task, we computed A prime 
(A’) detection sensitivity index (Zhang & Mueller, 2005; Table 11). This measure compares the 
proportion of ‘hits’ to the number of ‘false alarms’ when the target is absent. A 3×3×3 mixed 
ANOVA was conducted with A’ as the dependent variable. Within-participants factors were 
search goal (appetitive smoking/ aversive smoking/ reading), and distractor type (appetitive 
smoking, aversive smoking, gardening). Smoking status was the between participants factor 
(non-smoker, occasional, dependent).  
 Aversive smoking search goal  Appetitive smoking search goal  Reading search goal 
 
Aversive 
distractor 
Appetitive 
distractor 
Gardening 
distractor 
 Aversive 
distractor 
Appetitive 
distractor 
Gardening 
distractor 
 Aversive 
distractor 
Appetitive 
distractor 
Gardening 
distractor 
NS .69 (.14) .79 (.08) .81 (.04) 
 
.72 (.09) .69 (.10) .73 (.09) 
 
.70 (.10) .71 (.10) .71 (.08) 
OS .64 (.14) .76 (.08) .77 (.07) 
 
.70 (.15) .67 (.13) .70 (.14) 
 
.73 (.06) .72 (.07) .71 (.07) 
NDS .68 (.12) .79 (.05) .79 (.04) 
 
.71 (.14) .68 (.13) .71 (.07) 
 
.71 (.09) .72 (.09) .71 (.10) 
 
Table 11.  Mean A’ scores across all target and distractor conditions for the three difference experimental 
groups. Standard deviations are presented in brackets. A’ ranges from .5 (chance detection) to 1 (perfect 
hit rate and no false alarms). 
 
Target type was significant, F(2, 134) = 5.7, p = .005 (Huynh-Feldt corrected), η2p = 
.08, with negative smoking targets resulting in the highest A’.  Distractor type also showed a 
 Image type Non-
smokers 
Occasional 
smokers 
Dependent 
smokers 
Total 
      
 Negative smoking 1.14 (.25) 1.16 (.24) 1.34 (.9) 1.21 (.52) 
Valence Appetitive smoking * 3.22 (1.69) 4.69 (1.24) 5.21 (2.41) 4.31 (1.96) 
 Non-smoking 6.33 (1.16) 6.24 (1.18) 6.43 (1.31) 6.33 (1.19) 
      
 Negative smoking 3.86 (2.56) 4.69 (2.57) 4.46 (3.12) 4.33 (2.72) 
Arousal Appetitive smoking ** 2.25 (1.31) 3.26 (1.28) 3.91 (2.27) 3.08 (1.74) 
 Non-smoking 2.31 (1.48) 2.50 (1.13) 3.01 (2.11) 2.58 (1.58) 
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significant main effect, F(2,134) = 24.55, p < .001, η2p = .27.  Importantly, this was qualified by 
a significant interaction between search goal and distractor type, F(4,134) = 34.53, p < .001 
(Greenhouse-Geiser corrected), η2p = .34, with an apparent decrement in detection sensitivity 
when the distractors were congruent with the current search goal.  Interestingly, there was no 
difference between the smoking groups at any level of the analysis, all F’s < .86, p’s > .49, η2p < 
.03.  
We, therefore, collapsed across the different smoking groups in order to compare 
between the smoking related distractor condition and the non-smoking distractor condition, 
across each search goal condition. A positive effect would show significant interference in a 
given search condition. For these pair-wise comparisons p-values were computed, along with 
bootstrapped confidence intervals to counter violations of normality (1000 samples; Field 
2013). 
 To supplement the main analysis, we computed Bayes factors, which compare evidence 
for the experimental hypothesis (smoking stimuli will result in reduced target detection) and the 
null hypothesis (smoking stimuli will not reduce target detection).  The Bayes factor ranges 
from 0 to infinity, values less than 1 indicate that there is support for the null hypothesis, whilst 
values of greater than 1 indicate that there is support for the experimental hypothesis.  The 
strength of this evidence is indicated by the magnitude of the Bayes Factor; values greater than 
three or less than .33 indicate substantial evidence for either the experimental or null hypothesis, 
however, these are guidelines not definitive cut-offs as with p-values.  A value closer to 1 
suggests that any nonsignificant result is due to insensitivity and any difference is ‘anecdotal’ 
(Dienes, 2008; 2011; 2014; 2016). The Bayes factor was computed using a modified version of 
Baguley and Kaye’s (2010) R code (retrieved from Dienes, 2008).  To compute the factor, we 
used a half-normal distribution which estimates that smaller differences are more probable than 
larger differences.  This half-normal was centred on the null hypothesis: zero difference.   The 
prior used was a plausible effect size of A’ = .12, based on my previous research using alcohol 
distractors (Brown, Duka & Forster., under review – Chapter 4).   
 
Table 12.  statistical results from the pairwise comparisons between A’ in in the irrelevant gardening 
distractor condition and the A’ in the aversive or positive smoking distractor condition, across all search 
conditions.  
Search goal 
Smoking distractor  
vs irrelevant distractor 
p-value Bayes factor 
95% CI 
Lower bound 
95% CI 
Upper bound 
Aversive smoking 
Aversive  < .001 4837128 × 109 .10 .15 
Appetitive  .059 .61 >-.01 .02 
      
Appetitive smoking 
Aversive  .392 .15 -.01 .02 
Appetitive  < .001 4918.46 .02 .06 
      
Reading 
Aversive  .739 .05 -.02 .02 
Appetitive  .739 .06 -.02 .02 
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These comparisons revealed that there was substantial evidence of attentional capture 
when both appetitive and aversive smoking cues were congruent with the current search goal 
(Table 12). However, when these distractors were incongruent with the current search goal there 
was no significant attentional capture relative to the non-smoking distractor. Bayes factors 
revealed that many of these differences were sensitive null effects with one exception. The 
appetitive smoking distractor effect was marginally significant in the aversive smoking goal 
condition and the Bayes factor suggested an inconclusive result (> .33). 
 
 
Examining the mean values across groups reveals that this marginal effect was driven 
almost entirely by non-smokers (see Table 11), who rated the appetitive smoking images as 
unpleasant, which indicates that they were congruent with the current negative smoking search 
goal. There was no difference between these distractors in the nicotine dependent group. Thus, 
this marginal effect appears to be goal-driven rather than due to any stimulus-driven capture.   
Interestingly, the aversive goal-driven effect (plotted in Figure 19) was larger than the 
appetitive goal-driven effect, t(69) = 5.77, p < .001. This could have been due to the stronger 
arousal ratings (see Table 10) or it could have been due to the low-level salience, because the 
aversive images were less visually complex and contained larger features. 
In order to determine whether there was truly no difference between the smoking 
groups, we conducted Bayesian pairwise comparisons between non-smokers and occasional 
smokers, and non-smokers and dependent smokers. Based on the logic that smokers would 
show the largest mean distractor effect found in the current task, whilst non-smokers should 
Figure 19.  Mean distractor effects for aversive and appetitive smoking distractors across all search goal 
conditions. Distractor effects were calculated by subtracting the A’ detection sensitivity index when the 
distractor was either an appetitive aversive smoking related image from the A’ when the distractor was a 
gardening image. An appetitive distractor effect reflects a decrement in target detection versus the completely 
irrelevant distractor. Standard error represents within-participants standard error.  
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show no smoking distractor effect, the prior expected effect was set as A’ = .12 with a half-
normal distribution. Across almost all conditions, we found evidence which strongly favoured 
the null hypothesis, suggesting that there truly were no group differences (see Table 13).  
It should be noted that there were differences between the smoking groups on age, 
proportion of males, and impulsivity, with these characteristics being higher in the nicotine 
dependent group (see Table 9). These are all factors that have been implicated in a larger 
attentional capture by smoking cues, and would actually predict a larger effect, not a null effect 
(Perlato, Santandrea, Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2014; Coskunpinar & Cyders, 2013). 
 
  Occasional smokers  
vs Non-smokers 
 Dependent smokers 
vs Non-smokers 
Search goal Smoking distractor effect p-value Bayes factor  p-value Bayes factor 
       
Aversive  
Aversive  .682 .37  .872 .27 
Appetitive  .621 .09  .373 .07 
       
Appetitive  
Aversive  .514 .11  .622 .19 
Appetitive  .441 .08  .838 .23 
       
Reading  
Aversive  .388 .11  .918 .20 
Appetitive  .889 .17  .983 .19 
       
 
Table 13. p-values and Bayes factors from the pairwise comparisons of distractor effects between 
occasional smokers and non-smokers, and non-smokers and nicotine dependent smokers. Distractor 
effects are computed by subtracting the A’ when the distractor is a smoking related distractor from the A’ 
when the distractor was a completely irrelevant gardening distractor. Bayes factors were computed based 
on the largest expected difference between groups being A’ = .12, with smokers exhibiting larger smoking 
distractor effects than non-smokers.  
 
The sensitive null results suggest that differences in attentional capture isn’t due to the 
strength of the search goal for smoking images in smokers, which would predict group 
differences in the goal-congruent effect. It is also inconsistent with the hypothesis that smokers 
are sensitive to a stimulus-driven capture, which would predict differences in the goal-
incongruent effect. Instead, the current results are consistent with a group difference occurring 
due to the increased likelihood that smokers voluntarily search for a smoking image across the 
task; however, in the current investigation, instructing all participants to search for smoking 
cues obscured the group differences. This account could accommodate Zvielli, Bernstein and 
Koster’s (2015) finding that the temporal variability in attentional bias found in the dot-probe 
was most predictive of smoking related individual differences, rather than the conventional 
attentional bias score. This temporal variability could be explained in terms of fluctuation of the 
smoker’s search goals across the task period – during some parts of the task they may have 
focused on the instructed task goals, while in other parts adopted goals for smoking stimuli.  
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Some features of previous tasks like the dot-probe may have also increased the 
probability that participants favoured searching for smoking related stimuli over the task goals. 
The dot-probe and similar tasks only require participants to assume a non-specific search goal 
(i.e. respond to location of dot). This task does not require participants to hold a specific feature 
in memory, and can be completed by reacting to any stimulus onset, thus allowing competing 
visual representations to guide attention (see Gunseli, Olivers & Meeter, 2016, for discussion of 
competing memory guidance). Additionally, the probability that participants may prioritise 
attending to smoking cues would have been increased because they appeared in target locations 
(e.g. Mogg et al., 2003).  
Applications 
In the current task, searching for a specific category with consistent features resulted in 
no interference from smoking cues. This null effect suggests that searching for non-smoking 
features prevents distraction by smoking cues. In support of this, Donohue et al. (2016) found 
that when nicotine deprived smokers were instructed to respond to the location of a specific 
colour target, they were able to avoid attentional capture by smoking cues. It may be that by 
occupying the search goal with a specific pre-defined feature, this prevents the formation of a 
competing search goal for smoking stimuli. This points to a potential avenue for attentional bias 
retraining, which has shown promising, albeit inconsistent effects (Christiansen, Schoenmakers 
& Field, 2015); instead of training attention away from smoking stimuli, training participants to 
search for a healthy competing outcome (e.g. smiling faces) could be more effective in 
preventing attentional capture by tobacco products.  
Our finding that automatic orienting occurred only in goal-congruent conditions could 
also point to how graphic health warnings could be made more salient, and why unbranded 
packaging appears to increase the salience of the graphic warnings (Munafo et al. 2017). We 
found that searching for anything but an aversive image blocked interference from these 
aversive images. It may be that the branding information provides smokers with a non-aversive 
target feature to search for when they desire a cigarette, thus allowing avoidance of the graphic 
Figure 20. Current unbranded tobacco 
packaging on the left (Department of 
Health, 2016), and proposed changes to 
packaging on the right. The graphic warning 
has been enlarged to cover the whole front 
of the packet, the salient competing 
coloured warning has been made less 
salient, and the text warning which provides 
information about the image content has 
been embedded in the image. These 
modifications were made in order to 
increase the need for smokers to tune 
attention to the aversive features of the 
graphic warning in order to detect the 
cigarettes. 
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warning (Maynard et al., 2014). Removing this non-aversive feature makes the graphic warning 
the main identifying feature of the packaging. Thus, the only way to intentionally detect the 
cigarette packaging is to voluntarily search for the graphic health warning, leading to greater 
exposure. A recommendation based on my findings would be to make the aversive cue the only 
salient identifying feature on the packaging, removing any other coloured warning labels which 
constitute a competing salient feature (see Figure 20 for example).  
Conclusion 
The current results suggest that top-down goals constitute a powerful driver of 
involuntary attention, which may account for previous findings of automatic orienting to both 
appetitive and aversive smoking cues. The magnitude of this effect does not appear to vary with 
smoking dependence; if a goal-driven mechanism underpins attentional capture by smoking 
images, then the differences may emerge under conditions in which participants are freer to 
select their own search goals, or when the distractors are task-relevant. Delineating the role of 
goal-driven mechanisms underpinning attentional capture by addictive substances allows the 
advancement of models of attention and addiction, but also the refinement and creation of health 
interventions.  
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Chapter 6: Testing an Importance-Expectancy model of attentional goal selection 
 
Chris R.H.  Brown+ & Sophie Forster+ 
+ School of Psychology, University of Sussex, UK 
 
Abstract 
There has been extensive research exploring how goal-driven attention operates, however the 
process determining the initial selection of attentional goals is understudied. I, therefore, 
propose a novel Importance-Expectancy account of attentional goal selection, in which the top-
down prioritization of a particular object is jointly, but independently, predicted by the 
perceived importance of detecting the object as well as the expectancy of the object appearing in 
the current context. To test this model, we created a novel Concurrent Attentional Goal Task 
(CAGT), which forces participants to choose between two competing objects in order to rate 
relative importance, expectancy and priority. Experiment 1 revealed that individuals generally 
believe that both threat and reward associated images are attentionally important. Experiment 2 
demonstrated that, consistent with the Importance-Expectancy model, the extent to which 
individuals rated threatening objects as being relatively important and expected jointly predicted 
the priority that the individual placed on searching for threat, in a given context. Follow-up 
analysis revealed that importance and expectancy similarly predicted other reward and neutral 
objects. A significant effect of context was found on both expectancy and priority: participants 
reported expecting threat objects more, and reported prioritising these objects more in a 
threatening context, versus a safe context. By contrast, there was no effect of context on 
perceived detection importance. The current results provide support for the hypothesised 
Importance-Expectancy model of attentional goal selection, and reveals how this model may 
operate in real-world contexts, through a contextual cueing mechanism. 
 
In order to detect objects which are important to our current desires, concerns and 
intentions, we must be able to selectively attend to certain objects in our environment, whilst 
ignoring less important objects. For instance, if we are hungry then we should be able to detect 
food in our environment and ignore other less relevant objects in the background. Alternatively, 
if we feel unsafe we might wish to prioritise detection of any potential threats, and ignore other 
objects which could cause us to miss the potential danger. For this reason, we require a goal-
driven attentional mechanism which directs attention to goal-relevant objects.  
Typically, in cognitive experimental investigations, goal-driven attention is 
operationalised as the mechanism which results in the correct execution of the task instructions. 
For instance, when instructed to search for a coloured shape, the allocation of attention which 
results in the detection of this shape is often considered goal-driven; whilst any interference in 
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detection of this image is often considered independent of the current goal of the individual, and 
more reliant on bottom-up stimulus features (e.g. Theeuwes, 1992). This operational definition, 
however, may not be fully representative of how individuals would select attentional goals in 
real-world settings. As the examples above illustrate, attentional goals may often be internally 
generated without explicit external instruction. Curiously, despite decades of research 
elucidating how goal-driven attention operates when a goal is active (Folk, Remington & 
Johnson, 1992; Folk, Remington & Wright, 1994; Leber & Egeth, 2006; Eimer & Kiss, 2008; 
Eimer, 2015), the process by which attentional goals are selected has, to my knowledge, 
received no prior empirical consideration.  
Importance – Expectancy Models of Motivation 
One potential approach to exploring how attentional goals may be selected is to draw 
upon other areas of research. Specifically, research in social and motivational psychology has 
explored the factors which influence whether an individual pursues a behavioural goal; that is, 
what variables make an individual work to achieve one outcome over another competing 
outcome (see Braver et al., 2014 for review). For instance, in areas of social psychology, goal 
setting is often believed to be determined by the combined effect of expectancy of the goal’s 
outcome and the value or importance of this outcome (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger & Sears, 1944; 
Gollwitzer, 1990; Locke & Latham, 2002; 2006). These models state that if an outcome is 
important to an individual, and the outcome is expected to be attainable, then an individual will 
select to pursue that goal over another competing goal, and will then take action in order to 
achieve that outcome. 
This literature suggests that if a goal’s outcome is not deemed important by the 
individual, then they are unlikely to pursue it. For instance, if a person finds an activity 
inherently rewarding then they will pursue that goal more than one which has been given to 
them by an external agent (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Additionally, if a desired outcome is unlikely 
to be achieved then the goal will be neglected in favour of a competing goal, for instance if an 
individual has repeated failures in completing a task they may select an easier goal (Locke & 
Latham, 2002; 2006). Broadly, these models have focused mainly on the social factors which 
influence the level of importance and perceived attainability (i.e. expectancy). Neurocognitive 
research further supports the notion that the value of a particular outcome is determined by a 
combination of importance and expectancy. Regions of the reward network, which encode the 
value of an outcome, are sensitive to manipulations not only of value magnitude (amount of 
financial reward) but also to the expectancy of the outcome (probability of the rewarding 
outcome; Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson & Glover, 2005).  
Despite the Importance-Expectancy model of goal setting being pervasive in other 
literatures (Braver et al., 2014), it has never yet been applied to explain how participants choose 
to search for goal-relevant objects. I, therefore, investigated whether this model could be applied 
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to attentional goal selection. Given the key role of expectancy and importance in the valuation 
of outcomes and behavioural goal pursuit, it appears plausible that these factors could also be 
implicated in setting top-down attention to search for the features which are associated with 
these outcomes. 
The Importance-Expectancy model of attentional goal selection (see Figure 21) would 
suggest that the category of object which an individual voluntarily searches for is determined by 
its relation to the most important outcome that is expected in a situation. Specifically, if a goal 
outcome is very important to an individual, and this outcome is expected to occur imminently, 
then individuals will search for the features associated with this outcome. Also, based on 
existing models of expectancy and its interaction with attention, we suggest that expectancy is 
strongly related to the current context that the individual is in (Bar, 2004; Summerfield & 
Egner, 2009). We shall now review previous research which demonstrates these relationships in 
support of the Importance-Expectancy model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Importance and Attention 
There is some existing evidence which could suggest that importance of an outcome 
could be implicated in the selection of a top-down search goal. First, attention is often directed 
towards stimuli which are associated with a valued or motivationally important outcome. For 
instance, in a visual search task, when participants are searching an array for an odd-one-out 
stimulus, threatening stimuli such as fearful faces, or stimuli previously associated with electric 
shock, grab attention and slow target detection (Hodsoll, Viding & Lavie, 2011; Schmidt, 
Beloposky & Theeuwes, 2015; for reviews see, Anderson, 2016; Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea 
& Della Libera, 2013). Additionally, a similar effect has been found for images which predict 
reward, such as food or smiling faces, or images which are associated with financial gain (see 
Pool et al., 2016 for meta-analysis).  
Therefore, there is some level of allocation of attention to motivationally salient stimuli, 
such as these, despite no instructions to attend to them. Motivational salience in this context 
Importance 
(associated value) 
Expectancy 
(probability) 
Search goal priority  Current context 
Figure 21. A hypothesised model between the variables measured within Experiment 1 and 2. It is predicted that 
context will increase the expectancy of objects which appear in that context appearing, and that this will increase 
the chance that participants will assume a search goal for them. I predict that importance of an object will not 
vary across contexts, and that the importance of an object will positively predict the chance that participants will 
prioritise that object as a search goal. 
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refers to the attention-grabbing properties of a stimulus due to its affective, rewarding, or 
threatening associations.  Some theories of attention suggest that this occurs in a stimulus-
driven manner, whereby the motivational salience of the stimulus captures attention 
independent of the current intentions of the participant (Carretie, 2014; Öhman, 2005). 
Alternatively, recent research suggests that top-down factors such as task-relevance modulate 
this effect. Whereby if the motivational content of the stimuli is irrelevant to the task it no 
longer captures attention (Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; Everaert, Spruyt & De Houwer, 2013; 
Everaert, Spruyt, Rossi, Pourtois & De Houwer, 2014; Stein, Zwickel, Ritter, Kitzmantel & 
Schneider, 2009; Vogt, De Houwer, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2013; Lichtenstein-Vidne, Henik 
& Safadi, 2012; Vogt, Koster & De Houwer, 2017). This suggests that top-down factors may 
play a role in attentional capture by both threat and reward stimuli. More recently, it has been 
found within my own research that when individuals are instructed to search for a category of 
motivationally salient stimuli, such as alcohol in social drinkers, distractors which are congruent 
with this goal capture attention despite being irrelevant to the task (Brown, Duka & Forster, 
under review – Chapter 4). This is direct evidence that individuals’ attention is involuntarily 
drawn to the features which are congruent with what the individual is currently searching for. 
Interestingly, involuntary attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli are larger 
in individuals who are more likely to regard these categories of stimuli as important. For 
instance, participants who report being trait anxious have been found to attend to threat more 
than low anxious individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Additionally, this effect is greatest for 
threatening stimuli which are relevant to their personal concerns, such as spiders in spider 
phobic individuals, or emotional faces in socially anxious individuals (Pergamin-Hight et al., 
2015). It is plausible that an individual’s current concerns could result in a goal to search for 
these stimuli, based on their importance to this individual.  
Further evidence of this comes from associative learning research, in which individuals 
who have a history of consuming addictive substances preferentially attend towards stimuli 
which are associated with receiving drug reward; individuals who have not learned the 
association between these stimuli, and do not consider them important or valued do not 
preferentially attend to them (Field & Cox, 2008; Field et al., 2016).  Furthermore, there is 
direct evidence that personal relevance leads to attentional prioritisation; telling an individual 
that a shape is associated with themselves leads to this shape capturing attention more than a 
shape which they are told is associated with a stranger (Sui & Humphrey’s, 2012). In the current 
investigation, we generally characterise this personal relevance, learned value, or associated 
threat as importance. we suggest that these different factors converge and imbue a goal with 
‘importance’ but are influenced by separate factors.  
I note that traditionally, attentional capture by reward and threat has been seen as 
stimulus-driven, mainly due to the effect appearing involuntarily and interfering with task 
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instructions (Öhman, 2005; Öhman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001; Carretie, 2014; Bishop, 2008). 
There is evidence, however, that involuntary attentional capture can paradoxically occur as a 
consequence of voluntary top-down goals, not just stimulus-driven effects. For instance, it has 
been found across multiple investigations that when individuals are instructed to search for a 
feature of a target or a general category of stimuli in a relevant location, then stimuli in 
irrelevant locations which match this feature capture attention, as indexed by participants being 
slower to respond to a target, or make more errors in detecting a target. This occurs despite the 
distractors being irrelevant to the current task (Folk, Remington & Johnson, 1992; Folk, Leber 
& Egeth, 2002; Wyble, Folk & Potter, 2013; Eimer, 2015). Further, we have recently found that 
task-irrelevant motivationally salient distractors (i.e. threatening animals and emotional faces) 
only captured attention in an involuntary fashion when participants were searching for that 
category of image in a task-relevant location (Brown, Berggren & Forster, under review – 
Chapter 2). It, therefore, appears that the current goals of the individual could account for an 
involuntary attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli.  
In these previous tasks, participants were given an instructed goal, though it is also 
plausible that individuals would wish to deliberately search for these stimuli without instruction 
to do so, because they signal important outcomes which are relevant to current concerns. This 
importance could then lead the individuals to tune attention towards features which are 
associated with this important outcome. In the current investigation we shall aim to demonstrate 
that individuals perceive motivationally salient stimuli as important to detect. 
Expectancy and Attention 
Reviewing the previous literature, it appears that expectancy can influence the 
allocation of voluntary attention in response to an instructed search goal. For instance, there are 
several theoretical models which suggest that goal-driven attention is influenced by the 
expectancy of a target appearing (Corbetta & Schulman, 2000; Summerfield & Egner, 2009). 
These models suggest that prior expectations influence what goal-relevant features are searched 
for, where to search for these features, as well as making decisions regarding ambiguous 
perceptual information (Summerfield & Egner, 2009). These models, however, do not address 
how a search goal may be initially set, and instead focus on how an individual may use learned 
expectancies to guide an already active goal. In the current investigation, We focus on the novel 
idea that expectancy could be implicated in the motivation to begin searching for a particular 
object in the first place. 
 Predictive coding models’ or ‘Bayesian inference models’ posit that through statistical 
learning, participants acquire expectancies of where to search for certain stimuli in order to 
respond to them (Rauss, Schwartz & Pourtois, 2011; Rauss & Pourtois, 2013; Chikkerur, Serre, 
Tan & Poggio, 2010). If a target consistently appears in one location over another, then 
participants are more likely to attend to that location in order to detect the target, and are slower 
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to detect it if it appears in an unexpected location (Geng & Behrmann, 2005). Further, if a 
symbolic cue signals the correct location of a target on a high proportion of trials then 
participants are likely to attend to the signalled location, but not when the same cue is an 
unreliable predictor of the target location (Posner, 1980). Therefore, it appears that individuals 
can learn probabilities in order to guide their top-down goals through their prior expectations.   
Despite the main-stream attention literature not including the influence of expectancy 
on attentional goal-selection, the individual differences literature does appear to provide some 
indirect evidence that expectancy is implicated in attentional goal selection. Within the anxiety 
literature, it is well established that anxious individuals selectively attend to threat more than 
low anxious individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Interestingly, participants who report high 
levels of anxiety also exhibit a threat expectancy bias, whereby anxious individuals over-
estimate the likelihood of a threatening outcome (Reiss, 1991). For instance, in children, those 
who exhibited anxious symptoms reported expecting negative outcomes to be more likely to 
happen, compared to children with fewer anxious symptoms (Suarez & Bell-Dolan, 2001). 
Additionally, spider phobic individuals reported expecting a spider to appear more in an 
imagined situation relative to other animals, whilst non-phobic individuals did not show this 
difference (Aue & Hoeppli, 2012).  This raises the question of whether this heightened 
expectancy might contribute to the attentional capture effects. 
 Such expectancy biases are also influential in models of reward seeking behaviours; for 
instance, heavier drinkers reported expecting greater pleasurable outcomes and tension 
reduction compared to light drinkers (Rohsenow, 1983). Additionally, an expectancy bias has 
been implicated in risky gambling behaviour, where heavier gamblers expect to win more often 
in a gambling task compared to non-gamblers, and this resulted in riskier betting behaviour (van 
Holst et al., 2012b). Importantly, both heavy drinkers and problem gamblers have been found in 
separate investigations to exhibit involuntary attentional capture by disorder related imagery 
versus control images (Townshend & Duka, 2001; van Holst et al., 2012a), again raising the 
possibility that expectancy might be (partially) driving these biases. 
More recently, the link between expectancy and the attentional capture has been directly 
explored (Aue & Okon-Singer, 2015; Sussman, Jin & Mohanty, 2016), but these studies failed 
to reveal any effect of expectancy on attentional capture. For instance, it was found that 
participants were no faster at detecting a spider target in a visual search task when they were 
given the instruction that the target was 90% likely to be a spider (or a bird), compared to a 50% 
chance that it would be a spider (or a bird; Aue, Chauvigne, Bristle, Okon-Singer & Guex, 
2016).  One reason for the lack of evidence of the association between expectancy and 
attentional capture may be that expectancy does not have a direct effect upon attentional 
selection. It may be, instead, that expectancy effects are mediated by top-down search goals. 
Meaning that expectancy may be related to attentional capture by threat, or other motivationally 
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relevant objects, but this only occurs because it prioritises the goal to search for the object. It 
could have been that in the previous investigation, both the 50% and 90% expectancy condition 
were sufficient to activate an equivalent search goal for the spider, versus the bird (Aue et al., 
2016, see General Discussion for further explanation of this point).  
Context and Expectancy 
Models of attention which outline how expectancy could influence goal-driven attention 
cite the role of context in how participants deploy an already active search goal (Bar, 2004; 
Summerfield & Egner, 2009). For instance, when a search array is repeated across trials, 
participants learn the target location relative to the other non-target stimuli (Chun & Jiang, 
1998). Thus, participants quickly learn relational information between a target and the context. 
This is true when using real-world scenes as well, for instance, participants searched the sky 
before the ground when instructed to search for aircraft despite appearing in both locations 
across the task (Neider & Zelinksy, 2006; see also Bar, 2004). Additionally, influential 
computational models of attention suggest that participants use a combination of stimulus 
salience and learned scene regularities to detect a target (Itti & Koch, 2000). It therefore appears 
that the context can encode the probabilities of what appears in a particular location, and that 
participants use this information to efficiently detect a specific target. 
There has thus far been no direct evidence of contextual cueing of search goal selection 
within the attention literature. However, the relation between context, expectancy and goal 
setting is well established in other literatures. For instance, goal-priming research has revealed 
that health related cues in an environment can increase the chance that an individual will pursue 
health goals and reduce consumption of unhealthy food (Papies, 2016). Additionally, in both 
animal and human studies, drug seeking behaviour is greatest in environments which have been 
previously associated with receiving drug reward; and this occurs because the contextual cues in 
the environment increase the expectancy of receiving drug reward (Hogarth, Dickinson, Wright, 
Kouvaraki & Duka, 2007). 
In the present investigation, we therefore predict that the context that participants 
imagine themselves in will increase the expectancy that a context related object will appear; and 
that the search goal for this object will also be greater in this congruent context, compared to 
when it is presented alongside an incongruent context. Specifically, we predict that in a threat 
associated context, participants will expect and prioritise dangerous objects more than 
rewarding or neutral objects. If supported then this contextual cueing model would provide a 
parsimonious mechanism that could explain how individuals can use top-down search goals for 
specific stimuli, in order to maximise automatic detection of relevant targets, but minimise the 
cost of missing another important stimulus in the environment.  
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The Present Study 
In the current investigation, we shall explore how individuals may voluntarily choose to 
prioritise different stimuli of varying motivational relevance (threatening, rewarding or neutral), 
based on a proposed Importance-Expectancy theory of attentional goal selection. As in real life, 
in which attending to one object necessarily means attending less to other objects, we devised a 
forced choice rating task to establish goal-driven attentional priority. My first experiment tested 
whether the categories of motivationally relevant objects typically associated with attentional 
capture are rated as attentionally important. Specifically, participants were presented with pairs 
of objects and asked which object they would want to notice first if they encountered both 
objects in a room, simultaneously. To foreshadow the results, objects which posed an immediate 
threat were ranked as the most important to detect, whilst potential threat and rewarding stimuli 
were seen as less important to detect, but more important than neutral stimuli. 
In a second preregistered experiment (osf.io/vxkc2), we tested whether the Importance-
Expectancy model could predict the search goal priority of a specific object. We also wanted to 
determine the role of contextual cueing in this model. To test this, we instructed participants to 
rate the detection importance, expectancy, and search goal priority in two imagined contexts. It 
is expected that when a motivationally salient object is relevant to a context, then individuals 
will expect it more compared to a context where it is unrelated, and will prioritise it more as a 
search goal in the related versus unrelated context, but (based on the findings of Experiment 1) 
will not perceive it as more important to detect in the related context versus unrelated context. 
To do this we focused on threatening objects, due to their simple association with certain 
contexts. Specifically, the threatening objects should be prioritised as a search goal and 
expected more in the threat related context, and be less prioritised and less expected in the safe 
context. 
Due to the previous evidence that there was individual variation in goal-driven 
behaviour for reward seeking and threat avoidance, we also measured two personality variables 
related to these behaviours. Primarily we were interested in the relationship between trait 
anxiety and the search goal for threatening objects, due to the evidence that these highly anxious 
individuals would find these stimuli important and/or expect them more in the environment 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007). We also measured the behaviour activation system scale (BAS; Carver 
& White, 1994). This scale measures an individual’s general reward seeking behaviour, and has 
previously been found to positively correlate with attentional capture by reward associated 
stimuli (Hickey, Chelazzi & Theeuwes, 2010). We therefore expected this variable to correlate 
positively with the search goal for rewarding objects, as well as the importance or expectancy of 
these objects.  
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Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1wefocused on establishing the perceived attentional importance of 
various objects which may be encountered in daily life. We selected objects from different 
categories of affective stimuli which have been associated with attentional capture (see Pool et 
al., 2016; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). These categories were imminent threat (i.e. attacking dog, 
man with knife), potential threat (i.e. broken glass, warning sign), reward (i.e. phone, smiling 
face, money, food), and a control category of stimuli which were neutral (i.e. towel, chair). 
  The main aim of this task was to determine whether the affective categories which had 
previously been found to capture attention would also be reported as important to detect. we 
also hypothesised that some individuals would report some stimuli more important to detect 
than others; specifically, we expected that trait anxious individuals would report that imminent 
threat and potential threat were more important to detect than other objects, and that participants 
scoring high on the BAS subscale would report that detecting rewarding objects was more 
important than detecting other objects. 
Methods 
Participants. 239 participants responded to the online advert through the University of 
Sussex subject pool, of whom 213 participants completed the questionnaire. 28 participants 
were excluded for answering over half (> 5/11) reversed scored items with the previous 
unreversed item response. Of the remaining 185 participants, 150 were female and 35 were 
male. The average age of the participants was 19.86 (SD = 4.52). The sample size was 
determined by the number of participants who could be recruited over two academic terms. 
Participants were remunerated with partial course credit. Post-hoc power analysis using Gpower 
revealed that we had sufficient power to detect an effect of ƞ2p < .01 with power at .80 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2009). 
Stimuli and procedure. Participants accessed the experiment using their own computer 
on campus or at home using Inquisit online testing software. They first read the consent page 
before completing the Concurrent Attentional Goal Task (CAGT). The CAGT was designed to 
test the relative importance individuals would place on detecting different motivationally salient 
objects, by placing them in opposition to each other. This simulates the competitive nature of 
the allocation of attention, where some objects must be suppressed in order to focus on a 
prioritised object. An example trial and all image types are presented in Figure 22.  The 
different motivationally salient objects were selected so that they formed five specific 
categories. The categories were imminent threat (man with knife, attacking dog), potential threat 
(broken glass, flammable warning), neutral (chair, towel), and potentially rewarding object, in 
order to get a range of rewarding stimuli, four reward related images selected were selected 
desserts, money, smiling people, mobile phone). Four images were chosen instead of two, as 
with the other categories, in order to provide sufficient variety of reward related objects to 
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mimic the complexity of a real-world context. All images were the same across participants 
except for the smiling people, which varied depending on which gender participants reported 
being attracted to. Along with the age and gender demographic questions, participants were 
asked to say which gender they were most attracted to; the smiling face was the gender which 
they selected. Participants who responded with “I’d prefer not to answer” were shown a picture 
of a smiling man and woman.  
All of these images were sourced from Google images, and were resized to 200 x 300 
pixels. All tasks and images are available via the Open Science Framework (osf.io/vxkc2). As 
shown in Figure 22, these images were presented in pairs, one to the left, the other to the right; 
between the images was a visual analogue scale (VAS), and immediately below each image was 
an anchor phrase “I would want to notice this first”. At the centre of the VAS is a phrase “no 
preference”, whilst at the top of the screen was the question: “Which thing would you want to 
notice first in your environment?”. All the possible combinations of the object pairs were 
presented (e.g. man with knife versus towel), this led to 45 different combinations of the 10 
objects. The object pairs were presented in a random order, and the position of each of the 
objects in the pair was randomised.  
 
Prior to the CAGT, participants were given the following instructions: “In this task, you 
will rate the priority of several objects which you could encounter in your environment. During 
the task, you will be shown two images on the left and the right of the screen. The images will be 
No 
preference 
Which thing would you want to notice first in your 
environment? 
I would 
want to 
notice 
this first 
I would 
want to 
notice 
this first 
Figure 22. An example trial from the (CAGT) and all images presented in the task. The size and positioning of 
stimuli is approximate to how they appeared in the task. The images are ordered from left to right in their 
categories: imminent threat (knife, dog), potential threat (glass, warning), reward (money, food, phone, face), and 
neutral (towel, chair). 
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of things which could be important to your everyday goals and could be beneficial for you to 
notice quickly so you could respond to them. For each question, you should imagine that you 
are entering a room in which the two objects are present. You must compare these objects based 
on which you would want to notice first on entering the room, you do this by clicking along the 
continuous scale presented in the middle of the screen; if you would want to notice one object 
first then you would click on the scale closer to the image of that object. If you have no 
preference you would click in the middle of the scale. Please think carefully about how much 
you value each object and respond accordingly. You are encouraged to respond along the 
continuum, rather than responding just at the extreme ends of the scale. i.e. if you wanted to 
notice one object only slightly more than the other, you would click on the line closer to the 
middle, compared to if you wanted to notice one object a lot more than the other, in which case 
you would click closer to the preferred object.”  
CAGT Scoring. The dependent variable derived from the CAGT was the preference 
score for each category of object relative to each other category. This was computed based on 
how close the participant responded to an object, relative to the other objects, across trials. The 
closer the participant clicked to an object, the higher the preference score was on that trial for 
that object, and the lower the score was for the competing object; the score on each trial ranged 
from zero to 100. Across all trials the average relative score was computed for each individual 
object versus every other object. These scores were then averaged to form the overall category 
preference score. The intra-category comparisons were excluded from the category’s average, 
e.g.  the knife versus attacking dog comparison was excluded from the overall imminent threat 
average.  
Image ratings. In order to confirm the intended valence of the images use in the 
CAGT, participants next rated each of the ten images presented in the CAGT along dimensions 
of attractiveness, positive, threatening, and negative. These four scales ranged from one to ten 
on a Likert scale. The images were presented in a random order.  
Questionnaires. Finally, the participants completed two questionnaires, the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983) and the 
Behavioural Inhibition System/ Behavioural Activation System questionnaire (BIS/BAS; Carver 
& White, 1994). The STAI is a 40-item state and trait anxiety questionnaire, 20 items for state, 
and 20 items for trait anxiety (e.g. “I feel safe”). For state anxiety items, participants indicated 
how they were “feeling right now at this moment” in relation to these items. Whilst for trait 
anxiety items, participants indicated “how they generally feel” in relation to the items. 
Participants indicated how they felt along a four-point scale. The BIS/BAS is a 24-item scale 
measuring trait differences in general approach motivation and avoidance of punishment 
motivation. Participants had to indicate how relevant each of the items were to them, along a 
four-point scale. The activation system subscale was of interest in this investigation (e.g. “I 
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crave excitement and new sensations.”). The order in which these two questionnaires were 
presented was randomised between participants. 
Bayes factors. As well as using traditional significance testing methods, we also 
conducted Bayesian analyses in order to compare the strength of evidence in favour of the 
experimental hypothesis or the null hypothesis. A Bayes factor compares evidence for the 
experimental hypothesis and the null hypothesis, relative to the prior expected effect.  The Bayes 
factor ranges from 0 to infinity, values less than 1 indicate that there is support for the null 
hypothesis, whilst values of greater than 1 indicate that there is support for the experimental 
hypothesis. The strength of this evidence is indicated by the magnitude of the Bayes Factor; 
values greater than three or less than .33 indicate substantial evidence for either the 
experimental or null hypothesis, respectively. A value closer to 1 suggests that the data is 
insensitive and that any result is due to insensitivity and is ‘anecdotal’ (Dienes 2008, 2011, 
2014, 2016). The Bayes factor was computed using a modified version of Baguley and Kaye’s 
(2010) R code (retrieved from Dienes 2008). The Bayesian priors are listed with each individual 
analysis.  
Results and Discussion 
Image ratings. Initial examination of image ratings confirmed that the categories were 
perceived as intended (see Table 14). A repeated measures ANOVA comparing the threat score 
across the four categories, revealed that there was a significant difference across the categories 
of stimuli, F(2.19, 403.45) = 1942.83, p < .001, η2p = .91 (Huynh-Feldt corrected). Imminent 
threat was perceived as more threatening than potential threat, t(184) = 22.01, p < .001. 
Potential threat was also rated as more threatening than neutral stimuli, t(184) = 34.27, p < .001. 
Thus, the threatening stimuli were perceived as intended. Additionally, the reward images were 
rated as more attractive and positive relative to the neutral images, t(184) =22.15, p < .001; 
t(184) = 18.78, p < .001, respectively. 
 
 Image ratings 
 Threatening Negative Attractiveness Positive 
Imminent threat 8.73 (1.25) 8.45 (1.5) 1.68 (1.41) 1.48 (.91) 
Potential threat 5.75 (1.82) 5.95 (1.85) 1.73 (1.21) 1.69 (1.03) 
Neutral 1.19 (.64) 1.4 (.91) 3.61 (2.16) 4.26 (2.26) 
Reward 1.53 (.79) 1.82 (.97) 6.96 (1.55) 7.26 (1.39) 
 
Table 14.  Mean ratings of the different categories of images along dimensions of how threatening, 
negative, attractive, and positive the images were perceived. Ratings were along a ten-point likert scale. 
Standard deviations are presented in brackets. 
 
Overall CAGT results. An initial repeated measures ANOVA with imminent threat, 
potential threat, reward, and neutral categories as the levels was conducted. This revealed a 
highly significant effect across the categories, F(1.49, 274.28) = 186.4,  p < .001 (Greenhouse-
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Geisser corrected), 95% CI [25, 29.54], η2p = .5. As can be seen in Figure 23, the overall pattern 
of results reflected different levels of importance in detecting each of the four categories, with 
imminent threat receiving the most preference and neutral stimuli being preferred the least. 
Comparisons between different object importance. Bayesian pairwise comparisons 
between imminent threat, potential threat, or reward versus the neutral objects were computed. 
Due to the lack of prior knowledge regarding the size of this effect uniform prior was set 
(signified as BU), a plausible effect size of 80 was selected to compare imminent threat to 
neutral object, this was judged by myself to be a large effect on this scale, lower bound set to 
zero. Whilst comparisons between potential threat versus neutral, and reward versus neutral, 
were set to a plausible effect size of 50 which is a smaller but still substantial effect based on the 
current scale, with the lower bound set to zero. we were uncertain of the direction of the 
difference between potential threat and reward, We therefore set a two-tailed hypothesis with 
the lower bound set to -20 and the upper bound set to 20. These effect sizes were selected by 
myself based on what was judged to be a suitable effect, the data and script are available to the 
reader for potential reanalyses with different priors. 
 
 
Figure 23. Plot displaying the mean detection importance scores for each of the four categories of stimuli. 
The scores are centred on zero which signifies no preference or avoidance. Error bars depict within-
participants standard error.  
 
Follow-up t-tests revealed that imminent threat was rated as more important to detect in 
the environment than neutral objects or potentially threatening objects, t(184) = 19.15, p < .001, 
BU[0,80] = 3423814×72; t(184) = 18.07, p < .001, BU[0,50] = 5964428×63, respectively. It was also 
rated as more important to detect than the reward associated objects, t(184) = 27.88, p < .001, 
BU[0,50] = 121240512901. Therefore, imminent threat was the category clearly seen as the most 
important to detect. Potential threat was also rated as more important to detect than neutral 
stimuli, t(185) = 12.35, p < .001, BU[0,80] =8927185×25, as was the reward associated category, 
t(185) = 27.88, p < .001, BU[0,80] = 1916186×161. Therefore, the motivationally salient objects 
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were still seen as more important to detect than objects which were not strongly linked to a 
motivational outcome (i.e. towel, chair). The difference between potential threat and the reward 
category was the smallest, though reward was seen as slightly more important to detect than 
potential threat, t(185) = 2.14, p = 034, BU[-20, 20] = 1.51, however the Bayes factor suggested an 
inconclusive effect, despite being consistent enough to reach significance. 
Relationships between importance and individual differences. In order to investigate 
whether there was any relationship between anxiety, or reward seeking behaviour, and the 
importance in detecting threatening objects, we correlated trait anxiety and the overall BAS 
score with each of the detection importance scores. To determine whether these relationships 
favoured the experimental hypothesis or the null hypothesis, we computed Bayes factors using a 
uniform distribution where small effects are equally likely as large effects. Based on guidelines 
for the magnitude of effect size reported by Cohen (1988), we expected a effect size (r = .5), 
therefore, we used an upper expected effect of .55 which was the fisher transformed effect size.  
 
 
 Imminent threat Potential threat Neutral Reward 
Trait anxiety -.07 .03 -.03 .07 
BAS  .04 .1 -.02 -.09 
Imminent threat - .56** -.83** -.83** 
Potential threat  - -.56** -.86** 
Neutral   - .58** 
Reward    - 
 Bayes factors 
Trait anxiety .09 .23 .13 .41 
BAS .29 .72 .14 .08 
 
Table 15. Correlation coefficients between the different detection importance scores. p < .05 = *; p < .001 
= **. Bayes factors are also presented. Bayes factors above 3 signifies substantial evidence favouring the 
experimental hypothesis, a Bayes factor below .33 denotes substantial evidence favouring the null 
hypothesis. 
 
As can be seen in Table 15, and contrary to my predictions, the correlations suggest that 
there was strong evidence for the null hypothesis signifying no relationship between trait 
anxiety and self-rated attentional importance of imminent threat and potential threat. To 
conclude, trait anxiety did not correlate with detection importance of either potential or 
imminent threat, and there was evidence favouring the null hypothesis across all correlations; 
therefore, against expectations, trait anxious individuals do not consider threat as more 
important to detect than low trait anxious individuals in the current task. Similarly, there was no 
significant relationship between reward detection importance and BAS score, and Bayes factors 
favoured the null hypothesis for this relationship. 
The inter-dependent nature of the current dependent variable means that an increase in 
priority of one variable results in the inherent de-prioritisation of another variable; thus, strong 
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correlations are unavoidable. What these correlations do show is the direction of the competition 
between the categories. The data suggests that there is a divide between the categories, with 
both threat related categories positively correlating, and both non-threatening categories 
positively correlating. These relationships suggest that some groups of objects were rated 
according to their affective associations, although the exact pattern is too complex to draw 
strong conclusions.  
Experiment 2 
The results from Experiment 1 indicate that, overall, individuals’ self-reported 
voluntary attentional goals generally corresponded to the same stimuli that are known to capture 
attention in experimental tasks (Carretie, 2014; Pool et al., 2016). More specifically, potential 
threat and reward received a moderate level of prioritisation, suggesting that participants did 
believe these objects to be important to detect. However, relative to imminent threat, these 
objects were considered substantially less important to detect. 
The result of Experiment 1 is unsurprising; however, it was important to confirm this 
result as it is a necessary piece of evidence for the goal-driven account of attentional capture by 
motivationally salient stimuli; individuals would have to consider these stimuli important to 
detect in order to adopt an intentional search goal for them. However, a model of attentional 
goal selection, based purely upon importance, would predict that individuals would search for 
imminent threat across all contexts and potentially miss other important motivationally salient 
stimuli. For instance, if an individual was always searching for an attacking dog across every 
situation, even known safe situations such as home, then this would reduce the ability to focus 
on work or leisure. 
 Unlike the task in Experiment 1, in daily life individuals do not typically know exactly 
what objects are in an environment and must rely on prior expectations of what may appear 
there; therefore, based on previous evidence, individuals may select a search goal based on both 
the importance and the expectancy of an outcome (see Figure 21). In Experiment 2,wetherefore 
pre-registered and tested this Importance-Expectancy model of attentional goal selection 
(osf.io/vxkc2). In order to test it we adapted the CAGT to include forced choice response 
questions to measure expectancy and search goal priority, not just detection importance. we also 
added a contextual element to the task, thus resulting in the Contextual-CAGT (C-CAGT). This 
adapted version of the task required participants to make the ratings whilst imagining 
themselves within two separate contexts, one a threat associated context (dark alley) and another 
a safe context (safe office).  
I believe that the imagined context would be influential over whether a specific goal 
would be prioritised, such that if a goal was associated with the current context then it would be 
more likely to be prioritised than in the context less related to the goal. This contextual cueing 
effect would provide a suitable mechanism that would allow participants to effectively search 
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for the most likely outcome in a given context, thus allowing them to effectively pursue a single 
goal at a time without having to divide attention across multiple important objects. 
In Experiment 1,we found that there was evidence suggesting an absence of individual 
differences in the importance rating of the objects. It may be, that individual differences in 
anxiety or reward seeking are correlated with expectancy, rather than importance. For instance, 
all individuals may believe that threat is equally important to detect, but trait anxious 
individuals may expect it to appear more. Indeed, anxious individuals do appear to exhibit an 
expectancy bias for threat, thus making this a good candidate for explaining individual 
differences in search goal priority (Reiss, 1991; Sussman et al., 2016). I, therefore, expect that 
high trait anxious individuals will show a positive relationship with the expectancy that threat 
will appear and search goal priority of threatening objects. It is unclear whether this will occur 
across both contexts, in which case this would suggest that anxious individuals have a general 
top-down goal for threat. It could appear just in the threat associated context, in which case it 
would suggest that anxious individuals are sensitive to cueing effects from threat cues; or 
alternatively, trait anxiety could positively correlate with threat prioritisation and expectancy 
just in the safe context, which would suggest that anxious individuals are poorer at learning 
safety context cues.  
Methods 
Participants. In total, 265 participants responded to the online advert. 220 participants 
completed the whole experiment. The total time spent on the instruction pages was recorded, 
based on the distribution of these times, 9 participants were excluded for being over 2 SD’s on 
this measure which suggests poor attention or comprehension. An additional 11 participants 
were excluded for answering over 5/11 reversed scored items with the previous unreversed item 
response on the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983). Testing was continued until a total of 200 
usable participants were recruited. A total of 109 participants were female, 88 were male, and 3 
reported ‘other’ as their gender. The average age of the participants was 36.99 (SD = 11.97). 
Post-hoc power analyses revealed the final sample size had sufficient power to detect a 
minimum effect of ƞ2p = .01 within the interaction term, with a power of 1-β = .80 (Faul et al., 
2009). Participants were asked their demographic details at the start of the task, after the consent 
procedure. In addition to age and gender, participants were asked their level of education, 
employment, and nationality; they were no longer asked which gender they were attracted to 
most. 
Stimuli and procedure. 
Contextual – CAGT (C-CAGT). All trials of the C-CAGT were similar to Experiment 
1, with the following exceptions, see Figure 24 for an example trial and the selected stimuli. As 
in Experiment 1, all images were presented either side of the screen in pairs, with the VAS 
presented in between them. we selected five images from the ten presented in Experiment 1, in 
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order to avoid an excessively long task duration. The images selected from the range of 
categories of threat, reward, and neutral, specifically, broken glass, man with knife, towel, 
money, and phone. Image selection was based primarily on the threat and attractiveness ratings 
in Experiment 1. The man with a knife and the broken glass were selected because they were 
rated the most threatening from the imminent and potential threat categories. The phone and 
money images were selected because they were less reliant upon subjective judgments or 
current state, whilst the perception of facial attractiveness and food would be more variable. 
Objects which were actually present in the context scenes weren’t selected, meaning that faces 
and chairs were excluded because they were visible in the scene.  In this version of the task, a 
contextual cue was presented at the top of the screen – this could either be a threatening context 
or a safe context. For the threat context we selected an image of a dark alleyway at night, for the 
safe context we selected an office with people working. The question for that block was 
presented in the centre of the screen.  
 
There were three different blocks presented across the task each measuring a different 
aspect of attention. These blocks measured search goal priority, expectancy, and detection 
No 
preference 
Which thing should you look out for more in this situation? 
Safe context cue 
Threat context cue 
Figure 24. An example trial from the Contextual-Concurrent attentional goal task (C-CAGT) and all images 
presented in the task. The two possible context images are presented to the right of the trial frame and depict the 
threat alley context (above) and the safe office context (below). The contextual cue in this situation is a 
threatening context (dark alley). The size and positioning of stimuli is approximate to how they appeared in the 
task. The object images are ordered from left to right in their categories: imminent threat (knife), potential threat 
(glass), reward (money, phone), and neutral (towel). On the example trial participants are asked to rate their 
search goal priority. The other questions which were presented were expectancy: “Which thing would you most 
expected to find in this situation?”; and importance: “If both things were present in this situation which thing 
would you want to notice first?”. These were presented in the same location as the search goal priority question. 
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importance; each block only differed in the question which was asked, see below. The threat 
and safe context cues appeared in each block, sequentially, their order was randomised within 
the block. Within each context there were ten trials, one for each combination of the object pairs 
(e.g. broken glass vs money). Therefore, there were 20 trials per block, and 60 trials overall. The 
order of these blocks was randomised between participants.  
C-CAGT-Priority. The block began with an instruction of what the question for that 
block would be: "In this block you must imagine yourself in the situation presented at the top of 
the screen. You will be asked:  'WHICH THING SHOULD YOU LOOK OUT FOR MORE IN 
THIS SITUATION?’” 
Below this instruction was an image of an example trial, in which the context was a 
park, the image pair was a growling dog and an ice cream van. Further details of the question 
and response were given below this: "Your task in this block is to imagine yourself in the 
situation depicted at the top of the screen, and then answer the onscreen question with respect 
to the images on the left and right. Use your experience and knowledge of each situation in 
relation to the two things to make your decision. In this case, you must report which object you 
think you should be vigilant for in the specific situation when neither object is guaranteed to be 
there.  
Participants were also given more general information about the possible range of 
responses, using the example context and image pair as guide: You must use your beliefs and 
experiences of the situation and both objects to answer this question. For instance, for the 
example screen above you would imagine yourself in a park and judge whether you should look 
out for ice cream van or a scary dog more. If you think you should look out for the scary dog 
more than an ice-cream van when you are in the park then you would click on the line closer to 
that image; the closer you respond, the greater preference you are showing for that object. If 
you think both things should be looked out for equally in the specific situation then you would 
respond in the middle of the line. You are encouraged to use the whole of the line to indicate the 
extent to which you should look out for one object over the other". Following the instructions, 
participant completed the concurrent choice for each combination of the 5 images presented 
once, in a random order.  
C-CAGT-Expectancy. The expectancy block began with the instruction: “In this block 
you must imagine yourself in the situation presented at the top of the screen. You will be asked: 
'WHICH THING WOULD YOU BE MORE LIKELY TO FIND IN THIS SITUATION?'". The 
same example trial image was presented again (i.e. park context). Below which another set of 
detailed instructions was presented: "Your task in this block is to imagine yourself in the 
situation depicted at the top of the screen, and then answer the onscreen question with respect 
to the images on the left and right. Use your experience and knowledge of each situation in 
relation to the two things to make your decision. In this case you must report which object you 
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think is more likely to appear in the specific situation, based on your beliefs and experiences of 
that situation." Participants were given near identical instructions on how to respond in the 
example context, before continuing to the concurrent choice stage for that block. 
C-CAGT-Importance. The importance block began with the instruction: "In this block 
you must imagine yourself in the situation presented at the top of the screen. You will be asked:  
IF BOTH THINGS WERE PRESENT IN THIS SITUATION, WHICH WOULD YOU WANT TO 
NOTICE FIRST?". Again, the same example image appeared, and below more detailed 
instructions were given: "Your task in this block is to imagine yourself in the situation depicted 
at the top of the screen, then to answer the onscreen question with respect to the images on the 
left and right. Use your experience and knowledge of each situation in relation to the two things 
to make your decision. In this case you must report which object you think is more important to 
notice first when they appear at the same time and at a similar distance. This does NOT refer to 
which one you would prefer to be present, because both object simultaneously appear in the 
situation.” Participants were given near identical instructions on how to respond in the example 
context, before continuing to the concurrent choice stage for that block. 
Image ratings. The image rating was completed after the C-CAGT task, and was 
identical to Experiment 1, with the exception that only the five objects and two context cues 
were rated on how attractive, positive, threatening, and negative they were. 
Questionnaires. The questionnaires were presented after the image rating task. Due to 
the BIS/BAS being a secondary hypothesis, we presented this measure second to the STAI in 
order to decrease any between subject noise due to possible questionnaire order effects. 
C-CAGT scoring. The dependent variable derived from the C-CAGT was very similar 
to the measure in the CAGT. In this version, however, participants completed the relative 
response for each of the three different questions (importance, expectancy, priority) in the safe 
and threat contexts. The scores for the threatening objects were created from the average of the 
comparison scores between man with knife versus every other non-threatening object, and 
broken glass versus every other object; the comparison between the knife and broken glass was 
not included in this average. The average threat score was created by averaging the knife and 
broken glass scores together. 
Results and Discussion 
Pre-registration. We pre-registered all analyses prior to data collection, further, all 
analyses scripts and datasets are available online via the OSF (osf.io/vxkc2). In order to avoid 
over-testing, we focused specifically on the threatening objects, these being the man with a 
knife and the broken glass. Further, focusing on the dangerous objects allowed me to 
manipulate the contextual cueing, with threat congruent contexts providing a clear signal of 
danger. All analyses which were not pre-registered are reported as exploratory. Additionally, 
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Bayes factors for correlations and regression analyses were not pre-registered, though we 
provide detailed information regarding the computation of these values. 
Bayes factors. Bayes factors were calculated for all pair-wise comparisons, 
correlations, and regression analyses, in order to determine whether any non-significant effects 
were true null effects. To compute the Bayes factor for pairwise comparisons, we used a half-
normal distribution (signified by BH), with a mean of zero difference, which estimates a 
directional hypothesis with in which a smaller difference is more probable than a large 
difference. The standard deviation of this distribution is reported a long with the results, and 
was set according to the highest plausible effect size based on existing evidence taken from 
Experiment 1 and pilot data conducted on a small sample of participants (n = 38; see OSF for 
data osf.io/vxkc2). Conversely, due to the lack of knowledge about the size of the expected 
relationship between variables, we computed Bayes factors for correlations and regression 
analyses using a uniform distribution. All Bayes factors were one tailed, that is, expecting that a 
threatening object would be to be preferred in a threatening context versus a safe context, and 
expecting a positive relationship between the priority, expectancy, and importance preference 
scores, and also expecting a positive relationship between trait anxiety and these variables. The 
selection of the prior expected effect for these Bayes factors is outlined within the specific 
analyses. 
Manipulation check. There was a significant difference between the threat ratings of 
the office context and the threatening alley context M = 1.58, SD = 1.1 vs M = 7.38, SD = 2.24 
on threat rating, t(196) = 33.76, p < .001. In fact, only one participant reported the alley being 
less threatening than the office. Thus, the ratings confirmed that the contexts were perceived as 
intended.  
Context effects on threat priority. See Figure 25 for a plot of mean values. we 
conducted a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with context (office/ alley) and object (knife/ 
broken glass) as factors. The relative priority of the objects was the dependent variable. This 
revealed, as pre-registered, that the alley context resulted in higher relative priority of 
threatening stimuli than when they were presented in the safer office context, F(1,199) = 
614.52, p < .001, η2p = .76. Participants reported a higher relative priority score of the knife 
compared to the broken glass, F(1,199) = 359.63, p < .001, η2p = .64. Additionally, there was a 
significant interaction between the context and the object, F(1,199) = 964.24, p < .001, η2p = .83, 
whereby the increase in the priority of the knife was greater than the broken glass in the 
threatening alley. Planned comparisons revealed that the interaction was driven by a significant 
increase in priority of the knife in the threatening alley, relative to the safe office, t(199) = 
34.32, p < .001, BH[0, 50] = 1682524×10247.As well as the broken glass, t(199) = 9.94, p < .001, 
BH[0, 50] = 2219491×1013.  
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Figure 25.  Plot displaying the mean search goal priority for both the knife and the broken glass, relative 
to other objects, across the threatening context and safe context. Positive scores signify priority of 
searching for that object, negative scores signify avoidance. Error bars represent within-subjects standard 
error. 
 
Context effects on threat expectancy. See Figure 26 for plot of mean values. The 
same analysis was conducted on the relative expectancy of the broken glass and knife across 
both contexts. This revealed that the relative expectancy of the objects appearing increased in 
the threatening alley context, F(1, 199) = 833.03, p < .001, η2p = .81. Additionally, participants 
reporting a higher relative expectancy for broken glass compared to the knife, F(1, 199) = 
88.03, p < .001, η2p = .31. Though this did not differ between contexts, F(1, 199) = .61, p = .440, 
η2p < .01, with the difference in expectancy across contexts being approximately equal for both 
knife and glass. 
There was a significant increase in relative expectancy in the threat context versus the 
safe context for both the broken glass, t(199) = 25.78, p < .001, BH[0, 50] = 9504816×10117 and the 
knife, t(199) = 24.12, p < .001, BH[0, 50] = 1031107×10136. 
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Figure 26. Plot displaying the mean expectancy that a man with a knife and the broken glass would 
appear in the threatening context and safe contexts, relative to the other objects. Positive scores signify 
that the object was expected more than other objects, negative scores signify that the object was expected 
less than other objects. Error bars represent within-subjects standard error. 
 
Context effects on threat importance. See Figure 27 for plot of mean values. As 
predicted by my hypotheses, participants reported no significant difference between the relative 
importance of the objects in the threatening alley relative to the safe office, F(1, 199) = .07, p = 
.79, η2p  < .001. Though the knife was reported to have greater relative importance than the 
broken glass, F(1, 199) = 163.44, p < .001,  η2p = .45. Against expectations, there was a 
significant interaction between object and the context, F(1,199) = 8.35, p = .004, η2p = .04, with 
the knife having slightly higher importance in the threatening alley context, relative to safe 
office context. Whilst the opposite was true for broken glass which had slightly higher 
importance in the safe office context. The η2p suggested that this reflected only a small effect, 
further, planned comparisons revealed that the importance rating for the broken glass did not 
significantly differ between the two contexts, t(199) = 1.59, p = .112, BH[0, 50] = .01. 
Additionally, there was no significant difference between the two contexts for the knife rating, 
t(199) = 1.62, p = .107, BH[0, 50] = .19. Due to testing for a null hypothesis, rather than for a 
known effect, we repeated the Bayesian pairwise comparison for importance ratings with a 
uniform distribution. This did not change the interpretations of the results for either the knife or 
the glass object, BU[0, 50] = .02, BU[0, 50] = .18, respectively. It therefore appears that context had 
only a very weak effect upon the importance of the objects. 
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Figure 27. Plot displaying the mean detection importance of the knife and the broken glass in the 
threatening context and safe context, relative to the other objects. Positive scores signify that the object 
was important to detect relative to other objects. Error bars represent within-subjects standard error. 
 
Testing the Importance-Expectancy model of attentional goal selection. To 
investigate the relationship between priority, expectancy and importance, we conducted a linear 
regression using the average relative priority, expectancy, and importance scores of both the 
knife and the broken glass. This allowed us to investigate the general relationship of these 
variables across the threatening stimuli. We predicted that the priority of searching for threat 
would be jointly, and independently, predicted by both the importance and expectancy of threat 
in a given context. we therefore entered the priority of threat as the outcome variable, and 
expectancy and importance as predictor variables. This model was computed separately for each 
context. This revealed that in the threatening alley context, the hypothesised model was 
significant, R2 = .10, F(2, 199) = 11.34, p < .001, with the expectancy of a threatening object 
appearing predicting an increase in priority of searching for threatening object, β = .22, t(199) = 
3.23, p = .001, CI 95% [.07, .32] (see Figure 28 for scatterplots). Further, the reported 
importance of detecting threatening objects also predicted an increase in the prioritisation of 
searching for threatening object, β = .26, t(199) = 3.8, p < .001, CI 95% [.04, .37]. In the neutral 
context, however, the hypothesised model was non-significant R2 < .01, F(2, 199) = .41, p = 
.668. It therefore suggests that expecting a threatening object to appear and the importance in 
detecting threatening objects only predicted attentional priority for threatening objects when 
participants imagined being in a threat associated context.  
In order to further test the predictive ability of detection importance and expectancy on 
search goal priority, across all objects, we conducted exploratory linear regressions for each 
object in each condition, this produced ten regression models (Table 16). Each object’s score 
was the average of all the comparisons between that object and every other object for a 
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particular question in a context. This meant that the glass and knife scores were re-scored so that 
the average included the competition between these two objects. To supplement these analyses, 
we computed Bayes factors to determine the strength of evidence in favour of a positive 
predictive relationship between expectancy and search priority, and importance and search 
priority, versus a null effect. Further, the Bayesian analyses are less susceptible to effects of 
over testing, due to  
the interpretation being based on the magnitude of evidence, rather than an absolute significance 
value (Dienes, 2014). The Bayes factors were computed using the unstandardized coefficients as 
the raw effect size, and the standard error of these coefficients. Due to the lack of prior 
knowledge of the exact effect size, we used a uniform distribution with the lower bound set to 
zero, and the upper limit set to the plausible effect size of 1. This effect would indicate that a 
single unit increase in either expectancy or detection importance would directly predict a single 
unit increase in search goal priority, this is a suitable selection due to the variables using the 
same scale. 
Eight out of ten of these exploratory regression models were significant (seven out of 
ten after a conservative Bonferroni correction for ten tests), with both expectancy and detection 
importance significantly predicting search priority in all of the significant models (Table 16). 
Bayes factors revealed evidence in favour of the experimental hypothesis in all of these cases (B 
> 1). This occurred across both contexts, though interestingly, the only non-significant 
regression models were for the broken glass and man with knife images in the safe context. 
Bayesian analyses suggested that for the knife image importance was not predictive of search 
priority, but expectancy favoured a positive association, although this was inconclusive. Whilst 
for the broken glass, expectancy wasn’t predictive of search priority, and importance was 
inconclusive. The pattern of results therefore suggests that the Importance-Expectancy model is 
Figure 28. Scatterplots present the relationship between threat search goal priority and threat expectancy 
(r  = .20), and priority and threat detection importance (r = .24), both in the threatening alley context. 
Standard error is presented in as error bands. 
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highly predictive of search goal priority across multiple contexts for both rewarding, neutral, 
and threatening objects; but that in a safe context the relationship is altered for threatening 
objects, and that it may potentially vary between potential threatening objects, and objects 
which pose an imminent threat. 
 
 
Table 16. The regression analyses for each of the objects across both contexts. R2, Standardised 
coefficients, p-values, and Bayes factors are presented from each linear regression. Search goal priority 
was the dependent variable, and was predicted by detection importance (I), and expectancy (E). p < .001 
= **, p < .05 = *. Bayes factors above 3 signifies substantial evidence favouring the experimental 
hypothesis, a Bayes factor below .33 denotes substantial evidence favouring the null hypothesis. 
 
Individual differences in contextual cueing effects. In order to investigate whether an 
increase in prioritisation of searching for threat in the threatening alley, relative to the safe 
office context, was predicted by an increase in expectancy or importance, we repeated the 
regression but with the subtraction score between the contexts. That is, we subtracted the 
priority, expectancy, and importance scores in the safe context from the same scores in the 
threatening context. A higher score from this subtraction denotes a greater increase in threat 
preference in the threatening alley context versus safe office context. A linear regression with 
expectancy and importance predicting priority revealed an overall null effect, R2 = .01, F(2,199) 
= .62, p = .539. Rather, the strong within-subject effect of context on expectancy and priority 
appeared consistent across individuals. 
The role of anxiety in goal selection. In order to determine whether there was any 
influence of anxiety on expectancy, importance, or priority of threatening objects, we correlated 
these variables with trait anxiety, in both threatening and neutral contexts. This revealed null 
effects across the threat associated condition as well as the neutral condition. Bayes factors were 
computed to determine the sensitivity of any null effects that were found. Based on the absence 
of effects in Experiment 1,wereduced the prior to a moderate effect size (rz = .31; Cohen, 1988) 
with a uniform distribution centred on zero effect. 
As can be seen in Table 17, the correlation coefficients between trait anxiety and 
priority, expectancy and importance variables were all small and non-significant. Additionally, 
  Threat context  Safe context 
  
R2 β p-value 
Bayes 
Factor  
R2 β p-value 
Bayes 
Factor 
Knife 
E 
.08** 
.22 .001 23.00  
.02 
.14 .053 2.17 
I .19 .006 7.23  .02 .803 .16 
Glass 
E 
.15** 
.21 < .001 81.60  
.02 
-.02 .804 .09 
I .26 < .001 6848.30  .13 .071 .96 
Towel 
E 
.18** 
.27 < .001 541.25  
.08** 
.18 .013 4.33 
I .28 < .001 1184.89  .18 .013 4.11 
Money 
E 
.09** 
.21 .002 23.71  
.07** 
.17 .018 3.81 
I .20 .003 11.96  .20 .005 10.47 
Phone 
E 
.10** 
.19 .005 9.70  
.05* 
.14 .043 1.87 
I .24 < .001 86.72  .17 .015 4.74 
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the Bayes factors revealed that the majority of the correlations favoured the null hypothesis. 
There was a near sensitive null finding for the relationship between anxiety and attentional goal 
priority in the threatening context, and a sensitive null for priority in the safe context. For 
expectancy, there was a sensitive null finding in the threatening context, and an insensitive 
Bayes factor in the safe context, this was the only effect to favour the experimental hypothesis 
(Bayes factor > 1). For detection importance there was a sensitive null finding in both the 
threatening and safe contexts, thus replicating Experiment 1.wenote there were also no 
correlations between trait anxiety and any measure of the effect of context on priority, 
importance or expectancy (see Table 17). 
 
Table 17. correlation coefficients for the relationships between trait anxiety, detection importance, 
expectancy, and search goal priority, in the threatening alley context, safe office context, and the 
difference between these two contexts (threat minus safe scores). p < .001 = **, p < .05 = *. Bayes factors 
are reported for the relationship between Trait anxiety and the different preference measures, the prior for 
this effect was a moderate effect size of rz = .31. Bayes factors above 3 signifies substantial evidence 
favouring the experimental hypothesis, a Bayes factor below .33 denotes substantial evidence favouring 
the null hypothesis. 
 
General Discussion 
The present findings represent the first empirical exploration, to my knowledge, of the 
factors determining attentional goal selection. The aim of the current investigation was to 
determine whether a specific Importance-Expectancy model of attentional goal selection can 
account for how a top-down search goal could be selected. Until now, the actual question of 
search goal selection has not been investigated. The current results supported the proposed 
model and indicated that the explicit search goal priority for various motivationally salient and 
neutral objects could be accounted for by the independent effects of the perceived importance of 
detecting an object, and the expectancy that the object would appear in a specific setting. 
I also revealed a highly significant effect of contextual cues on both priority and 
expectancy of threat objects. This effect of cues on expectancy is somewhat consistent with 
other models of attention which suggest that participants quickly learn the association between 
contextual cues and targets (Chun & Jiang, 1998). In these previous models of attention, it is 
suggested that when participants are searching for an object within a scene they search in 
locations where the object has previously been presented, and search for features which are 
strongly associated with that object (Bar, 2004; Summerfield & Egner, 2009). The current 
 Threatening alley context Safe office context Difference between contexts 
 Priority Expectancy Importance Priority Expectancy  Importance  Priority Expectancy  Importance  
Trait anxiety .02 -.04 -.03 -.03 .11 -.03 .04 -.1 < .01 
Priority - .19** .24** - .03 .05 - .08 .02 
Expectancy - - -.1 - - -.05 - - -.04 
Importance - - - - - - - - - 
Trait anxiety .36 .19 .22 .22 1.73 .22 .48 .12 .3 
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evidence extends these models by demonstrating that the contextual cues could actually prime 
what to expect within the context as well as which goal participants choose to search for in the 
first place, based on the motivational relevance of that object in that situation. 
In the present dataset, the effect of threat contextual cues on both threat object 
expectancy and threat search goal priority appeared consistent across participants. However, we 
note that the two contexts used in the present study were relatively unambiguous and hence left 
little room for differences in interpretation. It may be that in a more ambiguous context, where 
there is more uncertainty about the presence of a threatening object, there would be greater 
inter-individual variation in the contextual cueing effect, thus this could reveal a correlation 
between measures. 
In contrast to the striking effects of context on expectancy and priority, there was very 
little variation in the perceived threat importance across contexts. Additionally, on this measure, 
there was a difference between specific categories of motivationally salient stimuli, with 
imminent threat being reported as the most important to detect. This is consistent with 
evolutionary models of attention to threat which suggest that detecting threat is vital in order to 
survive – it could also explain why early models of attention posited that there was an innate 
and unconditional ‘threat detection module’ (Öhman & Minneka, 2001; Amaral, Price, 
Pitkanen, & Carmichael, 1992; LeDoux, 2000; LoBue & DeLoache, 2009). If threat detection is 
always prioritised over other neutral goals, then it would likely appear to be an innate and 
unconditional bias because it would be active the majority of the time, at least when a 
threatening stimulus was expected to appear in the presence of a less motivationally salient 
target.  
The primary focus of the current investigation was whether the Importance-Expectancy 
model could account for the search goal priority of threatening objects. we selected these 
objects because it was simple to manipulate their congruence with the threat and safe contexts; 
further focusing on these two objects reduced the number of hypothesised comparisons. 
Interestingly, though, exploratory analyses conducted for all objects revealed that the 
importance and expectancy variables both predicted an increase in search goal priority. This 
therefore provided support for the idea that both importance and expectancy are pervasive 
factors which universally influence the current goals of the individual. 
When interpreting these exploratory regression models, it should be noted that these 
analyses are not entirely independent of each other: The importance, expectancy, and goal 
priority variables were rated separately; however, the ratings of different objects within each 
context are internally predictive (in that higher priority of one object in a given context 
necessarily means lower priority for another object, and so forth). This was a necessary feature 
of the design, given the competitive nature of attentional priority (cf. Fecteau & Munoz, 2006; 
Bisley & Goldberg, 2010). In other words, the intentional prioritisation of attention to a specific 
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real word object would result in a reduction in priority of other objects. Given this non-
independence of object-ratings in the CAGT the ten exploratory regression models cannot be 
considered as separate replications of the model, but rather, different views of the same data. 
However, the fact that seven out of ten of these models survived a conservative Bonferroni 
correction for multiple tests provides promising convergent support for the Importance-
Expectancy model. 
Only two of the ten possible regression models did not find support for the Importance-
Expectancy model. Interestingly, the two exceptions were the two threatening objects in the safe 
office context. This might simply reflect the very low expectancy of these objects in this 
context, meaning that individual differences in expectancy ratings in this context may have been 
driven more by the less cohesive contribution of expectancy of the three non-threat competitor 
objects. On the other hand, it is also possible that there may be exceptions to the predictive 
relationship of importance and expectancy on search goal priority (e.g. perhaps due to factors 
such as threat-avoidance goals). Future examination of such exception could be a useful avenue 
for future research. 
Across the study we found no evidence of any correlation between individual 
differences or trait anxiety with any of the variables. This could be evidence that variation 
across individuals in reward seeking and threat avoidance does not influence attention via a 
deliberate goal-driven route. This could suggest that a goal-independent mechanism underpins 
attentional capture in some individuals. For instance, as suggested in some models of anxiety, 
trait anxious individuals may have weaker top-down control and greater stimulus-driven input 
from threat, thus leading to a larger attentional capture effect through this route (Bishop, 2009).  
Alternatively, the current results could be due to the types of contextual cues which 
were selected. It has been found that the expectancy bias found in anxiety emerges within 
uncertain contexts. For instance, within a previous investigation, participants learned that two 
visually different shapes predicted a safe and an aversive outcome. Participants then had to rate 
the expectancy of an aversive outcome when presented with these shapes, along with stimuli 
which were visually similar to both safe and aversive shapes. When participants were presented 
with the unambiguously safe or threat predictive shapes there was no variation across anxiety in 
expectancy ratings of threat; however, it was found that anxious participants reported expecting 
an aversive outcome more than low anxious individual when rating the more ambiguous shapes 
(Lissek et al., 2014). It may be that when the context is more ambiguous then individual 
differences may emerge in expectancy ratings, and potentially goal priority ratings.  
The novel Importance-Expectancy model of attentional goal selection provides a 
potentially universal model of how individuals select what motivationally salient stimuli to 
search for in the environment. This model could explain previous results from past research 
which have explored top-down factors in attention to motivationally salient stimuli. Aue et al. 
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(2016) found that manipulating the probability that a target would be a spider did not alter the 
speed of detection of the spider target between conditions. Participants were just as fast to detect 
a spider when there was a 50% probability that the target would be a spider (or bird) versus 90% 
probability it was a spider (or bird), thus suggesting that expectancy did not alter goal-driven 
attention. This result did not, however, factor in search goal priority as a mediating mechanism 
of the effect of expectancy on attention. Prior evidence suggests that individuals can only tune 
attention to a small set of target features at any one time (van Moorselaar, Theeuwes & Olivers, 
2014). Indeed, evidence from my own research suggests that involuntary attentional capture by  
threat only occurs when individuals are searching for a single category of threatening stimuli, 
rather than multiple categories (Brown, Berggren & Forster, in preparation – Chapter 3). Due to 
the competitive nature of the bird and spider search goals, only one would become prioritised 
and searched for. Due to the cued expectancy being the same for both the spider and the bird, 
the only factor which would increase search goal priority would be the importance. In Aue and 
colleagues (2016) investigation, participants were told that there is 50% chance that a bird 
would appear and 50% chance a spider would appear. Due to the spider’s affective associations 
it would have a greater detection importance, meaning that the spider search goal would then 
outcompete the bird search goal. In the other condition, the 90% spider cue condition would be 
prioritised as the search goal as well. Therefore, in both conditions the spider would be 
prioritised, and this could explain why there was no difference between the 50% and 90% spider 
cueing conditions. Thus, the novel model can account for previous results which appear to 
contradict its predictions. 
The current evidence reveals that importance and expectancy correlate with what 
participants report they would search for; however, it does not confirm whether these variables 
actually directly influence attentional search goals in an experimental task. If the Importance-
Expectancy model of attentional goal selection can account for actual deployment of attention, 
then it would be expected that when participants are given two competing search goals with 
motivationally relevant outcomes, then stimuli related to the goal which is most expected and 
important will capture attention more than the competing goal.  
In conclusion, we have provided the first evidence that the current search goals of an 
individual are selected based on the magnitude of the motivational outcome (importance) and 
the expectancy of this outcome occurring. Further, we have demonstrated that this model 
operates in tight association with the current contextual cues an individual finds themselves 
exposed to. This finding allows us, for the first time, a view into the factors driving a general 
attentional goal selection of motivationally salient stimuli.  
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Chapter 7: The Influence of Self-Selected Motivationally Relevant Goals on Goal-Driven 
Attentional Capture 
 
Chris R.H.  Brown+, Theodora Duka+, & Sophie Forster+ 
+ School of Psychology, University of Sussex, UK 
 
Abstract 
Recent evidence has raised the possibility that involuntary attentional capture by motivationally 
salient (e.g. reward or threat associated) stimuli may not reflect stimulus-driven mechanisms, as 
was previously thought, but rather may be an involuntary consequence of goal-driven attention. 
However, this previous research has only examined the effects of single instructed attentional 
goals, which may not fully represent real-world goal selection. In applying this goal-driven 
account to real-world situations, an important remaining question is whether the involuntary 
capture seen previously in response to instructed goals could also be induced by self-selected 
goals. To test this question, a novel goal-competition task was created in which participants 
responded to two different coloured targets; one which resulted in winning financial reward, and 
another which resulted in avoiding an aversive outcome. Task-irrelevant distractors were 
presented prior to the target, these could be congruent with the reward seeking target feature, or 
the threat avoidance target feature. At the end of the task, participants were asked to indicate the 
relative priority they had assigned to the threat avoidance versus the reward associated target. 
As predicted, the self-reported pursuit of the reward seeking goal positively predicted 
distraction by the reward related distractor, although only for reward targets. Unexpectedly, 
there was also a strong cueing effect when the distractor was incongruent with the target type. 
This preliminary evidence is consistent with the suggestion that attentional capture by 
motivationally salient stimuli could be influenced by self-selected search goals, but also 
highlights the powerful role of contextual cues in goal-selection. 
 
 
It has long been established that stimuli associated with an aversive or rewarding 
outcome can involuntarily capture attention, apparently due to their motivationally relevant 
associations rather than any physical properties (for reviews, Carretie, 2014; Pool, Brosch, 
Delplanque, & Sander, 2016).  For this reason, we term these stimuli motivationally salient. 
This attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli has often been argued to reflect a 
stimulus-driven mechanism (Schmidt et al., 2015; Anderson et al., 2011). Recent evidence, 
however, suggests that this capture effect might alternatively reflect goal-driven attention, with 
an individual’s current search goals inducing ‘contingent capture’. Specifically, when 
participants are asked to adopt a goal to detect a category of motivationally salient stimuli (i.e. 
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alcohol in social drinkers, fearful faces, dangerous animals), task-irrelevant distractors from the 
same category capture attention and result in a decrement in target identification or detection 
(Brown, Berggren & Forster, under review – Chapter 2; Brown, Berggren & Forster, in 
preparation – Chapter 3; Brown, Duka & Forster, under review – Chapter 4; Brown, Forster & 
Duka, under review – Chapter 5). Consistent with the goal-driven account, but not the stimulus-
driven account, these same motivationally salient distractors were no more distracting than a 
neutral image when participants were given a different search goal. 
It appears plausible that individuals would adopt a voluntary goal to detect 
motivationally salient stimuli, because detecting objects which could signal harm or possible 
reward would allow individuals to respond quickly to them. However, the goal-driven 
attentional capture demonstrated in my previous research, and all other clear examples of goal-
driven capture to my knowledge, have occurred as a consequence of a single instructed 
experimental search goal (e.g. for a particular colour, or for a category of stimuli such as scary 
animals, Folk, Leber & Egeth, 2002; Wyble, Folk & Potter, 2013; Brown et al., under review – 
Chapter 2). This may not be fully representative of the manner in which goal-driven attention 
operates in daily life. There is currently little research into the factors determining attentional 
goal selection, although evidence from beyond the attention literature suggests that individuals 
rarely follow an instructed goal which is only based on external motivation for any amount of 
time, and instead select to pursue more intrinsically rewarding goals (Deci & Ryan, 2000). It 
therefore appears likely that many real-world attentional goals are not externally instructed, but 
rather selected on the basis of an individual’s own judgements of which goal would produce the 
most beneficial motivational outcome at that given time. An important question for any goal-
driven account of attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli is, therefore, whether self-
selected goals could also induce involuntary attentional capture. It might be argued, for 
example, that the mental representation of self-determined attentional settings might be weaker 
than those of instructed experimental goals, perhaps to allow greater flexibility in unpredictable 
situations, and hence be less likely to cause goal-driven involuntary attentional capture. 
In order to investigate this, we designed a novel goal-competition task, to allow 
participants to self-select their search goals and measure the effects on the degree of 
motivational distractor interference (our index of attentional capture). Forced choice, or 
concurrent choice, paradigms have been used in other areas of research, such as animal 
behaviour, to isolate the perceived value of an outcome by making individuals select between 
competing outcomes (Dickinson & Balleine, 1998; Mackillop et al., 2010; Chase, Mackillop & 
Hogarth, 2013). If self-selected goals could induce attentional capture by motivationally salient 
stimuli in the same way that instructed search goals can, then it would be expected that 
interference by a specific motivationally salient distractor would be greater for individuals who 
prioritise searching for that type of stimulus, over another competing search goal. This should 
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be revealed by a significant relationship between the motivationally salient distraction and the 
measure of priority that the individual gave for searching for that type of stimulus, versus 
another stimulus.  
Recently, we have used the principle of concurrent choice between motivationally 
salient stimuli to isolate the priority that a motivationally salient object had as a search goal, 
versus other objects; as well as the factors which predict this attentional prioritisation. This 
revealed that a two-factor Importance-Expectancy model predicted the search goal priority; 
whereby the expectancy that a motivationally salient object would appear in a specific context, 
as well as the importance in detecting this object, predicted its attentional priority versus other 
objects (Brown & Forster, in preparation – Chapter 6). Therefore, the notion of competition has 
been found to effectively isolate the self-reported attentional priority that an object has. In the 
current task we shall explore whether this competition can be used to isolate the influence of 
self-reported search goal priority upon attentional capture in an experimental task. 
 In order for the concurrent choice to reveal competition, the two competing outcomes 
must be roughly equivalent and reflect opposing motivations. For this reason, the two goals we 
selected were avoiding an aversive outcome in the form of a loud noise and unpleasant image, 
and seeking a rewarding outcome in the form of financial reward. Importantly, both these types 
of outcomes (i.e. financial reward, aversive noise) have been found to capture attention (Austin 
& Duka, 2010). Further, evidence has revealed that attention is directed towards threat at the 
cost of reward associated stimuli, and vice versa, thus suggesting that these two motivational 
outcomes compete for limited attentional resources (Frewen, Dozois, Joanisse & Neufeld, 2008; 
Schechner et al., 2011). Neuroimaging evidence also suggests that reward and threat have been 
found to be processed in distinct locations in the brain, and that greater attention to a reward 
associated target was related to attenuated threat processing (Hu, Padmala & Pessoa, 2013; 
Padmala, Spechler & Pessoa, 2013). Thus, reward seeking and threat avoidance appear to 
compete rather than act in concert, and should be appropriate competing goals to determine 
which goal is prioritised versus the other.  
The novel task was designed to produce several indices of priority. The primary one 
was an explicit self-reported search goal priority. This required participants to respond along a 
Visual Analogue scale (VAS) with the reward/threat associated target at each end, participants 
responded closer to the target they had been pursuing over the course of the task. In order to 
confirm the validity of this subjective measure of goal priority, we also computed an objective 
measure of attentional priority to corroborate the self-report. This was computed by subtracting 
the average accuracy for the threat target from the average accuracy of the reward target. A 
higher score on this subtraction measure would indicate greater accuracy in identifying reward 
targets, which suggests a greater prioritisation of this goal, versus the other threat avoidance 
goal. 
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The central hypothesis of the current investigation is that self-reported prioritisation of 
reward over threat will positively correlate with attentional capture by reward-related 
distractors, and negatively with threat-related attentional capture. To measure attentional capture 
by the motivational relatedness of the distractors, we subtracted the accuracy when the distractor 
colour was associated with a motivational outcome (threat/reward) from accuracy when the 
distractor colour was not associated with an outcome (neutral), in order to isolate the 
interference from the motivational associations.  
Within this exploratory investigation we also interested in determining whether 
personality variables were associated with differences in the reward seeking or threat avoidance 
search goal priority. I, therefore, measured personality variables which have previously been 
associated with involuntary attentional capture by both threat and reward related stimuli, in 
order to explore whether these were associated with the preference of searching for one goal 
over another. These personality variables were impulsiveness, state and trait anxiety, and the 
BAS (Coskunpinar & Cyders, 2013; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Hickey, Chelazzi & Theeuwes, 
2010). It was predicted that the variables which had previously been linked to attentional 
capture by reward would be associated with greater reward seeking (BAS, impulsivity). 
Conversely, variables linked to increased attentional capture by threat would be associated with 
greater threat avoidance (state - trait anxiety). If these measures predicted self-reported 
attentional goal priority, this could point to an alternative account of individual differences in 
attentional capture induced by top-down goals.  
Methods 
Participants 
The sample size was based on the largest number of participants that could be recruited 
in two academic terms. Originally 90 participants were recruited for the Experiment. In total, 77 
participants were carried forward to analyses, with 8 participants excluded for having below 
chance accuracy (25%) on identification of either one of the target types. This was necessary 
because the measure of attentional capture was sensitive to floor effects. Two further 
participants were excluded for incorrect learning of the colour-outcome associations, as shown 
by rating the aversive stimulus as positive, or the rewarding stimulus as negative at the end of 
the expectancy rating block. 
One further participant was excluded for reporting being aware from experience of prior 
studies that they would be rewarded with a set amount of money at the end of the task, rather 
than it being dependent upon performance (this was a requirement of the institutional ethical 
committee). Two other participants were excluded for skipping instructions and did not respond 
to the stimuli for most of the task. Participation was in exchange for credits and a fixed amount 
of financial reward, participants were only informed of the fixed payment after they completed 
the task which they believed to be performance dependent.  
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Stimuli and procedure 
All stimuli were presented using E-prime 2.0 on a Dell Optiplex 780 PC, displayed on a 
16-inch monitor with a screen resolution of 800×600. Participants viewed the stimuli at a 
distance of 59cm which was maintained using a chinrest. The task began with a consent 
procedure, where participants where given the opportunity to hear the aversive noise and view 
an example image of a mutilation which were presented during the task, in order for them to 
decide whether they wished to continue (see Learning phase section below for exact 
specification of these stimuli). The example image was not presented in the main task. 
Participants then had disposable skin conductance electrodes attached to their index and middle 
fingers of their left hand – the skin conductance data was not used due to problems extracting 
the data for analysis. There were two phases to the experiment - a learning phase and a goal-
competition test phase. Half the participants completed personality and state questionnaire 
measures prior to the learning phase, the other half after the goal-competition test phase (see 
Questionnaires section below for more details). 
Learning phase. During the learning phase, participants were first instructed that over 
the duration of the experiment there would be a rewarding outcome and a threatening outcome 
(see Figure 29a for example trial). The rewarding outcome was winning or being awarded 5 
pence on each trial, every time they were awarded this an 8.5°×6.5° colour image of coins was 
presented for 500ms. There were nine possible images and all were sourced from Google 
images, and depicted small denominations of UK currency. The threatening outcome was a loud 
40ms 102dB burst of white noise delivered through Blaupunkt CN-112 headphones. The loud 
burst of white noise was accompanied with a 500ms concurrent presentation of one of nine 
8.5°×6.5° images of dead bodies and mutilation. These images were sourced from the Affective 
Image Picture System and were selected based on their high unpleasantness and arousal ratings 
(IAPS; Bradley, Lang & Cuthbert, 2005).  
Participants were then instructed that during the learning phase of the experiment they 
would be presented with three coloured cues which would be consistently followed by three 
possible outcomes, and that they would have to learn the consistent pairing of each colour and 
each outcome whilst passively watching the screen. These outcomes were the rewarding and 
threatening outcome, previously mentioned, and no outcome, which consisted of 500ms of 
silence and no image presentation.  
In order to determine that all the coloured cues were perceived as neutral prior to the 
learning stage, participants completed two outcome expectancy ratings blocks. Within one 
block, participants had to rate the probability that a cue was associated with a positive outcome, 
the other block they reported the probability it was associated with a negative outcome. The 
order of these blocks was randomised. On each trial of the ratings blocks, each of the three 
coloured cues appeared as a 1° square presented in the centre of the screen. Participants then 
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had to rate along a VAS, ranging from 0% probability to 100% probability that a negative or 
positive outcome occurring. The colours that were rated were green, purple and orange (RGB 
colour values – green: 0,180,0; purple: 135,0,220; orange: 255,160,0), the order of these colours 
was randomised within each block. After completing the initial baseline rating blocks, 
participants completed the main part of the learning phase. 
Throughout the learning stage, four square placeholders appeared on screen. These 
measured 2.2° with a line thickness of 0.1°. These appeared to the left and right, and above and 
below the central fixation. Horizontal placeholders were 7.41° eccentricity from fixation, whilst 
the vertical placeholders were 6.77° from fixation. At the start of each trial four 1° cues 
appeared on the screen outside of the placeholders, at a diagonal distance of 6.5° from fixation. 
Each block consisted of six trials, on two trials the cues were green, two purple, and two orange. 
On half of the trials the cues appeared for 1000ms, the other half 8000ms. The colour-outcome 
association was consistent across the task and was counterbalanced between participants. At the 
end of the trial there was a randomly selected inter-trial interval ranging between 10s and 15s.  
At the end of each block participants were told how much money they had been 
awarded over the course of the block. To the left of the participants was a bank tin which 
contained £10 in small change (made up of 5 pence, 10 pence, 20 pence, 50 pence, and £1 
coins), participants were told to move the amount that they had won that block into the winnings 
tin to the right of them. Participants were made aware that they would be able to take their 
winnings home at the end of the task, although in reality they were paid a set amount. Before 
the next block began, participants completed another block of ratings, identical to initial positive 
and negative outcome rating blocks. In total there were three blocks of the learning stage, 
therefore the learning phase structure was thus: baseline ratings – learning block 1 – ratings 1 – 
learning block 2 – ratings 2 – learning block 3 – ratings 3. 
Goal-competition phase. See Figure 29b for example trial of the goal-competition 
phase. After the learning stage, the skin conductance electrodes were removed. Participants 
were instructed that they would now have to actively search and respond to win the rewarding 
outcome and avoid the threatening outcome, rather than passively view the screen. As in the 
learning stage, the four placeholders remained on screen throughout the task. Each trial began 
with a fixation cross appearing for 1000ms. This was followed by the four coloured cues that 
were presented in the learning stage, though they only appeared for 150ms in this stage. 
Participants were made aware that these coloured cues were now acting as distractors (hereon in 
referred to as distractors), and should be ignored because they would interfere with the task. 
There were four different distractor trial types across the goal-competition phase, in these 
experiments the distractor could be the reward associated colour, threat associated colour,  
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Associated outcome (500ms) 
Coloured stimulus (1s or 8s) 
Mutilation 
A 
B 
C 
Figure 29a. & 29b. a) Diagram of a single trial during the learning stage of the experiment. Within this stage 
participants first viewed four coloured square stimuli for either 1 second or 8 seconds, these squares could be one of 
three colours on a given trial. Immediately after the presentation of these squares an associated outcome was 
presented for 500ms. There were three possible outcomes, one consistently associated with each of the coloured 
squares. Outcome A was a ‘no outcome’, where the placeholders remained on screen. Outcome B was winning 5 
pence, this was signalled by an image of money. Outcome C was an aversive outcome which consisted of an image of 
mutilation and a 40ms 102dB burst of white noise. Each trial was separated by a 10 – 15 second jittered intertrial 
interval in which the placeholders remained on screen. b) A single trial within the goal-competition stage of the 
experiment. Within this stage participants first viewed a fixation cross for 1000ms, before the task-irrelevant 
distractors were briefly presented (150ms). Following this the stimulus array was presented with four Landolt C 
stimuli appearing in each of the four placeholders, one of these stimuli was the target stimulus. Participants had to 
respond to the stimulus which was either the colour associated with reward or a colour associated with threat. The 
reward associated target consistently appeared in two opposing placeholders (e.g. top-bottom/ left-right), whilst the 
threat associated distractor appeared in the other opposing placeholders (counterbalanced between participants). 
Following the briefly presented target array (83ms), participants were given 1500ms to respond to what they believed 
the orientation of the target stimulus had been, using the arrow keys. Participants were then given feedback for 500ms 
based on the accuracy of their response. If participants incorrectly responded to the reward target, or correctly 
responded to the threat target then no response was shown (Outcome A), however if they correctly responded to the 
orientation of the reward target then they presented with the rewarding outcome (Outcome B). If, however, they 
responded incorrectly to the orientation of the threat target then they were presented with the aversive outcome. Trials 
were separated by a variable inter-trial interval randomly jittered between 100 and 600ms. 
Mutilation 
b 
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no outcome associated (neutral) colour, and another condition where no distractor was presented 
at all. Each distractor trial type appeared on 20 trials, meaning that there were 80 trials per 
block. 
Immediately after the appearance of the distractors the placeholders were filled with the 
target and filler Landolt C’s which were presented for 83ms. These C shaped stimuli had a 
diameter which measured 1.1° with a gap of .2° in one side, this gap could be either on the left, 
right, top, or bottom of the C. Participants were instructed beforehand that they should respond 
to the direction the gap in the C using the four corresponding arrow keys, and that they should 
only respond to the targets which appeared as the threat and reward associated colours to 
achieve the associated outcome. The filler stimuli were identical to the targets with the 
exception that they appeared as different colours, these were blue (RGB: 60, 192, 243), yellow 
(RGB: 255, 240, 0), and red (RGB: 240, 0, 0). The orientation and location of each of these 
filler stimuli was randomised on each trial. On 32 trials the target was reward related and on 
another 32 trials the target was threat-related. Across a block there were eight trials for each of 
the four distractor conditions for each of the two targets. Each target type was presented at each 
of the four orientations an equal number of times, counterbalanced across distractor conditions 
and target location. 
In order to make it easier to prioritise one target over the other, the reward and threat 
targets appeared in consistent locations out of the four possible placeholders, with one target 
type potentially appearing in opposing places holders, and the other target potentially appearing 
in the other two opposing places. For instance, the reward targets could appear at the top and 
bottom placeholders, and the threat targets could appear in the left and right placeholders. 
Participants were made aware that there was a relationship between target type and location, but 
were not told the specific pairing, instead they had to learn this during the practice block (see 
below). The target-location pairing was counterbalanced between participants.  
Participants were made aware that correctly responding to the orientation of the reward 
related target resulted in being presented with the rewarding outcome from the previous learning 
stage, incorrectly responding or not responding to the reward related target resulted in no 
outcome. They were also made aware that correctly responding to the orientation of the threat-
related target would result in the avoidance of the aversive outcome, whilst incorrectly response 
or not responding would result in the delivery of the aversive noise and image.  
Participants were also made aware that on a portion of trials no target may appear, and 
that they should only respond when the target was present. This was to encourage accurate, 
rather than impulsive, responding. In total there were 16 no target trials, each distractor type 
appeared equally within these 16 trials. The location which would usually have presented the 
target was occupied by a Landolt C which was the colour of the neutral distractor.  
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After the target and filler array was presented, participants were given a 1500ms 
response window in which to respond to the orientation of the target C. Only the placeholders 
remained on screen within this period. Afterwards, the response dependent outcome was 
presented for 500ms. If participants correctly responded to the threat-related target then 
participants avoided the threat outcome (noise and image), however, if they incorrectly 
responded, or did not respond, to this target then the loud noise and unpleasant image were 
presented. If the participants correctly responded to the reward related target then they received 
the reward outcome (5 pence and money image), however if they incorrectly responded, or did 
not respond to this target then they received no outcome. This was followed by a random inter-
stimulus interval ranging from 100 to 600ms before the next trial began. At the end of each 
block, as in the learning phase, participants were told how much money they had won over the 
course of the block. They were instructed to move this amount from the bank tin to the winnings 
tin. 
Prior to the goal-competition task, participants completed a brief practice block in 
which they learnt the association between target type and location, as well as practicing the 
correct responses to the Landolt C shaped stimuli. These trials were identical to the main goal-
competition trials with the exception that only the target image without filler stimuli was 
presented; this appeared for 300ms, instead of 83ms, in order to make the practice easier. In 
total there were eight trials, four of which were reward relevant and four of which were threat 
relevant; each orientation of Landolt C was presented once but was randomly selected at each 
location, and each target appeared in each of the possible locations an equal number of times. 
Self-reported goal priority. At the end of the goal-competition task, participants 
completed a 3-trial goal priority rating task in order to determine their self-reported 
prioritisation of the reward seeking versus threat avoidance goals. In this task participants were 
asked “How did you divide your attention between these stimuli?”. Below the question, a pair of 
Landolt C stimuli were presented either end of a VAS. At either end of this scale were two 
anchors: “I focused all my attention on this image”. The image pairs that were presented were a 
reward associated colour C and a neutral associated colour C, the threat associated colour C 
versus the neutral associated colour C, and, most importantly, the reward associated colour 
versus the threat associated colour C. Participants were required to click closer to the image 
which they were preferentially attending to. The value of this final measure was the main 
dependent variable from this rating task, with a higher value reflecting greater voluntary reward 
seeking versus threat avoidance. The target stimuli orientations and the question order were 
randomly selected for each participant. 
Questionnaires. Approximately half the participants completed personality 
questionnaires after the consent procedure, prior to the learning phase, the other half completed 
them after the goal-competition task phase, prior to the debrief procedure. All questionnaires 
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were completed in a randomised order. The questionnaires were the Behavioural Inhibition 
Scale/ Behavioural Activation Scale (BIS/BAS), the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), and 
the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Carver & White, 1994; Spielberger et al., 1983; Patton, 
Stanform & Barratt, 1995).  
The BIS/BAS scale is a 24-item scale which makes up a single BIS subscale which 
consists of 7 items e.g. “criticisms or scolding hurt me quite a bit”; the BAS subscale measures 
facets of behavioural activation and included items such as “I go out of my way to get things I 
want”. Participants had to rate how relevant each of the statements were to them generally, 
using a 4-points scale ranging from ‘Very true for me’ to Very false for me’. The BAS subscale 
was the main focus of this investigation due to its links to reward seeking behaviour and 
attentional capture by reward (Hickey et al., 2011). 
The STAI is a 40-item measure of both current state and trait level anxiety. The state 
questionnaire consists of 20 items e.g. “I am tense”. Participants had to rate along a 4-point 
scale how relevant each statement was to how they ‘feel right now at this moment’, ranging 
from ‘Not at all’ to ‘Very much so’. For the trait subscale participants had to rate how relevant 
20 different statements were to how they ‘generally feel’, e.g. “I feel like a failure”. Again, this 
used a 4-point scale, although it ranged from ‘Almost never’ to ‘Almost always’. 
The Barratt impulsiveness scale is a 30-item scale designed to measure the construct of 
impulsiveness, that is responding without proper planning of the consequences. This scale 
included items such as “I don’t pay attention or “I do things without thinking”. The items 
required participants to rate along a 4-point scale how relevance the statement was to them, 
generally. Responses ranged from ‘Rarely/never’ to ‘Always’. 
Results and Discussion 
Learned Outcome Expectancies 
In order to confirm the successful learning of the associations between colour and 
positive and negative outcome expectancies across the blocks of the learning stage, two 3×4 
ANOVAs were performed on both positive and negative outcome expectancy ratings, with 
stimulus type (reward, threat, neutral) as one factor, and block order as a second factor 
(baseline/ block 1/ block 2/ block 3). As can be seen in Figure 30, the overall pattern of results 
reflects the successful learning of the outcome expectancies over the course of the learning 
stage. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of stimulus type on positive outcome, 
F(1.69, 128.44) = 410.62, p < .001, (Huynh-Feldt corrected), ƞ2p = .84, with participants 
reporting a higher probability of a positive  
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outcome when the stimulus shown was reward associated. There was also a significant 
difference across blocks, F(2.61, 234) = 10.09, p < .001 (Huynh-Feldt  corrected), ƞ2p = .12, 
with participants reporting lower expectancy of a positive outcome in later blocks; however, this 
was qualified by a significant interaction between stimulus type and block, which revealed that 
only the reward associated colour was rated as more predictive of a positive outcome in later 
blocks, whilst the neutral associated colour and the threat associated colour were rated as less 
predictive of a positive outcome in later blocks, F(4.08, 309.67) = 92.94, p < .001, ƞ2p = .55 
(Huynh-Feldt  corrected). In order to confirm that participants had indeed correctly learnt the 
colour-outcome associations, we compared the positive outcome expectancy rating of the 
reward associated colour in the final block to the rating of the neutral colour in the final block. 
This confirmed that reward was rated as more positive versus the neutral associated colour, M = 
98.3, SD = 4.81 versus M = 29.52, SD = 30.39, t(76) = 18.7, p < .001. Further, comparing the 
positive outcome expectancy rating in the final block for the threat associated colour to the 
neutral colour revealed that the threat colour was perceived as less positive, M = 2.7, SD = 
11.93, t(76) = .25, p < .001.  
Similar patterns were revealed with respect to learning for negative outcome 
expectancy. Here, again, a difference between stimuli was found, F(1.82,137.92) = 566.05, p < 
.001, ƞ2p = .88. (Huynh-Feldt corrected), whereby the threat associated colour was reported as 
being the most predictive of a negative outcome, whilst the reward associated colour was 
reported as being the least predictive, below the neutral distractor. Further, the main effect of 
block was also significant, F(2.67,202.55) = 3.68, p = .017, ƞ2p = .05. (Huynh-Feldt corrected), 
with participants reporting lower expectancy of a negative outcome in later blocks, although the 
interaction revealed that this effect was driven by participants reporting lower expectancy for 
Figure 30. Participants’ positive and negative outcome expectancy ratings at baseline and after each of the three 
learning blocks. Positive and negative ratings were conducted in separate blocks, participants rated their 
outcome expectancy along a visual analogue scale ranging from 0 – 100. Error bars reflect within-subjects 
standard error. 
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both neutral associated colour and reward associated colour stimuli, and only reported an 
increase in expectancy of a negative outcome in later blocks for the aversive associated colour 
stimulus, F(3.81,289.79) = 130.78, p < .001, ƞ2p = .63. (Huynh-Feldt corrected). 
 I compared the negative outcome expectancy ratings of the threat associated colour to 
the negative expectancy ratings of the neutral associated colour in the final block. This revealed 
that the threat associated colour was rated as having a higher expectancy of a negative outcome 
versus the neutral associated colour M = 98.4, SD = 4.9 versus M = 17.08, SD = 22.84, t(76) = 
29.87, p < .001. Comparing the negative ratings in the final block for the reward associated 
colour to the ratings of the irrelevant colour revealed that the reward colour was perceived as 
less negative M = 2.7, SD = 11.93, t(76) = 6.12, p < .001. Therefore, participants appeared to 
quickly learn which colour was associated with each outcome and that these outcomes were 
perceived as positive and negative as intended. The two participants who did not learn this 
association were removed prior to the above analyses. 
Goal-Competition Task Performance 
To investigate the differences in response accuracy across target and distractor 
conditions (see Table 18), a 2×4 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with goal target 
type (reward seeking/ threat avoidance) as one factor, and distractor type as another factor 
(reward/ threat/ neutral/ absent distractor types). The analysis revealed no significant difference 
between threat target identification accuracy and reward target identification accuracy, F(1,76) 
= 2.51, p = .118, ƞ2p = .03, suggesting that on average across participants reward and threat 
goals received a similar level of priority. There was, however, a main effect of distractor type, 
F(3,228) = 22.74, p < .001, ƞ2p = .23, revealing that all distractor types resulted in lower 
performance than the absent distractor condition, it also appeared that both reward and threat 
associated distractors resulted in lower performance than the neutral distractor condition which 
had not predicted any goal relevant outcomes. Unexpectedly, a highly significant interaction 
revealed that response accuracy across the different goal targets differed depending on which 
distractor preceded it, F(2.58, 196.33) = 29.95, p < .001, ƞ2p = .28 (Huynh-Feldt corrected).  
Follow-up t-tests revealed that this interaction was caused by an apparent cueing effect 
(see Table 18 for means and standard deviations), whereby participants were less accurate when 
the distractor colour was associated with a different outcome from the target. Specifically, the 
threat associated distractor caused a decrement in identification for the reward target relative to 
the neutral distractor, t(76) = 5.46, p < .001. Similarly, the reward coloured distractor resulted in 
a decrement in detection of the threat goal target, relative to trials where the distractor was 
neutral coloured, t(76) =  5.33, p < .001. It, therefore, appears that the colour of the distractor 
cued expectancy of the colour associated outcome, with the result that participants directed their 
attention to the spatial location of the outcome associated target (and hence missing the 
subsequent target when this was incongruent with the cue). On the other hand the reward 
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distractor did not result in a significant decrement or boost to reward target identification, t(76) 
= .31, p = .760. On the other hand, the identification of the detection of the threat goal target 
was non-significantly different when it was a preceded by a threat coloured distractor, t(76) = 
1.41, p = .162.  
 
 Reward distractor Threat distractor Neutral distractor No distractor 
Reward target .65 (.19) .55 (.21) .64 (.19) .68 (.19) 
Threat target .51 (.19) .61 (.22) .58 (.20) .63 (.21) 
 
Table 18. The percentage accuracy of target identification for both reward targets and threat targets across 
four distractor conditions. Reward and threat targets were intermixed meaning that participants had a dual 
target search goal. Standard deviations are presented in brackets. 
Relationship between self-reported goal priority and distractor effects. 
Bayes factors. Bayes factors were calculated for all correlations.  A Bayes factor 
compares evidence for the experimental hypothesis and the null hypothesis.  The Bayes factor 
ranges from 0 to infinity. The strength of this evidence is indicated by the magnitude of the 
Bayes Factor; values greater than three or less than .33 indicate substantial evidence for either 
the experimental or null hypothesis, respectively. A value closer to 1 suggests that the data are 
insensitive and that any difference is ‘anecdotal’ (Dienes 2008, 2011, 2014, 2016). The Bayes 
factor was computed using a modified version of Baguley and Kaye’s (2010) R code (retrieved 
from Dienes, 2008). To compute the factor, we used a uniform distribution, with a mean of zero, 
due to the lack of prior knowledge of the effect size. We hypothesised that trait and state anxiety 
would predict the prioritization of threat avoidance over reward seeking in the goal competition 
task. Conversely, we expected that BAS and impulsiveness would predict prioritization of 
reward seeking versus threat avoidance.  
Unless stated otherwise, the standard deviation of the distribution from the zero mean, 
for all Bayes factors was a plausible maximum effect size of rz = .55. This is based on the 
guidelines set by Cohen (1988) which state that r = .5 reflects a strong relationship, this effect 
was then Fishers’ Z transformed to correct for non-normality. We chose this effect size due to 
the lack of knowledge of how large the effect would be and therefore set the maximum likely 
effect.  
Goal-driven capture correlations. To first confirm whether self-reported goal priority 
would predict the performance based index of goal priority, we correlated the priority score for 
reward seeking versus threat avoidance with the subtraction score between the identification 
accuracy of the reward target versus the accuracy of the threat target. Higher scores on both 
these measures denoted greater preference for reward versus threat. This revealed a very strong 
relationship between the two variables, r = .73, p < .001, BU[0, .55] = 26767125265 (see Figure 
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31). Therefore, participants were aware of the competition between the two goals and were 
aware of how they allocated their attention under these conditions. 
 
 
Figure 31. Scatterplot presenting the relationship between self-reported reward search goal priority versus 
threat search goal priority, and the subtraction of threat target identification accuracy from the reward 
target identification accuracy, higher scores on this subtraction measure reflect better identification of 
reward compared to threat. The self-report measure was taken from a VAS, higher scores reflect higher 
reward seeking. The error band reflects standard error.  
  
 
Table 19. Correlation coefficients of the relationship between the subtraction of the reward and threat 
distractors from the neutral distractor condition across search conditions, and participants self-reported 
search goal priority.  p < .05 = *; p < .01 = **. Bayes factors were computed using a prior expected effect 
of rz = .55, which is the fisher transformed large effect size r = .5 (Cohen, 1988). 
 
 To test my main research question of whether individual differences in goal priority 
predicted attentional capture by goal-congruent coloured distractors, we ran four correlations 
between the distractor effects and the self-reported goal priority (Table 19). Given the 
unexpected large distractor cueing effect, we analysed the correlations across each target 
condition in case the distractor cueing effect influenced the relationship between prioritisation 
and attentional capture. These correlations revealed that when the distractor type was 
incongruent with the target colour there was evidence which favoured the null hypothesis, both 
 Reward target Threat target 
 Reward distractor Threat distractor Reward distractor Threat distractor 
Goal priority 
.25* -.01 -.1 -.07 
Bayes factors 
6.2 .29 .15 .17 
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these small relationships were non-significant. Focusing on the conditions when the distractor 
was congruent with the target type; the threat distractor effect was negatively correlated with the 
self-reported reward goal priority, although this was only weak, and the Bayes factors suggested 
that the evidence favoured the null hypothesis. There was, however, a significant moderate 
positive relationship between the reward distractor effect and reward goal priority, as predicted 
(see Figure 32 for scatterplots). Further, the Bayes factor favoured the experimental hypothesis 
(B > 3).  
 This correlation is in line with my prediction that participants who reported prioritising 
reward targets, over threat targets, would be more distracted by the task-irrelevant reward 
coloured distractor when the reward target was present. This, therefore, provides some initial 
evidence of goal-driven capture by a selectively prioritised goal.  However, we note that this 
effect would not survive a conservative Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (α = 
.013), and as such this finding should be interpreted with caution pending future replication.  
 Trait and state personality correlations. In order to investigate whether any 
personality or current state variables predicted the goal priority measure, we ran exploratory 
correlations between the personality measures and the goal priority measure (see Table 20). 
Only state anxiety significantly predicted self-reported goal priority, with more anxious 
Figure 32a and 32b. Scatterplots depicting the relationship between motivational distractor effects and 
self-reported goal priority as reported by the VAS. Due to an unexpected incongruent cueing effect I only 
present the motivational distractor effects from conditions where the target was the same type as the 
distractor; Figure 32a depicts the relationship when the congruent distractor effect when the target was 
reward-relevant. Figure 32b depicts the relationship when the congruent distractor effect was threat-
relevant. The scatter plots are divided into quadrants. A value in the upper quadrants would indicate 
greater attentional capture by a motivationally salient distractor versus a neutral distractor, as opposed to 
a value in the lower quadrants which would indicate a facilitation effect, with the distractor enhancing 
identification of the target. A value to the left of the line indicates greater self-reported threat avoidance 
versus reward seeking; whilst a value to the right of the line indicates greater self-reported reward 
seeking versus threat avoidance. Data values which favour goal-induced capture would be located in the 
top-right quadrant for plot 4a) and the top-left quadrant for plot 4b). The error band reflects standard 
error.  
b a 
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participants reporting that they focused more of their attention to the threat avoidance target 
than the reward seeking target. Trait anxiety showed a similar but weaker negative relationship 
with reward goal priority, with the Bayes factor ‘anecdotally’ supporting the experimental 
effect, although it remained inconclusive. The evidence of a relationship between the BAS and 
goal priority favoured the null hypothesis, although it too remained inconclusive. As did the 
relationship between impulsiveness and goal priority; the Bayes factor for this small positive 
relationship favoured neither the null nor the experimental hypothesis.  
 
 State anxiety Trait anxiety BAS Impulsiveness 
Goal priority -.34* -.18 .08 .14 
State anxiety - .31** < .01 -.08 
Trait anxiety  - -.25* .16 
BAS   - .09 
Impulsiveness    - 
 Bayes factors 
Goal priority 56.78 1.76 .49 1 
 
Table 20. Correlation coefficients of the relationship between the personality questionnaire variables, and 
participants self-reported search goal priority.  p < .05 = *; p < .01 = **.  A significant negative 
coefficient reflects prioritisation of threat over reward, and a positive coefficient reflects prioritisation of 
reward over threat. Bayes factors were computed using a prior expected effect of rz = .55, which is the 
fisher transformed large effect size r = .5 (Cohen, 1988). 
 
General Discussion 
Evidence from my previous work has suggested that instructing participants to hold a 
top-down goal can induce an involuntary attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli 
(Brown et al., under review – Chapter 2; Brown et al., in preparation – Chapter 3). However, 
this is unlikely to be how individuals search for motivationally salient stimuli in real-world 
contexts. Instead, we have recently proposed a framework in which individuals’ search goals are 
jointly determined by the perceived importance and expectancy of a specific stimulus (Brown & 
Forster, in preparation – Chapter 6). Engrained within this model is the idea that goals compete 
for priority, and that the prioritised goal can then induce an involuntary attentional capture 
effect. We will now discuss how the current findings relate to the idea of goal competition, as 
well as how other findings can be explained by the Importance-Expectancy model of attentional 
goal selection.  
First, the current study introduced a new experimental paradigm which is sensitive to 
reveal the extent participants choose to intentionally prioritise one attentional goal over another. 
We found that the self-reported goal priority strongly predicted superior identification of the 
prioritised target. Therefore, it is clear from the data that participants were aware of what they 
were searching for across the task, and that this preference transferred into actual task-
performance.  
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Second, we found a powerful but unexpected cueing effect, in which target 
identification was significantly less accurate when the distractor preceding it shared the colour 
of the opposing target type. Note that this is not a simple spatial cueing effect because the 
distractors were not associated with potential target locations. Neither could it reflect response 
competition, because both targets required the same responses. Finally, it cannot be fully 
explained through low-level feature priming, whereby the appearance of the stimulus activates 
these features and enhances processing of them across the visual field in a bottom-up fashion. 
By this account, because the distractor shared the same colour features as the target, and could 
have led to the activation of these features without activation of any sort of top-down outcome 
expectancy (Theeuwes, 2013).  However, this would not explain the incongruence effect, and 
instead would predict a congruence cueing effect, where the distractor facilitated the 
identification of the target which matched the colour, versus the neutral distractor, rather than 
the distractor impeding the detection of the contrasting target.  
Despite the incongruent cueing effect being unexpected, we propose that the most 
plausible account is within the proposed Importance-Expectancy model of attentional goal 
selection. Recently, we found that both the perceived importance and expectancy of a 
motivationally salient stimulus predicted the extent to which participants rated the stimulus as 
being deserving of attentional priority. Critically, we also discovered that both expectancy and 
attentional priority were significantly, and strongly, modulated by contextual cues: When the 
context was congruent with the motivationally salient stimulus, then both expectancy of the 
stimulus appearing, and the priority of searching for this stimulus increased. For instance, a dark 
alley context resulted in participants expecting to find, and prioritising as a search goal, a 
potential attacker with a knife (Brown & Forster, in preparation – Chapter 6). 
It appears plausible that the incongruent cueing effect in the present results may reflect 
a similar form of contextual cueing of goal selection. The expectancy ratings taken during the 
learning phase demonstrate that participants had made a strong association between the 
distractors and the expectation of the aversive and rewarding outcomes. The distractor, 
presented prior to the target, could therefore have acted as a contextual cue, increasing the 
expectancy that the outcome associated with the cue would occur, which in turn increased the 
likelihood that participants would switch to prioritising a search goal for the target feature or 
location associated with that outcome. In other words, in the same way that entering a dark alley 
could cue the search goal for a potential attacker, the threat associated distractor could have 
cued the search goal for the threat-related target. If the distractors cued expectancy of a 
particular target appearing and hence caused participants to direct attention to that location, this 
would explain why they were more likely to miss the actual target on incongruent trials. I, 
therefore, conclude that the incongruent cueing effect is most likely to represent contextual 
cueing of goal selection from the distractors, whereby the cueing increased the outcome 
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expectancy, as outlined in the Importance-Expectancy model of attentional goal selection 
(Brown & Forster, in preparation – Chapter 6). An interesting avenue for future research would 
be to adapt my task to further study this contextual cueing effect, for example by varying the 
level of expectancy associated with each cue. 
Unfortunately, the powerful within-subject cueing effect undermined the ability of my 
task to address my main research question, which was whether self-selected goals can induce 
goal-driven capture. On incongruent trials, participants who had been prioritising the correct 
target (e.g., due to perceived importance of the competing outcome) would be cued to switch to 
a goal for the other (incorrect) target. On the other hand, participants who had been already 
prioritising the other target would be unaffected by the cue. In both cases, the incorrect target 
was prioritised, thus causing a ceiling effect. On congruent trials, presumably all participants 
would have been attending to the spatial location of the correct target (either because they 
already prioritised it, or because they had switched in response to the cue). However, only those 
participants who were already holding a goal for the target prior to distractor presentation would 
have been vulnerable to goal-driven attentional capture (i.e. if participants only adopted the goal 
in response to the distractors, these goals could not affect attentional priority of the distractors). 
As such, only the congruent condition would be sensitive to reveal individual differences in 
goal-driven attentional capture.  
Within the congruent condition, those participants who self-reported greater 
prioritisation of the reward targets indeed showed greater goal-driven attentional capture by the 
reward distractor. The fact that the increase in attentional capture corresponded to the target 
which participants explicitly reported searching for highlights the involuntary nature of this 
capture. Additionally, it is clear that participants were motivated to pursue this goal and were 
not passively searching for it, because selecting it came at the cost of an increased likelihood of 
an aversive outcome. On the other hand, although the relationship between threat-priority and 
goal-driven distraction by threat was in the expected direction, it was only weak (r = -.07), and 
the Bayes factor suggested a sensitive null effect (B < .33). Therefore, although the present 
results are somewhat consistent with the hypothesis that self-selected goals can induce goal-
driven attentional capture, further research is required to confirm this. Revising the experiment 
to contain fewer between subjects counterbalanced variables (e.g. target type location) could 
help detect the hypothesised effect by removing unaccounted variation from the task, or 
alternatively provide further evidence for the null hypothesis.  
 As well as investigating my primary hypothesis, we also conducted exploratory 
analyses to determine whether any individual differences influenced the search goal priority. 
We found that state anxiety predicted greater threat avoidance versus reward seeking. This, 
therefore, introduces the idea that an individual’s current state can influence the choice to avoid 
threat, even at the cost of missing out on a rewarding outcome. It has been found that reward 
155 
 
and threat compete for attention, with attention being biased towards one at the cost of the other 
when they are presented as competing stimuli in a visual task (Frewen, Dozois, Joanisse & 
Neufeld, 2008; Choi, Padmala, Spechler & Pessoa, 2014). If my exploratory result were 
confirmed in future investigations, then it would suggest that this competition could be 
mediated by deliberate goal-selection.  
One possible approach could be to experimentally induce an anxious state by placing 
participants in stressful conditions (e.g. McHugh, Behar, Gutner, Geem & Otto, 2010) to 
determine whether this influenced goal-priority, as well as subsequent involuntary capture by 
the goal-relevant distractors. As well as state measures of personality, we cannot rule out the 
influence of trait measures on goal-selection (i.e. BIS/BAS, trait anxiety, impulsiveness) 
because the Bayes factors for the relationship between these variables and goal-priority 
suggested an inconclusive effect: neither strongly favouring the null nor the experimental 
hypothesis.  
The main contribution of the current investigation is that it points a path forward for 
future research. Up until now researchers have generally treated top-down goals as either 
synonymous with following task instructions (Theeuwes, 2010); or have concluded from an 
experimental manipulation that participants have chosen to adopt a goal for a stimulus, despite 
there being no explicit evidence of this selection. For instance, Vogt, Lozo, Koster and De 
Houwer (2011), compared attentional bias scores in a dot-probe task between a group of 
participants who interacted with disgusting objects versus a group who interacted with neutral 
objects. They found that the disgust induction group showed an attentional bias towards images 
depicting cleanliness, while the neutral group did not. This could be interpreted as participants 
choosing to attend to goal-relevant stimuli when they were not instructed to do so. However, 
with no explicit measure of choice it is not possible to conclude that this was goal-driven 
capture, it may have instead been reflective of the activation of low-level associative links 
between related images, which would influence attention independent of the current top-down 
goals (Moores, Laiti & Chelazzi, 2003; Bucker & Theeuwes, 2017). Further, because the clean 
images appeared in a target location, where the dot-probe would appear, it is not clear whether 
this is truly involuntary capture, because goal-driven attention would already have to be 
deployed to this location to detect the target. 
In the current investigation, however, the distractors were presented in completely task 
irrelevant locations away from the target, thus ensuring that attention to these stimuli was 
involuntary. The task also gave an index of explicit self-reported goal preference which was 
corroborated with an objective measure of task performance (subtraction between the target 
identification accuracies). This could lead to future tasks incorporating participant choice within 
their designs, rather than concluding that task instructions are synonymous with the actual 
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preferred goal of the participants, or that an experimental manipulation is in fact effecting the 
current goals of the individual. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
 
Traditionally, mainstream models of attention did not explicitly integrate motivationally 
salient stimuli into their frameworks. Instead, these models of attention focused primarily upon 
the bottom-up role of low-level stimulus properties such as brightness, and the role of guidance 
by a top down search goal (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Theeuwes, 1994; 2010; Itti & Koch, 
2001; Buschman & Miller, 2007; Parkhurst, Law & Niebur, 2002; Turatto & Galfano, 2000; 
Corbetta & Schulman, 2002). Motivational salience is, however, a vital factor which drives 
much of human attention and behaviour. Work within the attention and emotion literature has 
argued that the automatic attention to these stimuli is due to a stimulus-driven mechanism 
(Carretie, 2014; Bishop, 2007; 2009), although this account has been challenged by recent 
evidence that top-down goals may modulate attention to motivationally salient stimuli (Hahn & 
Gronlund, 2007; Everaert, Spruyt & De Houwer, 2013; Everaert, Spruyt, Rossi, Pourtois & De 
Houwer, 2014; Lichtenstein-Vidne et al., 2017; Lichtenstein-Vidne, Henik & Safadi, 2012; 
Vogt, Koster & De Houwer, 2017). Attempts to accommodate motivationally salient stimuli 
have also recently led to calls for revisions to mainstream models, adding a third determinant 
such as selection history (Awh, Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2012). The present thesis tested an 
alternative possibility, that motivationally salient stimuli could be accommodated under the 
existing framework as a (sometimes involuntary) outcome of voluntary goal-driven attention. In 
order to determine whether a goal-driven mechanism could plausibly account for involuntary 
attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli, we identified two essential questions that 
needed to be answered. In addition to these necessary conditions, we also set a third question in 
order to explore the precise underlying processes that could provide answers about how such a 
goal-driven mechanism could operate in real-world settings: 
 
Question 1: Do individuals believe that detecting motivationally salient stimuli is 
important? 
 
Question 2: Can top-down search goals for motivationally salient stimuli induce an 
involuntary attentional capture by goal-congruent motivationally salient stimuli? If so 
does this extend to self-selected goals? 
 
Question 3: How are top-down search goals initially selected? 
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Do Individuals Believe That Detecting Motivationally Salient Stimuli is Important? 
Due to the involuntary nature of attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli, it 
is often assumed that they attract attention independent of the current goals of the individual. 
This assumption neglects the possibility that individuals might want to search for these stimuli 
because they consider them important to detect. Evolutionarily, it would seem clearly 
advantageous and obvious for individuals to have a long term aim to avoid danger and seek 
reward. However, empirically confirming that individuals consider motivationally salient 
stimuli important to detect is an important and necessary first step to any goal-driven account of 
attentional capture by these stimuli. 
In Chapter 6, two large sample experiments provided clear evidence that individuals 
consider motivationally salient stimuli important to detect in their surroundings, and hence 
deserving of voluntary attentional priority. There was a difference between specific categories 
of motivationally salient stimuli, with imminent threat being reported as the most important to 
detect. This is consistent with evolutionary models of attention to threat which suggest that 
detecting threat is vital in order to survive – it could also explain why early models of attention 
posited that there was an innate and unconditional ‘threat detection module’ (Öhman & 
Minneka, 2001; Amaral, Price, Pitkanen, & Carmichael, 1992; LeDoux, 2000); if threat 
detection is always prioritised over other neutral goals, then at least it would likely appear to be 
an innate and unconditional bias because it would be active the majority of the time, when a 
threatening stimulus was expected to appear in the presence of a less motivationally salient 
target. Despite being seen as less important, potential threat and reward were still seen as 
important to detect and were rated more important that neutral stimuli, thus suggesting that 
these objects could effectively compete for attention against the less important neutral objects. 
To summarize, many of the same categories of stimuli which have been previously argued to 
capture attention correspond to those which people typically believe to be deserving of 
voluntary attentional priority. 
Can Top-Down Search Goals for Motivationally Salient Stimuli Induce an Involuntary 
Attentional Capture by Goal-Congruent Motivationally Salient Stimuli? If so Does This 
Extend to Self-Selected Goals?  
While Chapter 2 highlights that individuals may often voluntarily prioritize 
motivationally salient stimuli, Chapters 2-5 tested whether this voluntary prioritization could 
explain involuntary attentional capture. Involuntary and voluntary processes are often seen as 
distinct from one another. However, drawing on contingent capture research (cf. Folk et al., 
1992), Chapters 2-5 consistently demonstrated that involuntary attentional capture to a range of 
motivationally salient stimuli can be induced as a direct, yet unintended, consequence of a 
voluntary search goal.  
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In order to illustrate the cumulative evidence for goal-driven involuntary capture by 
motivationally salient stimuli, we meta-analytically computed effect sizes across experiments 
from Chapters 2 – 5 (see Figure 33). This produced the standardised Hedges’ g effect size which 
revealed the magnitude of the difference between the motivationally salient distractor and a 
matched neutral distractor under various search goal conditions. The meta-analysis was 
computed using R’s Metafor package. Hedges’ g and 95% confidence intervals were computed 
using DerSimonian-Laird random effects model, with each experiments’ effects weighted by 
sample size (as described in Aloe & Becker, 2012; Viechtbauer, 2010). All subsequent meta-
analyses within this chapter were computed using the same technique. Across nine experiments 
in Chapters 2 – 5, when participants were searching for a target from the same category as the 
distractor, task-irrelevant motivationally salient distractors resulted in lower detection or 
identification accuracy versus a neutral distractor. The cumulative effect size of this goal-driven 
effect was large and consistent, Hedges’ g = -.96, Z = 6.40, p < .001, 95% CI[-1.26, -.67], with a 
significant decrement in performance recorded across all goal-congruent conditions. Further, 
Bayesian comparisons revealed that when participants were not searching for the category of 
stimuli congruent with the motivationally salient distractor, there was no poorer performance 
versus the neutral distractor. 
The involuntary nature of this goal-driven attentional capture is supported by the fact 
that it occurred when the distractors were completely task-irrelevant and appeared away from 
the target, meaning that any attentional allocation to these stimuli would result in a complete 
inability to detect the target. Participants were also made explicitly aware that these distractors 
were irrelevant to the task and should be ignored. Additionally, this also occurred for conditions 
Figure 33. A forest plot depicting hedges’ g effect size and 95% confidence intervals from a DerSimonian-Laird 
random effects model. Effects are weighted by sample size. The decrement in performance, versus a neutral 
distractor, when a motivationally salient distractor was presented in conditions where participants were searching 
for a target from the same specific category. 
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where participants were searching for rewarding and personally relevant targets, such as in 
Chapter 5 when smokers were searching for appetitive smoking images. Under these conditions 
participants should have been especially motivated to pursue the search goal and detect the 
target and ignore the distractors. This finding, therefore, highlights the involuntary nature of the 
attentional capture in the current task.   
I found this goal induced attentional capture across a multitude of different 
motivationally salient stimuli – specifically threatening stimuli such as fearful faces (Chapters 2 
and 3), threatening animals (Chapter 2), images of mutilation (Chapter 3), and graphic health 
warnings related to relevant smoking concerns (Chapter 5). Additionally, we found the same 
goal-induced attentional capture for rewarding stimuli such as alcohol in social drinkers 
(Chapter 4), and appetitive smoking cues in nicotine dependent and occasional smokers 
(Chapter 5). It, therefore, appears that a goal-driven account of involuntary attentional capture 
could potentially explain a wide variety of attentional capture effect. There is the possibility that 
the motivational salience of the stimuli was not perceived in the experimental context, indeed 
Chapter 6 revealed that a safe context resulted in the reduced priority of motivationally salient 
stimuli. We did, however, find that participants rated the stimuli as emotionally arousing in 
Chapters 2 and 5, thus indicating that the affective associations of the stimuli were perceived by 
the participants in the experimental context. 
In addition to the consistent evidence that a single instructed search goal could induce 
attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli, Chapter 7 also found preliminary evidence 
suggesting that a self-selected goal (which participants were able to explicitly report) could 
induce a similar involuntary effect.  
 
Figure 34. A forest plot depicting hedges’ g effect size and 95% confidence intervals from a 
DerSimonian-Laird random effects model. Effects are weighted by sample size. The decrement in 
performance, versus a neutral distractor, when a motivationally salient distractor was presented in 
conditions where participants were searching for a target from the same general affective category 
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As well as revealing that involuntary attentional capture by multiple motivationally 
salient stimuli could be accounted for by a goal-driven mechanism, we also revealed an 
important boundary conditions of this mechanism. Goal-driven attentional capture only 
occurred when stimuli matched the specific semantic category of the goal. Stimuli linked to the 
goal only by affective content did not appear to capture attention - for example, searching for 
threatening animals did not induce attentional capture by fearful faces, despite both categories 
being related to threat. To test whether there was any cumulative evidence that there was a 
detrimental distractor effect on target detection, in conditions where there was affective but not 
conceptual overlap between the search goal and the distractor, we meta-analytically computed 
the Hedges’ g effect size across 7 conditions within Chapters 2 and 3 (see Figure 34). We found 
that the cumulative reduction in task performance, versus a neutral distractor, was very small 
and non-significant, Hedges’ g = -.07, Z = .82, p = .412, 95% CI[-.25, .10]. This suggests that 
affective similarity to a search goal does not automatically result in attentional capture when 
searching for a specific category of motivationally salient stimuli. This boundary condition has 
important implications for any goal-driven account of attentional capture by motivationally 
salient stimuli – namely, that these capture effects could only result from a goal for the specific 
semantic category of the stimuli. A broad, cross-category, danger avoidance goal alone would 
not be enough to induce involuntary attentional capture (cf. Vogt et al., 2013).  
How are Top-Down Search Goals Initially Selected? 
Having demonstrated that a goal-driven mechanism could plausibly drive attentional 
capture by motivationally salient distractors, we then questioned how attentional goals are 
initially selected. Across previous studies, including my own in Chapters 2 – 5, goal-driven 
attention has typically been operationalised as the following of task instructions. This is unlikely 
to be how search goals are commonly selected in real life. When a goal is determined by an 
external agent, individuals rarely follow the goal for a long time, and instead are more 
motivated to pursue intrinsically valued goals (Deci & Ryan, 2000). It is likely, therefore, that 
search goals are often internally generated based on personal needs and desires. Drawing upon 
social models of goal setting, as well as the findings across all six empirical chapters, We have 
developed a novel Importance-Expectancy model of attentional goal selection (A detailed 
description and diagram can be seen in Figure 35). This framework was directly tested in 
Chapter 6, where the data supported the proposed role of both importance and expectancy in 
predicting voluntary judgements of attentional priority. Specifically, my data supports the 
notion that voluntary attentional goal setting is jointly determined by a combination of the 
perceived importance of detecting a particular stimulus, and the expectancy of encountering this 
stimulus. Expectancy, in turn, varied between individuals but was also strongly cued by the 
context. Importance, on the other hand, varied between individuals but remained very consistent 
across contexts. 
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This framework accommodates the specificity of involuntary goal-driven capture, as 
revealed within Chapters 2-5. It might be argued that such specificity in a real-world setting 
would be maladaptive, as it could result in missing important information (e.g. missing an 
approaching car when we are talking to a friend whilst crossing the road). The strong contextual 
cueing effect would account for this by suggesting that participants adopt specific goals in 
response to the relative importance of all stimuli they are likely to encounter in a particular 
context.  
For instance, if individuals were approaching a road, they would have learned from 
prior experience that cars are both highly likely to be encountered and also highly important to 
detect, and would hence tune attention to prioritise cars. This contextual cueing mechanism 
would allow for adaptive allocation of attention given that there is often a consistent association 
between many motivationally salient objects and their surroundings (e.g. cars-roads; alcohol-
bar; spider-basement); and that participants are quickly able to learn these associations through 
a general Pavlovian learning mechanism, which is widely considered to be universal across 
organisms (Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rosas, Todd & Bouton, 2013; Shirakawa, Gunji & Miyake, 
2011). The contextual cueing mechanism of top-down goal selection, therefore, provides a 
plausible explanation of how individuals might select specific search goals in order to maximise 
detection of important objects, but reduce the cost of searching for multiple objects at one time 
(Eimer & Grubert, 2014).  
In summary, top-down search goals appear to be selected based on the importance and 
expectancy of the goals outcome in a given setting; and this is very specific to the environment 
that participants are in. Further, the findings of Chapters 6 and 7 suggest that at least in these 
conditions participants make a conscious choice between pursuing potential search goals. 
Theoretical implications for the literature 
Mainstream attention literature 
The current investigation can provide valuable information for mainstream models of 
attention. Recently, these models have focused on how involuntary capture by stimuli 
associated with financial reward and aversive outcomes capture attention (Anderson, 2016; Awh 
et al., 2012). The conclusion from this research has primarily been that these motivationally 
salient stimuli constitute a third mechanism which biases attention independent of the current 
goals of the participant. Within the current investigation, however, we found consistent 
evidence which suggests that these stimuli may capture attention through an existing goal-
driven mechanism, outlined in traditional models (e.g. Folk et al.,1992). Hence, my results 
allow for a parsimonious accommodation of motivationally salient stimuli within existing 
dichotomous models.  
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The evidence which has previous suggested a goal-independent third mechanism (e.g. 
selection history) is based on results from several tasks which often have similar features (see 
Chapter 1 and 2 for detailed discussion). In particular, these tasks have often presented the 
distractors in task-relevant locations, where participants would be unable to completely 
disengage goal-driven attention (cf. Forster 2013). In the current investigation, we found that 
when the motivationally salient distractors were presented in task-irrelevant locations that did 
not require goal-driven priority, there was evidence against attentional capture independent of 
the current search goal, across all experiments, as revealed by Bayes factors favouring the null 
hypothesis within each experiment.  
To highlight the absence of goal-independent attentional capture we meta-analytically 
computed an effect size across conditions where the motivationally salient distractor was 
incongruent with the current goal. In this analysis, to increase the chance that the motivationally 
salient distractors could compete for attention against the target, we isolated conditions where 
participants were searching for a neutral category of stimuli. According to stimulus-driven 
theories, the motivationally salient stimuli should effectively compete for attention against these 
stimuli, which are only prioritised based on their task relevance and visual qualities (see Figure 
36). The categories of stimuli in this case were shoes, pots/pans, and cars in Chapter 4, and 
images of people reading in Chapter 5. The meta-analysis was conducted using a method 
identical to the other meta-analyses in this chapter, and revealed a near zero and non-significant 
effect size when comparing the motivationally salient distractor to a neutral distractor, Hedges’ 
g = .01, Z = .11, p = .916, 95% CI [-.15, .17].  
 
 
Figure 36. A forest plot depicting hedges’ g effect size and 95% confidence intervals from a 
DerSimonian-Laird random effects model. Effects are weighted by sample size. The decrement in 
performance, versus a neutral distractor, when a motivationally salient distractor is presented prior to a 
neutral target. The neutral target type and distractor type within each condition are presented in columns. 
 
165 
 
The current results, therefore, do not find any support for any involuntary influence of 
motivational salience upon attention independent of goal-driven attention. We highlight that the 
current aim of the investigation was to test a goal-driven account of involuntary capture by 
motivationally salient stimuli, rather than to discount a stimulus-driven mechanism which may 
well influence attention under some conditions. Furthermore, we note that the sensitivity of the 
present investigation to detect stimulus-driven effects may have been restricted by certain 
features of my experimental paradigm. Specifically, the task was more perceptually demanding 
than previous investigations; in the current task participants had to search for a visually complex 
category amongst rapidly presented images. It has been found that the perceptual load of a task 
can reduce processing of a distractor because there aren’t enough perceptual resources 
remaining to attend to the distractor (cf. Lavie, 1995; 2005). Indeed, it has been found that 
fearful faces are only more distracting than neutral faces in a perceptually simple task, 
compared to a perceptually complex task (Bishop, Jenkins & Lawrence, 2006). It may be that 
stimulus-driven effects do result in attentional capture by task-irrelevant motivationally salient 
stimuli, but that this only occurs when the task is perceptually undemanding. Indeed, there are 
some instances when peripherally presented reward associated distractors do appear to interfere 
with target detection, and this is in a task that could be considered perceptually undemanding 
(e.g. flanker task; Anderson, Laurent & Yantis, 2011, though for conflicting findings see also 
Reeck et al., 2012; Notebaert et al., 2013). Future work should investigate directly whether the 
current results are replicated in both high and low perceptual load conditions. 
If stimulus-driven effects do influence attention but only under low perceptual load, 
then this implies that a goal-driven mechanism is resistant to perceptual load when a stimulus-
driven mechanism is not. This, therefore, provides further evidence for the strength of the goal-
driven mechanism and would position it as the primary driver of involuntary attention to 
motivationally salient stimuli (i.e. across all situations, rather than only those involving a 
perceptually undemanding task).  
As well as demonstrating that motivationally salient stimuli can be integrated into 
existing models of mainstream attention, my findings reveal for the first time, how these search 
goals may actually be set. Research which has tested how top-down search goals guide attention 
has only explored the influence of instructions, rather than self-selected goals. In the current 
investigation, we found that a simple two factor model predicted self-reported goal 
prioritisation, across contexts. Thus, the current thesis not only builds on existing mechanisms 
of mainstream models of goal-driven attention, but also introduces a novel extension to these 
models to explain how top-down goals are set.  
Emotion and attention literature 
The current findings also have implications for the attention to emotion literature, not 
just mainstream models of attention. In recent years, researchers within this field have suggested 
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that attention to threat and emotion may not be entirely unconditional as predicted by a 
stimulus-driven mechanism. Instead, evidence from this field suggests that the current task-
relevance of the affective content modulates the attentional capture by these stimuli (e.g. 
Everaert et al., 2013).  
Based on the finding that motivational salience isn’t unconditional but is pervasive, it 
has been suggested that the attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli occurs because 
individuals are more likely to consider threatening stimuli relevant to their current aims, and 
have a habitual goal to stay safe (e.g. Vogt et al., 2013). The current research is aligned with this 
recent work within the field of emotional attention, however, the current findings refine and 
advance this conclusion. Specifically, my finding that involuntary capture by motivationally 
salient stimuli can be induced by top-down goals demonstrates a plausible mechanism for task-
relevance effects, suggesting that these may be driven by relevance cueing specific top-down 
goals for the affective stimuli. Given the findings of Chapter 6, it appears plausible that task-
relevance might act through the proposed Importance-Expectancy model. For instance, by 
increasing the task-relevance of non-motivationally salient features, this may increase the 
importance of these features and enable them to compete as a search goal against the 
motivationally salient stimuli, which would usually be prioritised as a search goal. 
Alternatively, by presenting the distractors in a task-irrelevant location it could reduce the 
perceived expectancy of them appearing across the task, and reduce the prioritisation of these 
stimuli through that route; in most experimental tasks because the images are presented 
consistently across the task then expectancy is usually high, and would result in them competing 
for priority as a search goal.  
Further, it had not yet been explored whether the attentional capture was due to an 
explicit or implicit prioritisation of the affective stimuli. My current findings suggest that 
although multiple features can be active as a search goal, involuntary attentional capture can 
only be induced through voluntary prioritisation of a specific set of features. Within Chapter 
3wefound that capture was only induced by the deliberate prioritisation of a single conceptual 
category of threat. Further, evidence from Chapter 4 revealed that even when individuals held 
alcohol stimuli active in VWM, these features did not guide attention to task-irrelevant alcohol 
distractors, despite evidence that when alcohol was a single search goal these same distractors 
captured attention. 
It, therefore, appears that explicit search mediates the effect of the motivational content 
on attention. Complementary to this conclusion, we found that in Chapter 6 participants 
reported that they believed that they should intentionally lookout for motivationally salient 
stimuli in their environment when they expected them to appear. Chapter 7 also revealed that 
participants were able to explicitly state what motivational goal they had been pursuing, and that 
this strongly predicted actual goal target detection. Thus, we have direct evidence that 
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individuals would be likely to intentionally prioritise detection of these stimuli when they were 
aware that they would appear.  
More generally, the present work creates useful new linkages between mainstream 
models of goal-directed attention and the specific field of attention to emotion, and other 
motivationally salient stimuli. For example, the extensive existing work on contingent capture 
may now be applied to illuminate how general mechanisms of attention can account for 
attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli, as well as the potential exceptions to this 
general top-down mechanism.  
Applications of Current Findings 
As well as providing important novel findings for theoretical models of attention, the 
current results can also be used to inform real-world applications. One particularly promising 
finding is the absence of attentional capture in individuals who should be predisposed to 
distraction by these stimuli. For instance, previous evidence has found that cigarette cues 
interfere with attention tasks in nicotine dependent smokers, however, this effect was absent in 
the current investigation (Mogg, Bradley, Field & De Houwer, 2003; Field, Mogg & Bradley, 
2008). It has been proposed that the attentional bias to drug cues can induce a state of craving 
which could result in maladaptive consumption of the drug (Field et al., 2016).  
The current results suggest that when an individual adopts a search goal which is 
unrelated to a motivationally salient stimulus category, then they do not attend to the stimulus. 
This could potentially have therapeutic applications, especially for informing attentional bias 
retraining. It has been proposed that subtly manipulating attention away from the image of 
either an addictive substance or threat associated stimulus, then the pathological attentional 
biases observed in clinical samples can be reduced, and that this could result in a reduction in 
drug consumption or anxiety over time (Schoenmakers et al., 2010; Hakamata et al., 2010). This 
retraining technique has, however, had mixed results, and has produced several null findings 
(Christiansen, Schoenmakers & Field, 2015; Mogoase & Koster, 2014). One potential reason 
for this is that the training tasks focus on training participants to attend away from the craving or 
anxiety inducing stimuli. My results suggest that attentional capture to motivationally salient 
stimuli are suppressed or prevented when participants search for a competing goal, not through 
training avoidance of the motivationally salient stimulus, as has been done in previous 
interventions. Based on the current empirical findings, I would design an attentional training 
task which uses contextual cues to train the activation of a search goal towards an adaptive 
competing category of stimuli when in the presence of the maladaptive category of stimuli. For 
instance, with alcoholic individuals, the task would present a relevant contextual cue (e.g. image 
of a bar) as a signal for the appearance of a target from a healthy positive category of stimuli 
(e.g. smiling faces). Thus, when encountering this context in real life, the individual may learn 
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to search for the competing healthy category of stimuli, blocking the usual competing search 
goal for alcohol. 
Additionally, the current research findings would also suggest that giving individuals 
healthier and more adaptive goals to pursue would enable these goals to compete for attention 
against the more maladaptive goals. Previous evidence supports this, for instance alcohol 
abusers with more adaptive non-alcohol related goals (e.g. more chance of success or greater joy 
on completion of the goal) responded better to standard treatment; further, treatments which 
focused on encouraging individuals to pursue more adaptive life goals also reduced alcohol 
consumption (Cox & Klinger, 2002). Therefore, my current findings also lend support for these 
types of interventions, and suggests that interventions targeting goal selection may be 
successful. 
The finding that motivationally salient stimuli do not capture attention involuntarily, 
even in individuals who these images are personally relevant for, suggests that graphic health 
warnings on certain product such as cigarette packaging may not be effective unless individuals 
are searching for them. Indeed, it has previously been found that smokers preferentially attend 
to branding information on cigarette packages, rather than any other features (Maynard, Brooks, 
Munafo & Leonards, 2017). Further, removing this branding information appears to increase the 
salience of the graphic warning (Munafo, Roberts, Bauld & Leonards, 2011). My results suggest 
that branding information and other salient features on the packaging may allow smokers to 
search for these features, and prevent them from attending to the graphic health warnings. One 
recommendation would be to increase the size of the graphic warning and remove any other 
competing visual features, thus making the graphic warning the only identifying feature on the 
packet. In this case, the only way to search for the cigarette packet would be to tune attention 
towards the graphic health warning.  
Another important role that my findings have beyond theoretical models is the 
highlighting of contextual factors in top-down search goals. Top-down goals are often 
considered to be centred on the individual, and therefore places the focus of behaviour change 
on personal choices. The finding that contextual cueing plays a strong role in goal-selection 
bridges the gap between the individual and the environment. An application for the current 
research, therefore, would be to provide evidence in support of interventions which target the 
context the individual is embedded in. This can include ‘nudge’ research which aims to make 
small changes to the environment to prime healthier behaviour (Hollands et al., 2013). For 
instance, priming individuals to pursue healthier food choices through healthy eating posters in 
food shops (Papies & Hamstra, 2010; Papies, 2016). Interestingly, priming individuals with a 
health goal cue has been found to result in an increase in attention to healthier foods, as index 
by eye-tracking measures, which would suggest that the contextual cueing of health behaviour 
could be mediated through attentional processes (van de Laan, Papies, Hooge & Smeets, 2017). 
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Future Directions 
In regard to future directions, the Importance-Expectancy model provides a starting 
point for future research. The model is not intended to be a finished product, but rather to 
generate future research questions within a clear theoretical framework. One important aim for 
future research should be to replicate the finding that importance and expectancy influence the 
selection of motivational search goals, found in the survey task, but within an experimental task. 
For instance, in the goal-competition task in Chapter 7, it should be possible to decrease the 
selection of one goal (e.g. reward seeking) over another (e.g. threat avoidance) by decreasing 
the magnitude of the outcome of one of the goals (e.g. switching from 5 pence to 1 pence 
reward); similarly, reducing the expectancy of an outcome should also produce a similar 
reduction in goal-selection (e.g. switching from 100% probability of winning money to 50% 
probability). Through this novel paradigm, it should be possible to determine whether there are 
instances when search goal selection is more influenced by importance or expectancy, and what 
factors may influence this. For instance, awareness of the motivational associations, 
motivational personality traits, or current state may influence goal selection through either 
importance, expectancy or both.  
One factor which appeared to influence the goal-competition but was not included in 
the importance expectancy model was the current emotional state of the individual. It is not 
clear whether elevated state anxiety had a direct influence upon goal-selection, or whether it 
was mediated by elevated importance of the outcome or increased expectancy that the outcome 
would occur. An individual differences design where variation across individuals is correlated 
with a task measure could be used to test this, however, another possibility would be to induce 
an anxious state in participants and determine whether this directly resulted in increased threat 
avoidance versus reward seeking. Additionally, expectancy ratings and importance ratings could 
be measured at intervals throughout the task. It could be possible that state anxiety would 
increase the importance rating of detecting the threat related target, and this was what indirectly 
increase threat avoidance; or, it could be that more anxious participants expected the threatening 
outcome on a greater percentage of trials and therefore chose threat avoidance as a preferred 
goal.  
It is interesting that we only found evidence of a relationship between individual 
differences and task performance where participants were allowed free choice between two 
competing goals. In this task, participants had the choice of searching for reward or threat 
related stimuli, state anxious individual appeared to search for threat more, versus reward. 
Interestingly, this increased threat avoidance resulted in a reduction in distraction by task-
irrelevant reward associated distractors. This preliminary investigation, therefore, suggests that 
individual differences in goal-driven attentional capture may emerge when participants are 
given free choice between competing goals; whilst when participants were given a single goal, 
170 
 
as in Chapters 2 -5, this obscures individual differences. Alternatively, the absence of individual 
differences across many of the empirical chapters, with the exception of some preliminary 
evidence in Chapter 7, could suggest that individual differences do not influence attention 
through a goal-driven route, and instead effect attention through a more implicit mechanism 
(Stacy & Weirs, 2010). If this were the case, this would not undermine a goal-driven 
explanation of attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli. It would, however, suggest 
that individual variation across some participants was independent of this goal-driven 
mechanism. Future evidence is required to determine how individual differences in affective 
traits and states can be accommodated within the Importance-Expectancy model of goal-driven 
capture. Further, the Importance-Expectancy model must accommodate conditions which seem 
to cause more general context independent attentional biases, such as the bias towards all threat 
in Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD; Mogg & Bradley, 2016). The general attentional bias 
towards threat in this case could either reflect expectancy independent mechanism, or these 
individual simply expecting threat across all contexts and perceiving none of them to be safe 
(Browning, Behrens, Jocham, O’Reilly & Bishop, 2015). 
It has been posited that the mental representations which guide goal-driven attention are 
stored in VWM as prioritised features (Downing, 2000; Soto, Heinke, Humprehys & Blanco, 
2005; Woodman, Carlisle & Reinhart, 2013). In Chapter 4, Experiment 2, when participants 
held an alcohol image active in VWM whilst searching for a separate category, however, we 
found that alcohol distractors did not capture attention versus neutral distractors; but when 
participants were searching for alcohol as a primary search goal, this did induce an involuntary 
capture effect by the same distractors. It, therefore, appears that multiple valued goals can be 
active at any one time in VWM, but only currently prioritised features guide attention (Olivers, 
Peters, Houtkamp & Roelfsema, 2011; Olivers & Eimer, 2011). Further, in Chapter 3, even 
when participants were actively searching for multiple categories of motivationally salient 
stimuli, distractors which were congruent with exemplars from one of these categories did not 
capture attention. If multiple goals are searched for at one time, and there is no clear 
prioritisation, then involuntary attentional capture does not seem to occur, even if a distractors’ 
features overlap with the content of one of the search goals. This could be considered 
maladaptive in some contexts where individuals may want to detect multiple features; however, 
if it is considered that only a small subset of features can be prioritised in the attention system at 
one time (Olivers et al., 2011), then such a mechanism could prevent participants over 
committing to a single goal and missing an equally likely or important goal outcome.  
Within the current Importance-Expectancy model, it is likely that individuals would be 
constantly updating the prioritisation of each goal based on contextual cues. Thus, participants 
may hold several goals and their associated features active in VWM, but through the 
accumulation of contextual information, they may rapidly and dynamically update the priority 
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of each of the search goals until only a single goal is deprioritised. Within Chapter 
7,weunexpectedly found evidence which suggests that this process may be very quick. In a task 
where participants had to search for two coloured targets representing different search goals, we 
found that a coloured distractor/cue, which was presented for 150ms prior to the target, 
appeared to prime attention towards either the associated location or feature of the goal which 
was congruent with this distractor/cue. This was demonstrated by participants inaccurately 
identifying the target which did not match the distractor/cue colour, likely due to them not 
prioritising the associated location or feature of this goal because the competing goal’s target 
was prioritised. Within the Importance-Expectancy framework, this could be because the 
associated colour rapidly primed an increase in expectancy of the goal’s outcome, or the 
appearance of the target, and lead participants to prioritise this search goal over the other goal, 
thus leading to an incongruent priming effect when the different target appeared. Future 
research could examine the temporal fluctuation of search goal priority over time, and how 
responsive the updating of an attentional goal is depending on manipulations of importance and 
expectancy.  
In the current investigation, we found that only a search goal for a single category of 
stimuli from images of motivationally salient real-world objects could drive involuntary 
attention to these images. we have therefore proposed a model in which only a single set of 
features can be prioritised to induce involuntary capture at any one time. There is, however, 
evidence which may suggest that this section of the model needs further investigation and 
refinement (Figure 37). There is some evidence that multiple visual memory representations can 
guide external attention simultaneously, and that this occurs when participants are forced into a 
situation where a task can only be completed by tuning attention to equally prioritised features, 
Active VWM 
Goal B 
Search priority 
(background goal) 
Prioritised set of features 
Figure 37. Potential revision to the model if background VWM goals can capture attention concurrent to 
searching for a primary search goal. In this model, the features associated with two goals can be active at 
any one time in VWM, and this can result in involuntary attentional capture by these multiple memory 
representations. This may emerge under specific conditions, such as during a low perceptual load task (Tan 
et al., 2015). 
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although this requires more effort and is not the default search strategy (Grubert & Eimer, 2016; 
Irons, Folk & Remington, 2012). Additionally, there are some experimental conditions when an 
image stored in VWM can induce an involuntary capture to matching stimuli, despite these 
features not being prioritised as the primary target. The conditions when this occurs is in low 
perceptual load (Tan et al., 2015), when there is insufficient time to exercise cognitive control 
over the target selection (Han & Kim, 2009), or when the primary target is simple and repeated 
over multiple trials (Gunseli, Olivers & Meeter, 2016).  
Within Chapter 4, Experiment 2,wefound that a VWM representation of alcohol failed 
to induce attentional capture by alcohol distractors. The reason that this experiment did not 
produce evidence of background search goals may have been because it was perceptually 
demanding, and does not match the condition in which previous investigations have found that 
secondary VWM representations bias attention. To give a real-world example, we may be 
focusing our attention on our computer to do a task whilst thinking about how our phone may 
go off – if the computer task is perceptually complex and sufficiently engaging then only this 
attentional goal may drive attentional capture and the other VWM input may be suppressed; 
however, if the task is very simple and doesn’t require much attentional engagement then the 
background goal of thinking about our phone may cause attention to be captured by these 
associated features, despite attending to the computer being the primary goal. 
Interestingly, the conditions when this background VWM goal influences attention are 
also the conditions that motivational stimulus-driven or goal-independent effects are proposed 
to occur more strongly, with the tasks being relatively perceptually simple (e.g. Anderson et al., 
2011). I, therefore, propose that previous instances of goal-independent or stimulus-driven 
capture by goal. Motivationally salient stimuli could conceivably be accounted for by the 
distractor’s congruence with a background goal. This radical possibility would call into question 
whether any attentional capture by motivationally salient stimuli occurs independent of current 
top-down goals. Despite this position being extreme, there is some evidence to suggest that it is 
possible; for instance, Thomas, Fitzgibbon and Raymond (2016) found that a reward associated 
face was prioritised in VWM versus an unrewarded face, despite receiving the same attention 
during encoding. This result clearly suggests that by increasing the importance of a stimulus it 
also increases it’s priority in VWM. 
Additionally, holding an image of appetitive food active in VWM results in attentional 
orientation towards this image when it is a distractor in a perceptually simple visual search task; 
further, this distraction effect is larger when a food distractor is congruent with a food memory, 
compared to the distraction when a nonappetitive distractor was congruent with a nonappetitive 
memory (Higgs, Rutters, Thomas, Naish & Humphreys, 2012; Rutters, Kumar, Higgs & 
Humphreys, 2015). Therefore, more valued or important stimuli are more able to induce 
involuntary capture from VWM, versus less important neutral stimuli stored in VWM – at least 
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in a visually simple task. Therefore, these are the necessary conditions for top-down background 
goals to drive involuntary capture, 1) value associations causing the automatic prioritisation and 
maintenance of stimuli in VWM without instructions, 2) when a motivational stimulus is 
prioritised in VWM it results in a strong attentional capture by visually congruent stimuli. If 
future results confirmed that background goals to detect motivationally salient stimuli can drive 
involuntary capture, then this would result in a revision to the model depicted in Figure 35. It 
would require greater detail regarding the interaction between VWM storage states and the 
guidance of attention, as well as whether the importance and expectancy of the background goal 
can have a direct influence upon the prioritisation of these features enough that they can induce 
a concurrent involuntary attentional capture (see Figure 37). 
Finally, the investigation of the neural substrates goal-driven attention to motivationally 
salient stimuli. It may be that there is a potential interaction between prefrontal regions, which 
are related to the maintenance of visual search template, and the amygdala which is indicative of 
detecting motivationally relevant stimuli, especially threat (Cunningham & Brosch, 2012; 
Bishop, 2009). Indeed, recent theories of emotional processing have posited that lower level 
brain regions (e.g. amygdala) are tuned towards specific goal-relevant stimuli from higher level 
brain regions (e.g. prefrontal cortex; Markovic, Todd & 2014; Cunningham, Van Bavel & 
Johnson, 2008), meaning that the role that the amygdala has in detecting threat is more flexible 
than assumed by some models (Le Doux, 1995; 1998; Öhman, 1992). A potential way of 
investigating this in future would be to use fMRI in combination with the RSVP task used in 
Chapters 2 and 3. This may reveal amygdala activity only when the threat related distractor is 
congruent with the current search goal. 
 
Conclusions 
In summary, the findings across my thesis reveal that individuals typically believe that 
motivationally salient stimuli are important to detect and deserving of attentional priority. 
Further, we also found that across a wide range of reward and threat associated stimuli that an 
involuntary attentional capture could be induced towards these stimuli if they were congruent 
with the current search goal. we also found preliminary evidence that this was also true for self-
selected goals as well as instructed ones. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that a goal-
driven mechanism can plausibly account for capture by motivationally salient stimuli. Building 
on these findings, we have also developed a new Importance-Expectancy model of attentional 
goal selection. In this manner, my thesis advances current understanding of goal-driven 
attention, revealing it to be a process more complex than simply the following of task 
instructions, which is closely linked to motivation and can have both voluntary and involuntary 
consequences.      
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